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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the assessment, perception and insurance of credit
risk. The thesis aims to make contributions both within these areas, and at specific
points of interface between them. No attempt is made to develop a single unifying
thesis. Rather, a series of partial models are developed, both theoretical and
empirical, that develop and connect particular facets of financial economics.
The first model demonstrates how movements in market risk produce movements
in lender risk-assessment effort. It is demonstrated that deleterious movements in
market-wide risk can actually produce a fall in assessment effort. The capricious
nature of risk assessment causes changes in the lender's perception of the weights
placed on determinants. This has important implications for borrowers' attempts
to minimize risk premiums. Time-variability of signal-weights is tested using
structural break tests on ordinary least squares and fixed effects panel models.
Results suggest a fluid relationship between risk and determinants.
Central to empirical investigation is the measurement of perceived risk. A critique
of potential measures rejects the use of interest rate spreads - the most commonly
used measure - on the basis that they do not take into account the possibility of
credit rationing. A model is then constructed to reproduce the standard
explanation of credit rationing - Adverse Selection induced Credit Rationing
Equilibrium (ASCRE). This model is then extended to include classificatory risk
assessment. Assessment is found to reduce the scope for ASCRE, and to cause
favourable selection. Credit insurance is then included, and it is found that
insurance cover makes risk assessment less of an imperative to lenders, and
reduces the utility losses from raising interest rates. The parallel implication is that
credit insurance weakens ASCRE, to the extent that full insurance with flat-rate
premiums removes the possibility of ASCRE altogether. If the terms of insurance
are made contingent on the terms of the loan, a new form of credit rationing
emerges: Contingent Insurance induced Credit Rationing Equilibrium (CICRE).
CICRE is separate, but not mutually exclusive, to ASCRE.
A theoretical model of the demand for loan insurance is developed, and
empirically estimated, in the context of the UK mortgage market. Inter alia, the
model examines the role of auto-perception of risk determining credit insurance
demand. Results reveal the take-up of credit insurance to be relatively insensitive
to the borrower's perception ofhis/her own risk.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Assessing, Perceiving and Insuring Credit Risk
Mark Twain once described a banker as someone who 'lends you his umbrella
when the sun is shining and wants it back the minute it rains,.i Of course, it is
usually the lender's hope that the borrower will be able to return the loan at the
required time, whatever the weather. Unlike the use of an umbrella to protect
against the rain, however, the ability of the debtor to return the borrowed sum is
often directly contingent upon the success or failure of the very purpose to which
the loan was put. For an entrepreneur, repayment will be contingent upon the
outcome of the particular project for which the money was borrowed. For a
debtor country, it will depend on the success or failure of a whole range of
investment projects, plus a plethora of other micro and macro influences.
It is inevitable, therefore, that lenders will base their decision regarding whether or
not to lend, and the terms of lending, on some perception of the borrower's risk.
The degree to which this perception corresponds with reality will depend, at least
in part, upon the efforts and lengths the lender has gone to in establishing the
likely success of the borrower's intended project. Thus, an essential determinant
of the interest rate charged, and indeed of the decision regarding whether to grant
credit at all, will be the assessment of risk.
Even in the most favourable of circumstances, however, such procedures are often
too costly or too cumbersome to fully allay the lender's fears and so the lender
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will usually attempt to secure an arrangement which guarantees some cost to the
borrower and some remuneration to himself in the event of default. However,
even the existence of collateral may be insufficient to appease the lender,
particularly if he is averse to risk. An additional strategy for ensuring a profitable
outcome would be to ~ against the risk of default.
Insurers, of course, will have concerns of their own, particularly with regard to
whether the insurance cover will adversely affect the bank's lending decisions (for
example, by making risk assessment less of a necessity; or by encouraging the
lender to set interest rates at a level that will boost repayment revenues, but
discourage good risks). Thus, the insurer may attempt to ensure that the terms of
the insurance contract are designed in such a way as to positively influence the
lender's decisions in setting the interest rate and selecting borrowers.
The requirement to provide collateral, or the desire not to be blacklisted in future
credit applications, may mean that it is the borrower who initiates the purchase of
loan insurance, not the lender. Again, the percevtion and assessment of risk - this
time by the borrower with regard to his own risk - will be paramount in
determining whether or not credit insurance is purchased.
It is these issues-a nd their implications for existing theoretical and empirical
models-which form the substance of the thesis.
1.1.1 Defining terms
The terms that specifically need defining are risk, perception of risk, assessment of
risk, and credit insurance. In modern portfolio analysis, risk is defined simply as
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the variance of returns to an investment (see, for example, Ball et al., 1998). So a
project is said to have low risk if the variance of returns is small and vice versa.
The thesis will not look at the returns of specific projects-project returns are only
of relevance to the thesis in that the distribution of returns will affect the
probability of default on the loans used to fund these projects. That is, the
investor may only be able to repay the loan if the returns are above a certain
threshold. Therefore, holding other things equal, the greater the variance of
returns on a project, the greater the chance of default. 'Risk', for the intents and
purposes of the thesis, is thus taken to be synonymous with 'probability of default'
and with related phrases such as, 'risk of default'. Creditworthiness is simply the
probability of not defaulting (taken to be one minus the probability of default).
Note that I do not follow Knight's (1921, pp. 20, 226) distinction between risk and
uncertainty. According to Knight, risk applies only to situations where objective
measurements of probabilities can be computed, such as the probability of a
number occurring on a fair die. Uncertainty, on the other hand, refers to situations
where no objective classification is possible, such as the probability that Scotland
will win the next world cup. This distinction, however, has 'proved to be a sterile
one' (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992, p.10) because,
'It does not matter ... whether an "objective" classification, is or is not
possible ... even in cases like the toss of a die where assigning 'objective'
probabilities appears possible, such an appearance is really illusory. That
the chance of any single face turning up is one-sixth is a valid inference
only if the die is a fair one - a condition about which no one can ever be
"objectively" certain. Decision-makers are therefore never in Knight's
world of risk but instead always in his world of uncertainty.' (ibid.).
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All economic decisions are therefore based on the perception of risk: individuals
make decisions on the basis of the probability of an event occurring as they
perceive it. All probabilities are subjective as far as the user of those probabilities
is concerned. That is not to say that individuals do not have different levels of
confidence in the probabilities they ascribe to events. To return to Hirshleifer and
Riley's (op cit.) analogy of rolling a die, one would be more confident of one's
beliefs about the probability of a certain number occurring if one had information
on the frequency of the number occurring in all previous rolls of the die. One
could thus ascribe probabilities (also perceived), or 'levels of confidence,' to
one's own estimates of the probabilities of events occurring (similarly, there are
implicit 'levels of confidence' about one's estimates of 'levels of confidence' etc.
but I shall not explore the potentially infinite layers of uncertainty). Where there
is some financial loss or gain attached to the actual outcome of an event, (such as
a money-gamble on the die coming up with a six), there is a clear incentive to
acquire information about the event in order to increase one's confidence in one's
perceived probabilities. In the context of credit markets, this attempt to gather
information is called 'risk assessment' - a process central to most lending
decisions. One of the key areas of exploration in this thesis is the actual process
of risk assessment: how the level of risk assessment is determined (particularly
when there are costs involved) and how it affects credit rationing and insurance
behaviour.
There arises, therefore, two subtly different avenues of research into risk
assessment: (l) research done by lenders which attempts to estimate the credit risk
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of individual borrowers for the purpose of lending decisions; and (2) research
done by academics into how lenders arrive at these estimates. Rather confusingly,
the literature has labeled these two avenues: (1) 'analyses of objective risk', and
(2) 'analyses of subjective (or perceived) risk' respectively. The labeling is
confusing because, as I have noted above, there is strictly speaking no such thing
as objective risk - or at least, it is not knowable with total certainty, and so for the
purpose of economic decision-makers, it is a redundant concept. The labeling
does have a rationale, however, in that the first category of researchers are making
the measurement of objective risk their goal (albeit an unattainable one), whereas
the second category of researchers are really not interested in objective risk, but in
the behaviour of the first category of researchers and how they came to arrive at
those estimates. Thus they see the results of the first category for what they are:
i.e. subjective probabilities which may vary across lenders and over time, even
though actual risk remains constant. I shall discuss this terminology again when I
come to review the literature (chapter 2), but it is worth summarising how the
above nomenclature will be used in the bulk of the thesis:
• in the development of theoretical models, all probabilities of events
occurring will be assumed to be perceived: that is, all decisions by
economic agents are based on their estimates of those probabilities;
• objective risk will be used to refer to the goal of risk assessment and to
those academic studies which have this goal as the main motivation for
their analysis.
One would assume that the most obvious analytical framework for examining
decisions made on the basis of subjective probabilities is a Bayesian one, since
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this is the approach most commonly associated with perceived risk. In chapter 2, I
explain why this is not the case for the topics analyzed in this volume, and why I
have chosen not to use this framework. For the purposes of clarifying the use of
terminology, it is worth summarising the argument here before we come to it:
Bayesian analysis only adds to the understanding of a problem when it is possible
to measure the revision of beliefs based on new data. Where it is only possible to
measure lenders' a posteriori probabilities (i.e. those after new data has been
received) and not a priori probabilities (i.e. those before), or where it is one-off
probability estimates that we are analyzing (i.e. there is no scope for revised
belief), then the Bayesian approach reduces to (or adds nothing of substance to) a
classical probability approach.
Having explained what will be meant by the perception and assessment of risk, the
only core term that remains to be defined is that of insurance. This is simply:
indemnification taken out by the lender or borrower to protect against the
consequences of default.
1. 1.2 Partial Models
It was assumed from the outset of the research process that a single unifying
theory of all aspects and variants of credit markets was not a realistic or desirable
goal and so a strategy of developing a series of separate 'partial' models seemed
inevitable (hence the presentation of the thesis as a series of papers rather than as
a unified thesis). Note that even multiple models could not hope to capture all the
variants and aspects of credit markets; the handful of models developed here
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consider only a selection of queries and issues, each of which relate in some way
(if not directly) to the interpretation of each of the other models.
Although complete integration of the various models is not attempted, a degree of
synthesis can be achieved by considering the implications of, and connections
between, the separate models. This is discussed in the concluding chapter as a
means of drawing together the various strands of the thesis.
1.2 Plan and Aims
The thesis is comprised of nine chapters; an introductory chapter (I), a literature
review (2), four theoretical chapters (3, 5, 6 and 7), one purely empirical chapter
(4), one chapter with both theoretical and empirical analysis (8), and a concluding
chapter (9). The aims of each chapter are as follows:
Chapter Two: Literature Review
This chapter will aim to show how the models developed in the thesis relate and
contribute to their respective literatures. This will entail a review of previous
studies and explain the conceptual connections between the various elements of
the thesis. These connections include the effect of changes in market risk on
assessment effort, which in tum affects perceived risk (chapters 2 and 3). Credit
insurance is also shown to affect perceived risk via its implications for credit
rationing (chapter 4). Changes in market risk affect credit insurance take-up and
so this has credit rationing implications (chapter 5).
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Chapter Three: Heteroskedastic Risk Assessment Errors
The first model presented in the thesis examines the way in which fluctuations in
risk assessment effort may result in changes in the weighting of risk signals, even
though actual risk is constant. Chapter 3 provides a rationale for why risk
assessment effort might vary due to changes in market risk. It attempts to
demonstrate how movements in market risk produce movements in lender risk
assessment effort, and in particular, how deleterious movements in market-wide
risk can actually produce a fall in assessment effort. The capricious nature of risk
assessment causes changes in the lender's perception of the weights placed on
determinants. This has important implications for borrowers' attempts to minimize
risk premiums.
Chapter Four: Empirical Testiue Q,[Fluctuations in We;ellts
This chapter tests for movements in weights over time using a measure of
perceived risk of sovereign debt as the dependent variable. An important theme of
this chapter is the measurement of perceived risk and the problems with using
interest-spreads as an indicator of perceived risk, particularly with regard to the
effects of credit rationing which is an important indicator/consequence of lender
perceptions of risk. Time-variability of signal-weights is tested using structural
break tests on ordinary least squares and fixed effects panel models.
Chapter Five: ClassjficatolJ' Risk Assessment and Favourable Selection
This chapter examines the implications of classificatory risk assessment, where
the risk assessment procedure yields bands of risk rather than a continuum. It
begins by reproducing the S&W (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) result that raising the
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rate of interest causes adverse selection when there is no risk assessment,
providing a rationale for equilibrium credit rationing. The chapter then introduces
risk assessment and shows that differentiated interest rates, will always increase
the return on loans to a borrower of particular risk type. The chapter also shows
that risk-differentiated pricing can produce favourable selection, and how there
will exist an absolute limit for the optimal level of risk assessment. At this limit,
it is shown that there is no scope for ASCRE - Adverse Selection induced Credit
Rationing Equilibrium - the S&W source of credit rationing. (The two
subsequent chapters examine how the introduction of credit insurance produces
moral hazards for lenders and the possibility of a new type of credit rationing -
Contingent Insurance induced Credit Rationing Equilibrium [CICREJ).
Chapter Six; Credit Insurance, Perverse Incentives and Ration;n!:
Although a vast body of literature exists on the operation of credit and insurance
markets, apart from the considerable efforts in the literature devoted to analyzing
deposit insurance, relatively little has been done to examine interaction of the two
markets, particularly with respect to loan insurance. Nevertheless, loan insurance
is a large and pervasive industry, employed in a range of markets, from mortgage
insurance to Government initiated small firm loan guarantee schemes, and the
indemnification of balance sheet receivables. This chapter attempts to develop a
suitable theoretical model to examine the agency and credit rationing issues
associated with loan insurance. Loan insurance is introduced into the model
developed in chapter 5 and shown to reduce the utility gain from lending to lower
risks, with the corollary that insurance cover makes risk assessment less attractive,
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which is bad news for the insurer, given that risk assessment and risk pricing
result in favourable selection. In addition, a further moral hazard is shown to
exist, termed 'acute moral hazard'. This refers to the tendency for insurance to
reduce the utility losses from raising interest rates and so results in a higher
optimal interest rate, thus screening out good risks.
Loan insurance is also shown to weaken ASCRE (the S&W credit rationing
result), because flat rate loan insurance reduces the utility loss of lending to bad
risks, diluting the adverse selection effects associated with raising interest rates to
clear the market. Thus, when coverage is 100%, there is no utility loss from
lending to bad risks, and so no disincentive to raising interest rates in the event of
excess demand. In this situation, equilibrium credit rationing is not feasible,
irrespective of the level of information asymmetry between banks and borrowers.
I also show how insurance rationing is a feasible equilibrium outcome when
borrowers pay since raising premiums to clear the market increases the costs of
borrowing, having a similar adverse selection effect as raising interest rates.
Chapter Seven; Implications of Alternative Insurance Regimes
This chapter considers the effect of alternative insurance regimes on the credit
rationing results of chapter 6. A number of possibilities are discussed including:
loan insurance with flat rate premiums, where lenders pay the premiums; loan
insurance with flat rate premiums, where borrowers pay the premiums; interest
contingent insurance terms, where lenders pay contingent premiums and where
borrowers pay; loan insurance with contingent coverage; assessment of risk by
insurers; observable actions and knowledge of payoffs. One of the findings of this
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chapter is the result that contingent Insurance terms can cause a previously
overlooked form of credit rationing - contingent insurance induced credit
rationing equilibrium (CICRE) - which is different from ASCRE, but not
mutually exclusive.
Chaater Eight: Take-up WElat Rate Credit Insurance: Borrower Perceptions
This chapter considers how perceptions of risk are not just important in
determining the behaviour of lenders and insurers but also of borrowers since they
too face uncertainty. A theoretical model of the take-up of credit insurance is
developed where it is the borrower who pays the insurance premium. and this
model is estimated using data on mortgagors in Glasgow and Bristol. Estimates
are derived of take-up elasticities with respect to premiums, state provided
welfare, perceived unemployment/ill health risks and private cover. These
elasticities are important because they identify the factors to which the insurance
decision of mortgage borrowers is most sensitive. In particular, whether the state
safety net for mortgage borrowers affects the insurance decision in any significant
way (that is, whether it 'crowds-out' private mortgage protection insurance). Also
of interest is the sensitivity of take-up to 'auto-perception' of risk (the borrower's
perception of her own risk of ill-health and unemployment) the results of which
will be of interest because they will demonstrate the likely effects of movements
in market risk upon the prevalence of credit insurance. The chapter will also aim
to consider the extent to which rational economic incentives drive the decision to
take out insurance, compared with other factors (such as the timing of the
purchase decision, and ignorance of statutory changes).
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1.3 Categorisation According to Underlying Assumptions
One way of distinguishing/categorising the models presented in subsequent
chapters is by their underlying assumptions. The following table summarises the
models developed in the thesis by their title, purpose and assumptions. It can be
seen that the models revolve around the trinity of themes listed in the thesis title:
assessing, perceiving and insuring credit risk. The model developed in chapter
one assumes asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders (i.e.
borrowers know their true credit risk but lenders do not); borrowers to be risk
neutral and lenders to be risk averse; risk assessment produces estimates along a
continuum of possible default probabilities (i.e. borrowers are not classified into
broad risk categories) and these estimates become more reliable the greater the
risk assessment expenditure; there is no credit insurance; collateral is assumed to
be exogenous (i.e. borrowers and lenders do not vary collateral - to offset risk, for
example) and credit rationing only occurs if the expected profit from offering
credit is less than zero. The model developed in chapter five is also based on
exogenous collateral and information asymmetry, but this time risk assessment is
discrete - the greater the expenditure on risk assessment, the finer the
classification of risks. Chapter six extends this model to include credit insurance,
and chapter seven extends the model further by relaxing a variety of assumptions
(e.g. by allowing insurers to assess risk or to have knowledge of the lender's
payoff function). Chapter 8 assumes symmetric information between
borrowers/lenders/insurers, and assumes that borrowers are risk averse. Credit
insurance is paid for by the borrower and demand is determined by the borrower's
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perception his/her own risk. Collateral is implicit in the model, and both interest
rates and access to credit are assumed independent of whether or not the borrower
has credit insurance (Mortgage Payment Protection Insurance--MPPI).
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Table 1-1 Under/yingAssumptions o.fEconomic Models in tlte Tltesis
Model
and
Chapter
Title and Purpose Assumptions
Modell:
(Ch.3
and 4)
Heteroscedastic Risk
Assessment Errors
Purpose: •
to provide a rationale for the •
time vanance of signal •
weights
• Asymmetric information
Borrowers are risk neutral
Lenders are risk averse
Continuous risk assessment
No Credit Insurance
Exogenous collateral/punishment
strategy
No strategic credit rationing
Model 2:
(Ch.5)
Classificatory Risk
Assessment
Purpose: •
to examine the implications of •
non-continuous classification •
of risks following assessment
•
•
Model 3:
(Ch.6)
Credit Insurance •
Purpose:
to examine the moral hazard
and credit rationing
implications of credit
insurance
•
• Asymmetric information
Borrowers are risk neutral
Lenders are risk averse
Classificatory risk assessment
No Credit Insurance
Exogenous collateral
Model 4:
(Ch.7)
Alternative forms of Credit
Insurance
Purpose:
to examine the implications of
alternative insurance
arrangements
•
•
•
Asymmetric information
Borrowers are risk neutral
Model 5: Take-Up of Credit Insurance
(Ch.8)
Purpose:
to examine the borrower
decision to take out credit
Insurance
• Lenders are risk averse
• Credit insurance
• Lenders assess risk
• Exogenous collateral
• Asymmetric Information
Borrowers are risk neutral•
• Lenders are risk averse
• Various assumptions considered:
Insurer assesses risk .....
Exogenous collateral•
• Symmetric Information
• Borrowers are risk averse (lender
behaviour is not explicitly modelled)
• Demand for insurance contingent upon
borrower's perception of own risk.
• Implicit collateral
• Interest rate independent of whether or
not have MPPI
• access to credit independent of
whether or not have MPPI
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1.4 Summary
This chapter has provided an introduction to the thesis by defining the key terms,
categorizing the analytical models according to underlying assumptions, and
summarising the aims and structure of the thesis. I shall now go on to delineate
and overview the relevant literature before developing the main theoretical and
empirical models of the thesis.
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Notes:
j Quoted in CHRUS News (1996), Issue 3, February 1996, Newsletter of the Centre for Housing
Research and Urban Studies, p.l.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to provide an overview of four strands of literature, including:
(i) analyses of actual risk assessment (particularly applied empirical work in the
field of international sovereign risk - i.e. models of country behaviour); ii)
analyses of perceived risk (i.e. models of bank behaviour); (iii) analyses of. and
explanations for, credit rationing; and (iv) investigations into the nature and
consequences of credit insurance. Before moving to review these strands of
writing, it is worth saying something about the relevance of these strands to the
themes of the thesis, and how the particular avenues of reading were chosen.
2. 1. 1 The Chojce of Readjng
2.1.1.1 Actual and Perceived Risk
The first branch of literature is relevant to the thesis in that it sets the context for
perceived risk analyses. As discussed in Chapter 1, in analyses of objective (or
actual) risk, the focus is on borrower behaviour; in the analysis of perceived (or
subjective) risk, the focus is on lender behaviour and their attempts to model
actual risk. Although distinguishable, the two strands of literature are inextricably
intertwined and so it is not possible to consider one branch of literature without
reference to the other. Because the focus of the thesis is very much on the second
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strand, the choice of literature considered relevant to perceived risk will be used to
determine the boundaries for choosing the selection of readings from the first
strand. Choice of perceived risk analyses will in turn be driven by the choice of
credit market for empirical examination. Risk assessment is applied in some form
or other in just about every credit market. However, for the most part, these
procedures are something of a black box and it is not possible to observe lender
behaviour with regard to how they assess risk and how the assessment results
affect loan decisions. This is particularly true in credit markets where loans are
made to individuals or firms where data protection and confidentiality
requirements preclude academic investigation. Thus, in order for meaningful
empirical investigation and verification/falsification of theories of risk assessment
to proceed, a real life credit market situation has to be found which matches a
fairly demanding set of criteria.
First, it has to be a market where the same set of borrowers can easily be traced
over time; if this is not possible, then it will be difficult to identify whether it is
lender behaviour that is changing, or simply the pool of borrowers (i.e. it will not
be possible to disentangle heterogeneity of borrowers from other causes, as a
cause of variation in risk assessment procedures). Second, the perceived risk
results on each borrower, which arise from the assessment procedure, must be
publicly available, otherwise we shall have no measurable dependent variable in
our analysis. Third, data on the characteristics of borrowers must be widely
available, to the extent that the observer of lender behaviour can be reasonably
confident that he has at his disposal the same set of relevant information on
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borrowers as do lenders. Fourth, there have to be enough borrowers to constitute
a viable sample, and it must be possible to acquire a sample that is sufficiently
large and representative to reflect the characteristics of the population. Fifth, it
has to be a credit market in which there have been sufficient variations in market
risk to facilitate the examination of the impact of movements in mean risk on
lender behaviour (it will become apparent in chapter 3 why this is necessary when
I present a rationale for the time-variance of signal weights based on movements
in risk assessment investment driven by movements in mean market risk).
Given these fairly stringent requirements, the choice of credit markets suitable for
empirical investigation is rather limited. It also implies that the boundaries of
relevance of the literature will be clearly defined. It is my conclusion, that one of
the few credit markets to meet these criteria (if not the only one) is that of
sovereign debt. It is evident that this is a market where: (i) the same set of
borrowers (namely sovereign states) can be traced over time; (ii) lender estimates
of perceived risk are publicly available in the form of interest rate spreads,
secondary market prices, and country credit ratings (see discussion of the
dependent variable in chapter 4); (iii) data on the economic, debt, and political
characteristics of countries are readily available, at least in hindsight (the main
advantage that the lender has over the academic observer is that it can use its
substantial resources to obtain up to date estimates of these characteristics
whereas the researcher has to wait for official publication, which is not a handicap
if the researcher can be satisfied with historical analysis); (iv) there is data
available on a sufficient number and types of countries to ensure a representative
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sample, and the feasibility of tracing these borrowers over time means that data
can be pooled to avert degrees of freedom problems; (v) LDC debt crises and
cycles in world economic activity ensure variation in market wide risk.
It is not surprising, given the research-friendly nature of sovereign debt markets,
that much of the work on the analysis of risk assessment has been written in this
context. Thus, in practice, the stringent criteria listed above leave no shortage of
literature to be reviewed.
2.1.1.2 Credit Rationing
The third strand of literature (credit rationing) is chosen because of its relevance
to chapters 5, 6 and 7 of the thesis, which examine the links between risk
assessment, credit insurance and credit rationing. I will thus only give an
overview of the credit rationing literature (truly vast in its entirety) that is relevant
to the thesis, which is effectively confined to the theoretical explanations put
forward for equilibrium credit rationing (one of the innovations of the thesis is to
provide an additional theoretical rationale for the existence of credit rationing.
namely credit insurance with endogenous terms).
2.1.1.3 Credit Insurance
The final strand of literature to be considered is that relating to credit insurance,
which is relevant to chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the thesis. Because it is one of the aims
of the thesis to examine empirically the demand for credit insurance, as in the
choice of perceived risk literature, the credit insurance literature is selected on the
basis of finding a real life credit market with relevant characteristics. This implies
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constraints In terms of finding a market where data is readily available on
borrowers, the price of credit insurance, and on the loan characteristics. Because
most loan insurance procedures are even more of a black box than lender risk
assessment procedures, the shorter list of requirements is no less restrictive in the
choice of markets that are suitable. The process of elimination left two practicable
possibilities. First, the UK mortgage payment protection insurance (MPPI)
market; and second the UK Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS). In the end, the
selection was narrowed further to the choice from a set of one because the LGS
has already been extensively researched by Cowling (1995) and access to
appropriate data was not possible within the time frame of the research. Thus,
analysis of the demand for MPPI was selected as the optimal research path. Due to
the complete absence of empirical work on the take-up of MPPI in the existing
literature, this resulted in ground breaking work in this area (presented in chapter
8) by providing the first estimates of MPPI take-up elasticities.
2. 1,2 Gaps in the Literature
In the final section of this chapter, I will aim to highlight the main gaps in the
literature. It is the view of the author that the most striking gaps are not to be
found within the subject areas themselves, but between them. Although each of
these streams of research have become established subjects in their own right,
each has developed independently, and their paths rarely cross. Consequently,
although research in some of the areas has matured to the point of near saturation,
the interface between them remains undeveloped, and it is at this interface that the
present thesis aims to make progress (hence the eclectic nature of the thesis and
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the strategy of presenting it as a series of papers, rather than a single unified
thesis). The final section of this chapter, then, will point to the most obvious areas
of neglect of inter, rather than intra, disciplinary credit-market research, and
identify the particular gaps that this thesis aims to fill.
We shall now move on to consider the first relevant strand of literature: analyses of
actual risk.
2.2 Analyses of Actual Risk
The empirical literature on risk analysis can be divided into two broad groups: i)
direct (or actual or objective) assessments of risk determination, which are
essentially models of country behaviour; and ii) assessments of perceived (or
subjective) risk determination, which essentially model bank behaviour. Figure 2.1
gives a diagrammatic representation of the two distinct concepts. Starting from
debt, economic and political characteristics (depicted in the middle of the diagram)
these variables are assumed to determine the decision to default/reschedule. From
these observable outcomes, analyses of actual risk attempt to estimate the
relationship between default decisions and the characteristics of the country.
Analyses of perceived risk, on the other hand, do not examine the default decision
directly, instead they are interested in how the characteristics of country relate to the
lender's estimate of risk. They are thus concerned with the risk assessment
procedure of banks rather than the default decision of borrowers. The second class
of literature (analyses of the determination of perceived risk) has emerged because
there is no one commonly accepted equation that defines objective risk, nor is there
Gwilym B. J Pryce. 1999. Chapter 2: Literature Review 23----------------~~---------------------------------
one common equation used to explain perceived risk, and so questions about bank
behaviour and optimal risk assessment have emerged.
As we shall see later in thesis, the lender's assessment and perception of risk
feedback to the debt characteristics of the country because they determine the risk
premium and quantity of credit offered to the borrower (hence the connecting arrow
in the diagram between 'Subjective/Perceived Risk' and 'Debt Characteristics of the
Country').
2.2. 1 Accuracy of Risk Assessment
That the measurement of risk by the banking community is not exact, is supported
by the failure of the banking community to anticipate successive debt crises (such as
the sovereign debt crisis of the early 1980s and the UK house repossessions crisis in
the early 1990s; the subjects of chapters 4 and 8 respectively). The extent to which
bank assessment improves subsequent to such crises is questionable and certainly
does nothing to invalidate this assumption as no lender would claim error free risk
assessment. The credit market is thus generally perceived to be one of asymmetric
information: banks not able to observe the true risk of default. Indeed, some have
questioned whether the majority of banks use any method of systematic assessment
at all, relying instead upon qualitative assessment (Goodman, 1978), though most
would agree that risk assessment has become more sophisticated and quantitative
over time, indicative of the growth and wide dissemination of computer technology
(Hefferman et al. 1985a,b). There is also evidence (Goodman op cit.; Kutty 1990)
to suggest considerable variation between institutions at any point in time with
regard to risk assessment. Kutty (1990), for example, notes that, 'Some banks rely
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on a single yardstick, such as the debt service ratio, some others use check lists to
evaluate sovereign risks' (Kutty, 1990, p.I649).
Given this dichotomy between actual and perceived risk, it becomes immediately
obvious that even the sophisticated academic studies of sovereign risk are
themselves less than perfect and so arrive at measures which are still essentially
subjective. The distinction remains useful, however, in that it allows us to
distinguish between those studies which directly examine what determines the
decision to default/reschedule, and those which analyse the risk assessment
procedures of lenders. Some studies straddle the two categories of literature by
comparing their own estimates of objective probabilities with those of published
ratings, such as Balkan (1992), for example.
Although Hefferman (1986) provides a comprehensive review of the objective risk
literature up to that time, and most analyses of country risk since then have included
at least a brief review of the most salient literature, these reviews are either now out
of date, or have largely neglected the subjective risk assessment literature. So it is
worthwhile providing a brief survey.
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Figure 2-1
Relationships Between Country Characteristics, Actual Risk and Perceived
Risk
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2.2.2 Theoretical Foundations of Actual Risk Analvsis
On the whole, greatest emphasis has been placed on the influence of economic and
debt variables. This is partly due to the popular assumption that the decision to
reschedule is mechanically related to the economic and debt status of debtors; and
partly due to the difficulties involved in measuring political influences. However, it
is important that default is not seen (whether explicitly or implicitly) as a
mechanical outcome of a series of events, as Edwards (1984) and the other early
studies of objective risk, conceived it. Rather, it is 'the result of a set of decisions',
both on the part of borrowers and of lenders. Thus in considering the determinants
of 'default', lenders must consider factors which influence the willingness to repay,
not just variables which affect the ability to repay. The same can be said of
rescheduling:
'A nation's decision to reschedule its external debt reflects not only its
economic circumstances, i.e. its ability to meet its obligations, but also its
willingness to service these obligations. The latter reflects the political
environment of the debtor nation in that the decision to reschedule is a
political decision.' (Balkan, 1992, p.999).
Few studies have ventured so far as to include political variables in their analysis,
and of those which have, only a handful offer any comprehensive conceptual
framework to accommodate such influences, even though they have found them to
be of considerable importance in the determination of objective risk. This is largely
Gwilym B. J. Pryce, 1999, Chapter 2: Literature Review 27--~----~------~--------------------------------
because, with the exception of Alesina and Tabellini (1988), the impact of political
variables on risk was all but overlooked in the theoretical literature.
Most of the early theoretical literature was concerned with identifying and
explaining links between the factors which drive the long run growth of the
economy and factors which drive the size of debt and the decision to reschedule. In
the context of domestic debt, Domar (1944) identifies the debt burden as the
necessary tax rate to finance interest payments, when a government borrows a given
fraction of output each period. Examination of the after-tax income of non-
bondholders reveals that the link between the rate of interest on debt and the
growth rate of output is the key relationship in assessing the debt burden. In
extending this approach to external financial flows, Domar (1950) and Solomon
(1977), among others, traced out time paths of macroeconomic variables, and
compared the time paths of debt with income, or with debt service to income ratios.
From these comparisons they evaluated the sustainability of the predicted foreign
borrowing programmes. Provided the marginal return on investment exceeds the
real interest rate, no debt difficulties are foreseen. Bardhan (1967) draws similar
conclusions from more flexible neo-classical growth models, where foreign
borrowing is treated explicitly as a means of maximising utility subject to an
intertemporal budget constraint.
As Kharas (1984) notes, however, one of the main problems with the growth theory
approach is that it can not be subjected to straightforward empirical analysis. The
approach was unsuitable for analysing shocks to the system because there was 'no
clear identification of the process by which overborrowing can occur', (Kharas
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1984, p.416). For example, little indication was given of the viability of the growth
path if major price changes occurred which have the potential to reduce the mean
existing capital stock return, but raise the marginal return on new investment. Also,
rates of interest were generally assumed to be constant.
Contract Theory Approach
A more recent theme in the theoretical literature has been attempts to construct
equilibrium models which would give rise to a debt crisis (e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz,
1980, 1981). Such models usually construct an environment which has maximum
credit levels or limited enforceability, and attempt to model a game between the
debtor and creditor where it is usually advantageous for debtors to default at some
point. If periods of world recession posit an optimum time for default as far as
debtors are concerned, such models may go some way to explaining why defaults
tend to cluster. However, as noted by Citron and Nickelsburg (1987), it seems
unlikely that the wave of reschedulings that came in the sovereign debt crisis of the
1980s can be entirely explained as the outcome of an optimal borrowing strategy
conceived of from the moment the loans were agreed.
2.2.3 The Empirical Approach
Parallel to these various strands in the theoretical literature, an empirical thread has
emerged that has tended to stress 'the levels of macroeconomic variables at any
point in time rather than emphasising the parameters of the system as in the
theoretical approach' (Kharas 1984, p.416). These studies take account of the fact
that the impact of such shocks will tend to be contingent upon the levels of the
capital stock and outstanding debt (some also consider nature of the political regime
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in which rescheduling decisions are made, but usually estimation is done in absence
of theory).
The rationale behind estimating objective default probabilities is clear: a reliable
measure of sovereign risk would be of great value to the lending community as it
would provide a guide to the appropriate risk premium that should be attached to a
particular sovereign loan and provide an early warning indicator of default. Thus,
the academic literature has attempted to develop the most appropriate procedure for
estimating risk.
A number of fundamental problems have been encountered in these studies,
particularly with regard to measurement of the dependent variable. The great
majority of papers use methods that allow for a dichotomous limited dependent
variable, such as logit or probit so as to take advantage of the extensive data on
rescheduling. The aim is to,
'[gauge] a country's prospects of repaying the funds loaned to it' using 'a
variety of economic indicators, usually in the form of aggregate ratios' ...
These ratios are introduced into formal models which estimate an "objective
probability of default" for each country-case and classify countries into two
categories (rescheduling and non-rescheduling) in order to arrive at an early
warning model of debt-servicing difficulties'(Savvides, 1991, pJ09).
The problem here, however, is the precise definition of default. Eaton et al. (1986)
argue that most of the studies up to that point did not define what they meant by the
term. In a two period model default can be simply conceived as, 'whenever the
borrower gives to the lender less than the fixed amount that he is committed to pay'
(Eaton et al., 1986, p.483). But in a multi-period situation, the concept is more
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elusive: 'A default occurs whenever the lender formally declares that the borrower
has violated a certain condition of the loan' tibid., emphasis mine).
The concept is further complicated by the fact that the lender does not have to
declare the loan in default every time the borrower fails to meet scheduled
repayments. The contract merely provides him with the right to do so. Indeed, in a
multi-period situation, it is in the interests of the lender to attempt some type of
rescheduling agreement with the borrower, rather than accept outright default. In
fact, a loan may never be considered completely 'in default' since there always
remains some unknown probability that repayments may resume some time in the
future.
2.2.4 Measurement of Default
Ambiguity surrounding the definition of default has inevitably lead to problems
regarding measurement. During the period 1960 to 1990, only two countries have
actually been guilty of outright default: Cuba in 1961, and North Korea in 1974
(Balkan, 1992, p.l 000) and even for these countries, there will always remain some
probability that they will continue with repayments. As such, no dependent variable
exists for the required period which explicitly represents repudiation and so authors
have resorted to using the occurrence of rescheduling as a proxy. However,
rescheduling, defined as an agreement initiated either by the debtor or creditor to
redefine the terms or repayment (interest rate, grace period and maturity), may not
be a very good proxy for default and there is a case for keeping the two concepts
quite distinct.
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First, it is not at all clear that rescheduling of loans is necessarily a negative event
for the lender. Often banks can achieve an increase in the face value of the debt
through rescheduling by offering additional loans to ease current interest repayment
difficulties, but rarely offer any forgiveness of debt. Outright default, on the other
hand, has no obvious benefits for the creditor, hence the tendency of banks to prefer
endless debt-rescheduling over declaring the loan in default. (Either the creditor or
the lender can suggest rescheduling, but the ultimate decision to reschedule
remains with the debtor since the lender has little incentive to refuse new finance
if the alternative is default).
Second, there is the issue of debtor bargaining power, which although of little
relevance to the subject of default, may be of considerable importance in the
decision to reschedule. This dichotomy arises because there is an additional
variable involved in the decision to reschedule which is not involved in the decision
to default; namely the terms of rescheduling. These include the interest rate, grace
period and maturity agreed upon in the rescheduling contract. It has become
evident that there are substantial differences in the terms offered on rescheduled
loans to different countries, differences which have widened considerably since
1982. Larger middle income countries have managed to negotiate 'substantial
increases in maturities and reduced spreads' (World Bank, 1993, p.87). Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines and Venezuela, for example, have achieved
reschedulings with 15 to 20 year maturities and with spreads of 13/16 per cent
(ibid.; 13116 per cent is 0.8125 =13 divided by sixteen over LIBOR, which is
greater than the London inter-bank offer rate on US six month deposits). This
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compares with the much harsher terms of sub-Saharan African countries (Nigeria
excepted). Mozambique was offered 15 years maturity with eight years grace in
1987, but with a margin of 1-118per cent (i.e. 1.125 greater than LIBOR). Gabon
(in 1987) was given 10 years maturity, with five years grace, and a spread of 1-3/8
per cent. Smaller countries such as Gambia (1987) and Malawi (1988) did even
worse, receiving eight year maturities with 1 per cent margins (ibid).
Using a multinomial logit model Lee (1991b) has shown that country size
(measured in terms of GNP) and the absolute value of debt are important factors in
determining the terms of rescheduling. These differences, it is argued, inevitably
affect the rescheduling decision. If country A has a larger external debt and
greater economic clout than B, A's expectations of obtaining favourable terms are
likely to be greater than B's, and so it is reasonable to conclude that A will have
more incentive to reschedule during times of difficulty than country B, eet. par.
2.2.5 Confusion of Rescheduling and Default
Thus, rescheduling is quite different to default, and is not even a good proxy. The
latter cannot be viewed as simply an acute manifestation of the former.
Nevertheless, there is much confusion in the literature between the two, and a
number of authors speak of them synonymously (for example, Moghadam et al.,
1991, p.512; Citron and Nickelsburg, 1992, p.386). One of the few empirical
studies to offer explicit definitions of default and rescheduling is Kutty (1990).
Even so, his definition essentially equates default with rescheduling, and is not
consistent with the traditional theoretical definition (Eaton et al., 1986). Kutty' s
justification is that symptoms of repayment difficulties reflect the underlying
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likelihood of default. This assumption, as we have explained, may not always be
valid.
A further possible aspect of the importance of distinguishing between default and
rescheduling is that they are likely to require different policy responses. One of the
questions investigated in the theoretical literature is whether a country having
repayment problems is best helped by finance (i.e. new loans) or forgiveness (i.e.
reduction of the contractual value of debt). Krugman's (1988) view is that liquidity
is intrinsically linked to solvency since a country only encounters liquidity problems
if there are doubts about its solvency. If reschedulings are tied to illiquidity, and
illiquidity is linked to solvency, does this mean that reschedulings are linked to
solvency? If so, there may be a case for supporting the use of rescheduling as a
proxy for default.
The weakness of Krugman's argument is that it pivots on the assumption that
decisions to default or reschedule are solely dependent on the solvency and liquidity
of the country. In contrast, Eaton et al. (1986) argue that rescheduling and default
are the outcome of a deliberate decision, not the mechanical realisation of economic
forces. For this reason Eaton et al. (1986) emphasise their 'dissatisfaction with
models that simply take critical parameters of the economy as exogenous and by so
doing create a problem' (p.484). What these studies overlook is that a country can
reschedule or default without having liquidity problems or being insolvent. The
choice is based on an assessment of the costs and benefits involved. Costs will be
perceived as the net present value of the punishment threatened by lenders, usually
assumed to be the exclusion from the capital market after the time of default. The
Gwilym B. J Pryce. 1999. Chapter 2: Literature Review 34--~----~------~--------------------------------
exact exclusion cost will dependent on the circumstances involved, such as the
volume of international trade (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1980), the fluctuations of
unsmoothed consumption (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), and the restriction to capital
accumulation (Allen, 1983). Benefits of default, on the other hand, will be
evaluated as the net present value of outstanding debt obligations and interest
payments which would otherwise have to be transferred to the creditor if
repayments continue.
Furthermore, such choices are not made in a political vacuum. Each decision is
likely to be influenced by cultural and political factors as well as economic
variables. A distinction should also be made between the country and the decision
making body of that country, since governments may make decisions in their own
interests, but which are at odds with the interests of the country at large. For
instance, a government may choose to default in order to maintain its own political
stability (Citron and Nickelsburg, op cit.), or for the benefit of the social class it
represents (Alesina and Tabellini, 1988), but there is nothing to guarantee that either
of these decisions are in the long term interests of the population as a whole. This
fundamentally undermines the mechanical application of economic theory to
rescheduling decisions because the emphasis on the role of economic and debt
variables assumes that the incumbent aims to maximise the welfare of its citizens,
and so its behaviour is congruent with the optimisation principles of standard neo-
classical economic theory. When this assumption breaks down, the relationships
between rescheduling, default, illiquidity and insolvency become inevitably
ambiguous.
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Thus, in general the government will decide to reschedule (default) if and only if
UR ~ UN
where UR is the expected government utility from rescheduling (default) in each
period, and UN is the expected government utility from not rescheduling
(defaulting) in each period. The extent to which these utilities coincide with the
social welfare function of the nation is given by
T= (WR - WN) - (UR - UN)
where,
T transparency of the political system,
WJ social welfare function in the reschedule (R) or no-reschedule (N)
states of the world.
The value of T is contingent upon the incentive structure of the political process and
the quality of democratic representation. The extent to which they reflect
exclusively the standard measures of international liquidity and solvency depends
heavily upon the level of influence which political factors have in the decision
making process. Thus illiquidity and insolvency cannot be used to justify a
systematic relationship between rescheduling and default since the decision to do
either is only ambiguously related to the concepts of liquidity and solvency.
Interpretine the reschedulines
How then should reschedulings be interpreted? Eaton et al. (1986) offer a number
of definitions. One interpretation is that rescheduling is a another means of issuing
a long-term loan. This has a number of advantages for banks over explicit long-
term loans in that it gives the creditor 'more control over the borrower's
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indebtedness' (op cit. p.S10). Thus 'short-term loans may be employed even when
it is correctly anticipated that there will be high probability of a rescheduling' (ibid
p.SlO).
The conclusion is that, in the context of empirical testing, it is more accurate (but
less ambitious) to interpret estimates of 'risk' in discrete dependent variable models
as attempts to estimate 'risk of rescheduling' rather than the 'risk of default'.
Clearly, the consequences to lenders of rescheduling are by no means so
catastrophic as in the case of absolute default. As such, the rationale behind
estimating the risk of rescheduling is less forceful than that behind the estimation of
the risk of default; although authors have argued that reschedulings are costly and
de-stabilising, and as such banks wish to avoid them. Nevertheless, it is safer to
limit the conclusions that can be drawn from these models to those which refer to
rescheduling rather than to default. Moreover, if it is recognised that it is actually
the risk of rescheduling that is being estimated, it becomes a serious deficiency if
such a model does not at least attempt to include the influence of the expected terms
of rescheduling upon the decision to reschedule, since it is clear that these terms
influence the decision to reschedule. Few of the studies considered in this review
actually did this (the principal exception is Lee 1991a) and so we view this to be a
major weakness of the literature so far.
2.2.5.1 Estimation Method
As already mentioned, the methods of estimation applied have tended to be heavily
influenced by the nature of the dependent variable, particularly with respect to its
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dichotomous nature. From Table 2-1 it can be seen that the most common method
of estimation is logit, followed by probit and discriminant analysis. Although
simi liar, each statistical method will produce slightly different results (Maddala
1992).
Table 2-1 Estimation Methods in Analvses QJActuaVObjective Risk
Method Studies
Logit Kutty, 1990 (logit);
Lee, 1991a (logit);
Feder et ai., 1981 (log it)
Oral et al., 1992 (logit, G-logit)
Citron and Nicklesburg, 1987 (log it);
Probit Balkan, 1992 (probit)
Moghadam and Samavati, 1991 (probit);
Moghadam et al., 1991 (probit);
Kharas, 1984 (theory + probit);
Savvides, 1991 (simultaneous probit);
Discriminant Analysis Frank and Cline, 1977 ( Discriminant);
Taffler and Abassi, 1984 (Discriminant).
Multinomial Logit Lee, 1991b (multinomiallogit)
Generalised Logit Oral et al., 1992 (logit, G-logit)
Few authors have strayed from using one of the three principal approaches, the
main exception being Oral et al. (1992) who compare the performance of logit with
Generalised Logit (G-logit), based on algorithms developed by the authors
themselves, and found that under the given circumstances, the G-logit model was an
improvement on the standard logit model. Linear probability models have generally
been avoided because it is 'generally unsuitable when the dependent variable takes
o or 1 since there is no guarantee that predicted probability will lie within the
probability limit of 0 and l' (Kutty, 1990, p.1651).
The seminal paper which set the precedent for the application of dichotomous
dependent variable models to risk assessment was the article by Frank and Cline
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(1977) which used quadratic discriminant analysis to estimate creditworthiness.
More recently the paper has come under criticism because of 'the group overlap
between rescheduling and non-rescheduling cases causing a weak discriminatory
power of the model' (Kutty 1990). What makes the study unusual. however, is that
it was done before the debt crisis and so predated the subsequent flurry of interest in
sovereign risk.
Although discriminant analysis is less widely used in the economics literature as a
whole, Taffler and Abassi (1984) defend the use of discriminant analysis on the
basis that logit and probit techniques are not superior to the discriminant analysis,
particularly when continuous explanatory variables are used and 'where the groups
are well separated' (Taftler and Abassi, 1984, p.548).
Another important deviation from the standard risk estimation procedure is Lee
(l991b). This study hypothesises that borrowers become increasingly likely to seek
a debt rescheduling=-rather than risk the consequences of default-s-as the
probability of default increases. Lee goes on to make the assumption that increases
in the risk of debt rescheduling are necessarily indicative of increases in the
probability of default, although, as already stated, this assumption is questionable.
Lee separates commercial rescheduling cases into subgroups and constructs a
trichotomous multinomiallogit model accordingly. Dependent variable groups are
defined as follows, Y = 0 if no rescheduling; = 1 if 'pure' rescheduling; and = 2 if
'partial' rescheduling. 'Pure' rescheduling is defined as those rescheduling cases in
which a borrower managed to postpone its obligations, but failed to negotiate a
lowering of the terms of repayment; and 'partial' rescheduling is defined as those
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rescheduling cases in which a borrower does manage to negotiate lower debt service
obligations.
Lee's method of distinguishing between 'pure' and 'partial' instances of
rescheduling is to subtract the average spread on all new loans (NLS--new loans
spread) was calculated as the difference between the average interest rate charged
on all new loans to a particular country and the LIBOR on US six month deposits
during the rescheduling period. Data were obtained from World Bank (1993) in the
rescheduling year from the spread in the rescheduling agreement. This gives the CS
(comparison of spread):
RS
(Rescheduling
Spread)
NLS
(New Loans
Spread)
CS
(Comparison of
Spreads)
If the CS is positive, the rescheduling case is pure; if negative then the rescheduling
case is partial (That is: IfRS ~ NLS then Pure Rescheduling; !fRS < NLS then
Partial Rescheduling).
This method requires the calculation of the difference between the NPV (Net
Present Value) obtained using rescheduling terms (i.e. interest rate, grace period,
and maturity) and NPV obtained using the average terms on all new loans
contracted by the borrower during the agreement year. If this calculation produces a
negative figure, then that rescheduling case is 'partial'. In all but three cases (Sudan
in 1981 and 1982, Mexico in 1984), however, the NPV method produced equivalent
results to the CS method.
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These studies, although of interest in themselves, are relevant only indirectly to the
remainder of the thesis in that they provide the necessary context (rather than core
substance) to the perceived risk studies of sovereign debt, which are our main
concern. Because neither academic researchers, nor lenders, have agreed upon a
unified single approach to estimating default risk (Burton and Inoue, 1983), studies
have emerged which investigate the actual nature and process of lender risk
perception. It is to these studies that we now tum.
2.3 Analyses of Perceived Risk
It was noted in Chapter 1 that economic decisions are always in the context of
uncertainty and are inevitably made on the basis of subjective probabilities
(rendering the distinction between risk and uncertainty redundant). Thus, it is
contended that the papers described above as studies of 'actual' or 'objective' risk
are inevitably and intrinsically subjective because the estimates of risk calculated
by these authors, no matter how sophisticated and rigorous, are still estimates. As
in the tossing of 'fair die', one can never be objectively certain that the risk
assessment procedures involved are unbiased, exhaustive and appropriate.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned papers are distinct from what has become
known as the 'perceived risk' literature since the latter do not attempt to make
estimates of risk per se, but to analyse the determinants of lender perceptions of
risk. Since it is on the basis of 'perceived' or 'subjective' risk that lending
decisions are made (actual risk, as Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992, correctly stipulate,
is in the strictest sense merely a theoretical abstraction and never the basis of
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economic decisions) it is of considerable importance how these perceptions are
determined. In the words of Feder and Just, 'Lenders' behaviour ... depends
crucially on their subjective evaluation of the probability of default' (1980, p.12S).
However,
to explain lender behaviour, knowledge of lenders' subjective
information is generally unobservable; and empirical analysis of lending
behaviour is, therefore, difficult. Furthermore, there is often reason to
believe that subjective information may vary considerably from lender to
lender or from transaction to transaction because of previous experience,
personal relationships, etc; and, hence, the role of subjective perceptions
cannot be ignored'. (Feder and Just, 1980, p.12S).
2.3.1 TheAbsence of Baves
The above comment from Feder and Just goes some way to explaining why the
most obvious framework for analysing perceived risk--Bayesian statistics--has
not been applied in the sovereign debt context: namely, because of the
unobservability of key aspects of lender behaviour. Bayesian methodology only
adds to the understanding and modelling of decisions made under uncertainty
when the revision of beliefs in the light of new evidence can be explicitly
incorporated into the analysis. It is therefore clearly not relevant in the context of
the credit rationing models of chapters 5, 6 and 7 where the loan offer is a one off
decision in each case. The methodology would seem most appropriate in the
context of lending decisions where borrowers take out long term loans with
variable interest rates or where the same borrowers return for additional credit.
That this applies to the sovereign debt market suggests at first sight that Bayesian
statistics would be an appropriate method of risk estimation for international
lenders. There are four reasons, however, why Bayesian analysis has not been
applied in this thesis (and in the perceived risk literature in general):
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1. Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned not with deriving a robust estimate of the
default risk of each country (for which Bayesian statistics may be useful), but
with how lenders assess risk and the weights they place on determinants. We
are not interested in prior and posterior probabilities.
2. To apply Bayesian analysis we would have to attribute to lenders their
perceived prior probabilities. In the event, we only have data on lenders
posterior probabilities----measured by Country Risk Ratings. That is, we can
only observe the published perceived probabilities of default after risk
assessment has been completed in each period.
3. It is not possible to observe the relationship between new information and
revised posterior probabilities in subsequent periods because we do not know
what new information has caused the revision. We can only observe changed
posterior probabilities and infer changes in the weights that lenders place on
determinants, but we cannot say which new information in particular has
caused the change in weights. We can only draw the more general conclusion
that the change in weights has come about due to some change in the risk
assessment procedure.
4. The literature (for example, Hefferman 1986) suggests that lenders in fact
adopt a more classical approach to statistical risk assessment, rather than a
Bayesian approach, even if Bayesians (such as Phillips, 1973, p.69) have long
argued that the application of Bayesian methods is the only certain way of
rationally interpreting data.
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2.3.2 Nature of the Literature
It should be noted that the perceived risk analysis is distinct from the costly
monitoring literature (for example, Williamson, 1987) which assumes that lenders
'know as much as borrowers about the riskiness of the projects being funded, but
only the borrower is able to observe his project returns costlessly.' (Hillier and
Ibrahimo, 1993, p.276). The risk assessment literature, in contrast, assumes that
lenders are also asymmetrically informed about the risk, not just the return, on
loaned funds. Lenders are assumed to know less than borrowers about the riskiness
of the projects being funded, and lenders consequently undertake some form of risk
assessment to discover something of the borrower's true risk before lending.
Fortunately, many of the problems that surround objective risk estimation are not
encountered in the analysis of subjective/perceived risk. This is largely due to the
fact that, whilst subjective risk analysis is not without its problems with regard to
dependent variable measurement and definition, the difficulties encountered are by
no means so severe as those encountered in the conceptual minefield of using
rescheduling as a proxy for default. In contrast to objective risk analysis, models of
bank behaviour have a number of measures to choose from which could act as
dependent variables (see discussion in chapter 4).
Interest in the assessment procedures of lenders and in the determination of
perceived risk has arisen out of the apparent failure in a number of credit markets of
the banking community to anticipate repayment crises. Recent examples include
the 1992 repossessions debacle in the UK mortgage market (see chapter 8), the
ongoing Asian crisis, and the Third World Debt problem. Because of its
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amenability to empirical research (see the introduction to this chapter) much of what
has been written about perceived risk analysis has been in the context of the latter of
these credit market problems.
The determination of perceived risk is not just of academic interest, if for no other
reason, than that it has direct and profound financial consequences for borrowers.
If the risk premiums attached to loans are driven by lender perceptions, it is in the
borrower's interests to comply with the lender's signals of risk. If, however,
lender perceptions are not consistent over time, it will be difficult for borrowers to
identify how to maximise its perceived creditworthiness.
It has been argued (see Feder and Ross, 1982; Edwards, 1986) that banks
themselves had a significant role in the development of the sovereign debt crisis,
particularly with respect to their failure to anticipate the crisis, and the extent to
which, as a result, lending institutions over-exposed themselves to problem
countries. It could be even argued that if banks had successfully anticipated the
repayment problems of participating countries, much of the crisis could have been
avoided. Accordingly, a strand of empirical literature (Feder and Ross, 1982;
Edwards, 1986) has focused on what Savvides terms the 'subjective probability of
default' (Savvides, 1991, p.310). This probability is reflected in measures such as
the LIBOR spread, and published risk ratings such as Institutional Investor and
Euromoney. These studies have attempted to identify the factors which drive the
process of sovereign risk assessment and focus not on the behaviour of borrowers,
but on the conduct of the international banking community.
Gwilym B. J Pryce, /999, Chapter 2: Literature Review 45--~----~------~----------------------------------
There are two main questions of interest and relevance to this thesis: first. How do
banks assess risk? That is, what variables do they take into account before
calculating the creditworthiness of a country. This is discussed further in chapter 4
where a priori possible influences are categorised into three areas: economic, debt,
and political factors. Second, has their method of assessing risk changed since the
debt crisis? If so, how? In particular, how have they changed the relative weights
they put on these various factors? This is important because it has implications for
borrowers in terms of how they restructure their economies to maximise their
perceived creditworthiness. This is also the subject of chapter 4 and forms the
motivation for the empirical search for structural breaks in the relationship between
perceived risk and determinants.
Related to both these questions is the extent to which lender's assessment of risk is
distorted by bias and prejudice. Just as the state failure literature (Alesina, 1989;
Alesina, 1987; Brown and Jackson, 1990; Heald, 1983; Hibbs, 1977; Nordhaus,
1975) has critiqued the notion of the objective, disinterested policy maker, so too
assumption of risk assessment on the basis of purely objective and rational criteria
may be unrealistic. The judgement of risk assessors may be distorted by their own
political bias, prejudices and knee-jerk reactions. To what extent (and in what
direction) are banks influenced by whether governments are socialist or capitalist,
totalitarian or democratic, stable or unstable? What role, if any, does income
inequality and civil rights have upon risk assessment? Clearly answers to these
questions have implications for policy makers in developing countries and for the
ethics of country risk assessment. These non-cognitive aspects of the decision
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making process may thus dominate, or at least introduce bias to the empirical
assessment of risk. Consequently, any model of risk assessment must allow for
this.
2.3.3 Perceived Risk Literature
A more comprehensive discussion of the literature on perceived risk and
econometric modelling is given in the next chapter, and so what follows is a brief
summary. In contrast to the objective/actual risk studies, the perceived/subjective
risk literature is relatively undeveloped and some of these questions have yet to be
considered in any depth (for example, the issue of the determination of perceived
risk changing over time). This is indicative of the theoretically-lightweight nature
of the literature as a whole. There are exceptions, such as Feder and Just (1980),
who offer a theoretical basis for analysing lenders' perceived risk, but even here,
there are major theoretical shortcomings in the assumption that interest rate
spreads reflect perceived risk and do not affect the probability of default (these
issues are discussed in more detail in chapter 4).
Most studies are purely empirical and attempt to establish the relationship between
indicators of subjective risk and likely determinants. The dependent variable is
some measure of perceived risk, such as interest rate spread (Feder and Just, 1977,
1980; Haegel, 1980; Edwards, 1984; Gottlieb, 1989; Calvo and Kaminsky, 1991;
Rockerbie, 1993), or some risk rating composed from a survey of lender opinions
(Feder and Ross, 1982; Feder and Uy, 1985; Brewer and Rivoli, 1990; Cosset and
Roy, 1991; Seck, 1992; and Lee, 1993). One study (Balkan, 1992, p.999ft)
compares performance of these various measures (Institutional Investor,
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Euromoney, and International Country Risk Guide) with that of a probit model
constructed along the same lines as the objective risk studies.
Explanatory variables in these models include all measurable influences on the
lender's perception of borrower risk. However, if creditors do vary their level of
risk assessment according to the level of market risk (as suggested in chapter 3),
there may be implications for the validity of conventional econometric estimation
procedures (tested in chapter 4). Detailed discussion of these papers is given in
chapter 4, and so there is little to be gained from providing more detail here on the
variables and techniques used. It is worth noting, however, the main gap in the
literature which this thesis tries to plug in chapters 3 and 4. Studies of perceived
risk have invariably assumed a constant relationship between risk and determinants.
This is an important assumption in a number of ways. First, if true, it implies that
lenders set interest rates in a consistent way. Second, it means that borrowers have
a clear and fixed goal to aim for in terms of manipulating economic policy to
maximise creditworthiness and minimise the risk premium they face in international
markets. This assumption has not been seriously challenged or tested before except
in a very limited way by Thapa and Mehta (1991) who tested for a structural break
between the sample periods 1979-1981 and 1982-1983. They found that the Chow
test statistic was not significant, and so the null hypothesis that the two regressions
were the same could not be rejected. However, they did not test for structural
breaks across other time periods and only included a limited selection of
explanatory variables (with no measure of political stability). They also did not
consider any theoretical rationale for structural breaks. The aim of Chapter 3,
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therefore, is to provide a theoretical rationale for why the assumption of constant
parameters may not hold. Chapter 4 then attempts to test empirically whether
perceived risk parameters have indeed remained stable over time by testing for
structural breaks between a range of time periods.
2.4 Credit Rationing
Central to any empirical analysis of perceived risk is measurement. What
constitutes a reliable indicator of lenders' opinion of borrower credit risk? As
discussed above and in Chapter 4 below, the measure most commonly used has
been interest rate spreads. This has the obvious drawback of not picking up the
effect of credit rationing as an aspect of lenders' response to risk. Rather than
raising the interest rate on loans to a group of borrowers who are perceived as
becoming more risky, lenders may simply ration credit to this group. Hence
interest rate differentials may not have a consistent relationship with differences in
perceived risk. It is thus necessary to consider the literature on credit rationing,
particularly since an additional rationale for the existence of credit rationing is
offered in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Not all of the vast and sprawling literature on credit rationing is of equal relevance
to the core themes of the thesis. The main reason for the growth of interest in
credit rationing is the implications it has for a number of other fields, not least the
impact on the macro-economy, which has been discussed at length in the literature
(Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Baachetta and Caminal, 1996). The main concerns
of the macro effects of credit rationing are that during' episodes such as the Great
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Depression, developments in credit markets seem to have amplified output
fluctuations' (Baachetta and Caminal, op cit., p.l; see also Bernanke, 1983),
though systematic evidence on the link between financial factors and business
cycles is still tentative (Baachetta and Caminal, 1996). Given the potential
importance of credit rationing in determining macro variables, it is not surprising
that a large literature exists specifically devoted to this field. Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1993), Baachetta and Caminal (op cit.) provide dynamic general
equilibrium models where capital market information asymmetries exacerbate
output fluctuations. Because a number of surveys of the literature on the
ramifications of credit rationing already exist (Gertler, 1988; Lowe and Rohling,
1993), and since these ramifications are not per se the subject of this thesis, there
seems little to gain from providing an exhaustive review here. It is true that the
macro effects of credit rationing may be a source of feedback to the actual risk of
default, but this link is tenuous since the type of credit rationing considered in this
literature is primarily that faced by individuals and firms borrowing from
domestic lenders, not sovereign nations borrowing from external banks. Credit
rationing may still have adverse implications for the macro economies of these
countries, but not through the kind of transmission mechanisms developed in such
papers.
There has also been research which considers the impact of credit rationing on
specific markets (Leece, 1995, for example, examines the UK mortgage market),
but little has been done to explore the implications for perceived risk, and nothing
at all on the impact of credit insurance on credit rationing.
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Whilst the 'macro effects' literature is not directly relevant, studies which provide
a theoretical rationale for credit rationing are of interest, since one of the main
aims of the thesis is to proffer a new explanation for the cause of credit rationing.
Thus, it is worth spending some time summarising the 'explanatory' literature.
Again, a number of more than adequate reviews already exist (Clernenz, 1986;
Hillier and Ibrahimo, 1993) and so there is little to be gained from providing an
in-depth review, or from attempting to compare the various models within a
common framework (this has already been done by Clemenz, 1986). So what
follows is a review with enough detail to trace the development of the theoretical
credit rationing literature and to identify where the developments presented 111
chapters 5, 6 and 7 fit into the overall landscape of existing work.
It is worth noting, as an introduction, that although the ramifications of credit
rationing have been amply explored and tested for in a variety of directions, there
is only a small number of adequate theoretical justifications for the existence of
equilibrium credit rationing. Indeed, finding a sound conceptual foundation for
credit rationing equilibria has escaped economic theorists until relatively recently,
becoming something of a Holy Grail in the 1960s and 1970s.
The intractability arose from the surprising theoretical robustness, under the
assumption of full-information, of the traditional automatic adjustment
mechanism of the market. In most markets, a situation where supply does not
equal demand constitutes a position of disequilibrium. Hence, 'Conventional
economic theory has traditionally viewed market clearing and market equilibrium
as being one and the same' (Clemenz, 1986, p.15). However, the equivalence of
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market clearing and equilibrium is not inevitable; it is merely the consequence of
certain informational assumptions. If these assumptions are relaxed, particularly
in the case of credit markets, a non-market clearing position (particularly excess
demand for credit) is possible. Thus, equilibrium credit rationing is defined as
occurring where there are no net forces in the system to bring about change to
quantity or price, even though demand exceeds supply. For this type of credit
rationing to be a theoretical possibility, therefore, there has to be some explanation
of why it is not in the lenders best interests to raise the price of credit to clear the
market.
This has proved to be a more difficult goal to achieve than casual theorising might
suggest. The early attempts at solving this puzzle tried to find a solution within a
full-information framework and tended to examine what Clemenz (op cit., based
on Keeton's 1979 distinction) described as Type I rationing; that is, where 'some
or all loan applicants get a smaller loan than they desire at the quoted loan rate of
interest'. More recent models have tended to consider what Clemenz classifies as
Type II rationing: 'some loan applicants are denied a loan even though for the
bank they are indistinguishable from accepted applicants' (p.IS). It is the
possibility of credit rationing in the presence of perceived homogeneity of
applicants that has proved to be of most interest, hence the shift of emphasis
towards it.
Another characteristic of the early attempts to explain credit rationing was their
assumption that borrowers had different wealth endowments, and hence different
capacities to offer collateral. Studies which employed this core assumption
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include Hodgman (1960), Freimer and Gordon (1965), Jaffee (1971), Jaffee and
Modigliani (1969, 1976), Smith (1972), and Azzi and Cox (1976). These studies
attempted to show, for example, that the probability of default was greater for
larger loans and that this may lead the bank to restrict the size of loans to certain
borrowers. Clemenz, op cit., notes that a general weakness of these studies,
however, was a failure to explicitly model the demand side. When consideration
of demand was fully taken into account, it became impossible to demonstrate the
optimality (and hence potential for equilibrium) of rationing. Adjusting price or
offering separate prices to the different classes of borrowers, always proved more
profitable to the lender than restricting quantity. Clemenz concludes that 'the
older literature on credit rationing, though it offered some valuable insights, did
not provide a satisfactory explanation' (op cit. p.31).
Two more successful attempts at a theory of equilibrium credit rationing were
proffered by Cukierman (1978) and by Fried and Howitt (1980). Cukierman ' s
explanation pivoted on the assumption that lenders offer a range of services
besides credit, such as 'demand and time deposits, foreign exchange transactions
and in some countries like Israel even brokerage functions' (Cukeirman, 1978,
p.165, quoted in Clemenz op cit. p.31). By assuming that the demand for banking
services is an increasing function of the loan size, Cukierman showed that
customers with a lower propensity to buy banking services may be rationed if the
lender has to charge one loan rate to all borrowers. Fried and Howitt attempted to
apply implicit contract theory as a means of explaining credit rationing. By
assuming a volatile deposit interest rate (causing fluctuations in the loan rate) they
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assume that the lender insures risk averse borrowers by offering them a fixed
interest rate, and it is this implicit contract which (in certain circumstances) results
in credit rationing.
Both the Cukierman and the Fried and Howitt explanations had major weaknesses
of their own, however. In the Cukierman model, the weakness lay with the
uniform rate restriction: 'if the bank were free to charge different loan rates to
different clients rationing would not occur' (Clemenz op cit., p.33). The main
weakness of the Fried and Howitt model is that, following the onset of the loan
agreement, there is always an implicit incentive either for borrowers to attempt
renegotiation of the loan terms or for lenders to offer a lower interest rate,
depending on whether the fixed loan rate is above or below the deposit rate plus
administration costs.
A convincing rationale for equilibrium credit rationing did not really appear until
the development of the theory of asymmetric information. The seminal work of
Arrow (1968) and Akerlof (1970) showed how markets could radically deviate
from their conventionally ascribed patterns of behaviour when the traditional
assumption of complete information was relaxed. Arrow developed the principal-
agent framework, and refined the notion of 'moral hazard': the possibility that
where the preferences of principal and agent differ and where the principal's
knowledge of the agent's behaviour is less than complete, the agent may be
tempted to take actions which are sub-optimal for the principal. Akerlof's
contribution was to highlight the importance of adverse selection, which focused
on, 'the difficulty of distinguishing good quality from bad' which Akerlof argued
Gwilym B. J. Pryce, 1999, Chapter 2: Literature Review 54--~----~------~-------------------------------
was 'inherent in the business world' and may 'explain many economic
institutions' (1970, p.500). In his example of the second hand car market, Akerlof
showed how the buyer's lack of information on quality may lead to sellers of high
quality goods withdrawing from the market resulting in the fall in average quality
of goods on sale (i.e. 'adverse selection').
The first applications of these concepts to credit rationing were by Jaffee and
Russell (1976), and S&W. In Jaffee and Russell's model, borrowers vary with
respect to their costs of default, and from this they demonstrate that an increase in
the rate of interest may result in an increase in the share of defaulters. In S&W
borrowers vary by the riskiness of their projects, with risky projects being more
profitable. This means that good risks have a lower threshold interest rate and so
are screened out by a rise in the rate of interest. These applications showed how,
unlike conventional markets, a rise in price has a deleterious effect on the quality
of the lender's loan portfolio, and thus provided a possible incentive for lenders
not to raise the rate of interest to clear the market when there is excess demand.
This led S&W to conclude that,
'The Law of Supply and Demand is not in fact a law, nor should it be
viewed as an assumption needed for competitive analysis. It is rather a
result generated by the underlying assumptions that prices have neither
sorting nor incentive effects. The usual result of economic theorising: that
prices clear markets, is model specific and is not a general property of
markets - unemployment and credit rationing are not phantasms' (S&W,
p.409).
Since the S&W model will be reproduced and extended in Chapters 5, 6 and 7,
nothing more will be said about it here. It is sufficient to say that a number of
developments have been made since their paper, most notably the development of
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multi-period models, and the inclusion of endogenous collateral. The one-period
nature of the S&W model has been cited as an important weakness (Clernenz, op
cit.) and so attempts have been made to anticipate the effect of extending the
model to a multi-period framework. Clemenz (1986) makes some steps towards a
dynamic extension of the S&W model; a multiperiod version is attempted by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), and other developments have been made by Diamond
(1989), and Bester (1994).
One of the limitations of the theory so far, however, is that it has not taken into
account the effect of risk assessment or of credit insurance. The literature has
tended to assume that lenders' information set is fixed or exogenous, but most
lenders in reality have a choice of how much knowledge they choose to
accumulate on borrowers. Increased expenditure on risk assessment reduces the
pooling of risks and the asymmetry of information and hence reduces the moral
hazards and adverse selection that generates the S&W result. In that sense, the
common assumption in the literature is a heroic one. In addition to the option to
assess risk, both lenders and borrowers usually have the opportunity to insure
against the risk of default. Again, the implications of credit insurance for the
credit rationing results have been overlooked. It is therefore the aim of chapters 5,
6 and 7 of the thesis to rectify to some extent this omission and explore the impact
of introducing risk assessment and credit insurance into the S&W model. Having
already discussed the risk assessment literature I shall now review the insurance
literature which has emerged relatively independently.
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2.5 Credit Insurance
Most of the literature examining the relationship between insurance and credit
markets has been in the context of deposit insurance (McCulloch, 1985, Thomson
1987; Urrutia, 1990; Duan et al. 1992; Allen and Saunders, 1993; Kerfriden and
Rochet, 1993; Brewer and Mondshean, 1994, for example), and has tended to
apply Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing techniques to analyse the
incentives of flat rate premiums.' More recently, these techniques have also been
applied to the mortgage insurance market by Kau, Keenan, and Muller (1993); and
Kau and Keenan (1996). Deposit insurance and loan guarantees are viewed as
'put option[s] on the value of a bank's assets at a strike price equivalent to the
promised maturity value of its debt' (Keeley 1990, p.ll83). A number of
variations on the basic option pricing model have been developed, such as the
inclusion of catastrophic events (Kau and Keenan 1996) and of coinsurance and
adjustable clauses (Urrutia 1990). Other models have been developed based on a
risk-rated structure of insurance premiums that would vary with a bank's portfolio
risk (Scott and Mayer, 1971; Goodman and Santomero, 1986); Bayesian
graduation of mortgage insurance contracts (Herzog, 1983); and optimal mortgage
payment pattern models with uncertain future house values (Brueckner, 1984,
1985).
Although the option pncmg approach has the appealing quality of being
empirically testable, leading to estimates of appropriate premiums for insurance,
the assumption of perfect capital markets (which is essential to the analysis),
inhibits examination of the intricate incentive implications of information
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asymmetries. Brueckner's (1985) study is one of the few papers written prior to
the application of option pricing which aimed to develop a theoretical analysis of
loan insurance. He constructs a two period model to examine the mortgage choice
problem faced by borrowers in a world of uncertain house values: either opt for a
mortgage with a low LTV (loan to value ratio) and avoid insurance costs, or
choose a riskier mortgage, and pay the associated insurance premiums. Brueckner
shows that,
'borrowers who discount the future heavily choose risky mortgages
carrying high insurance premiums, while those who place a higher value
on future consumption opt for less risky contracts carrying low (or zero)
premiums' (Brueckner, p.129).
Brueckner's analysis has its limitations. however. Although loan to value ratios
still dominate most lender's risk assessment calculations, it is clear that it is by no
means the only determinant of default, and indeed the increasing use of
sophisticated credit scoring techniques reflects this. Even if borrowers are treated
primarily as consumers, as in Brueckner op cit., a great deal of the risk associated
with repayment arises from factors independent of LTV s such as future
employment status, future income flows, probabilities of divorce, death or ill
health. Moreover, many property purchase decisions are made at least in part with
some kind of investment motive. This may be a speculative motive (purchased in
the anticipation of making capital gains), landlord motive (purchased to earn a
rental income), or as some component of a broader entrepreneurial decision (such
as business/living premises for self employment). Where there exist investment
motives for borrowing, a general financial rule usually applies; namely, the
greater the return from the project if successful. the smaller the associated
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probability of success. (S&W, for example, assume mean preservmg spreads,
which is a special case of this rule. If higher return projects did not have
associated higher risks, then there would effectively be an arbitrage opportunity.
Thus in the housing market, any housing investments which do not follow this
financial rule must reflect a temporary state, and not one where the market has
adjusted and returned to equilibrium. Interest rate rises may also have a moral
hazard effect in the mortgage market by making borrowers more inclined to
purchase in areas with rapidly rising but more volatile house prices in the hope of
recapturing the increased costs of borrowing. Or it may induce borrowers to
locate in high risk employment areas, or purchase a dwelling more likely to have
structural faults, or buy in a difficult to sell locale, or locate somewhere further
from work making it more difficult to successfully maintain employment. The
greater the interest rate hike, the greater the gamble that borrowers may be willing
to take. Equally, it may screen out borrowers too risk averse to take these risks, or
induce good risks to take out smaller mortgages relative to high risks).
If the textbook relationship between risk and return exists in conjunction with
information asymmetries, then there will be a much broader range of implications
for, and from, loan insurance than simply those implied by variations in LTV sand
time discount rates. To highlight some of these implications, the model developed
in chapters 5, 6 and 7 assumes constant LTVs, and zero time-discount rates.
Thus, it is argued that studies which assume only uncertainty regarding future
events, and overlook possible information asymmetries, lack much of the richness
derived from more game theoretic approaches" that have been applied separately
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to the markets for credit and for insurance (such as Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976;
S&W; Eaton et al., 1986; Bester, 1985, 1987, 1994 inter alia). However, this
literature has tended to focus either on the problem of explaining equilibrium
credit rationing and other credit market paradoxes with the assumption of an
insurance free loans market (S&W; Bester, 1985, 1987; 1994); or upon insurance
as a market in itself (Rothschild and Stiglitz, op cit.).
A handful of papers have examined agency problems in the mortgage insurance
industry, but have done so by focusing upon the relationship between lender and
insurer, without modelling the borrower explicitly. (Mulherin and Muller 1988, for
example, describe an incentive conflict from loan insurance removing any
motivation to maintain and repair foreclosed properties; and Mulherin and Muller
1987 show how on a fully insured mortgage in danger of default, an incentive may
exist for lenders to actually encourage default rather than restructure the loan).
Thus, as far as the author is aware, no asymmetric information study to date has
examined the simultaneous interaction of both insurer incentives, lender incentives
and borrower incentives, and considered the implications of loan insurance for
lender decisions to offer credit, set interest rates, and assess risk. Thus, it is these
issues which the theoretical model presented in chapters 6 and 7 attempts to analyse.
Chapter 8 continues the theme of credit insurance, but focuses on a specific real-life
example, namely Mortgage Payment Protection Insurance (MPPI) in the UK, and
we shall postpone the discussion of the literature relevant to this market until then.
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2.6 Identifying Gaps in the Literature
It has already been indicated that the most obvious gaps in these literatures are not
within, but between. Thus, in this section, I attempt to summarise the areas of
neglect in the inter-disciplinary research alluded to above (each discipline falling
within the universal of 'credit market research'). However, to point out the
unresearched links between the different fields presupposes knowledge of what
these connections might be. Hence, an epistemological paradox emerges: the
delineation of areas of ignorance is constrained by ignorance of where the
boundary between potential knowledge and the unknowable actually lies. Because
we cannot know what we don not know, the construction of an exhaustive list of
under-researched connections between our four fields of interest is precluded. So
what follows is, by logical necessity, an incomplete list arising out of connections
made by the author whilst investigating each subject field. A small subset of these
identified areas of ignorance are the connections explored in this thesis.
I certainly do not make any claims, therefore, to have plugged all the gaps. For
one thing, ignorance of the gaps, as I have said already, precludes this. Also, some
gaps, even when they have been correctly identified, may be intrinsically
'unpluggable' because of the lack of data or because of the intractable nature of
the problem. Even the handful of gaps selected as the subject for the present
investigation are by no means plugged in any final or complete sense, they are
merely explored and initiated. What follows now is an overview of these gaps
and where the thesis attempts (if at all) to bridge the abyss.
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First, the thesis considers the interface between actual and perceived risk
assessment. Apart from Balkan (1992) comparison of the various risk ratings,
very little has been done to test why and how lender perceptions of risk may differ
from reality. Moreover, no study has considered the effect of movements in
actual risk on risk assessment effort and expenditure. One of the aims of the
thesis, therefore, is to demonstrate theoretically that movements in market risk can
cause changes in optimal level of risk assessment and that the relationship is not
necessarily monotonic (see chapter 3). The thesis also aims to empirically test the
implications of this hypothesis (namely, the time variance of perceived
parameters) using data on the sovereign debt market between 1979 and 1990 (see
chapter 4). In chapter 5 the thesis also considers how categorical risk assessment
can affect the selection of risks.
Second, the thesis considers the interface between analysing perceived risk and
credit rationing. The author is aware of only one study (Seck, 1992) which briefly
examines the implications of credit rationing for the analysis of perceived risk.
Credit rationing has profound implications for the observation and measurement
of perceived risk, because if credit rationing exists, it will result in perceived
creditworthiness being reflected in quantity as well as price. Chapter 4 will
discuss the measurement of perceived risk, and consider the implications of credit
rationing for the validity of popular measures of perceived risk such as spread
over LIBOR and published country risk ratings based on a surveys of lenders.
Third, the thesis considers the interface between credit rationing and insurance.
As far as the author is aware, no study to date has considered the possible
Gwilym B. 1. Pryce. 1999. Chapter 2: Literature Review 62--~----~------~--------------------------------
connections between equilibrium credit rationing and the terms of loan insurance.
As such, we attempt a new theory of credit rationing, based on the spillover
effects of asymmetric information in the insurance market on the market for loans
(see chapters 6 and 7).
Fourth, the interface between credit insurance and perceived risk will also be
considered in the context of the demand for loan insurance. Again, as far as the
author is aware, there is no published work which examines the link between the
take-up of credit insurance and the insuree' s perception of risk. Thus, in chapter 8
a model of Mortgage Payment Protection Insurance demand is developed in which
the borrower's decision to take out mortgage insurance is affected by his/her
perception of his/her own risk of ill health and/or unemployment.
Another aspect of the interface between credit insurance and perceived risk to
have remained untouched in the literature is the effect of the terms of the credit
insurance contract on lender incentives to assess risk. This aspect is considered in
the theoretical models developed in chapters 6 and 7.
Fifth, the interface between actual risk and credit insurance. Although a massive
literature exists on the moral hazards and adverse selection implications of deposit
insurance, no published work could be located on the perverse incentive effects of
credit insurance. This also will be considered in the models developed in chapters
6 and 7.
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2.7 Summary
This chapter has delineated and reviewed the literature relevant to the thesis. Four
main strands of literature were considered: assessment of actual risk; assessment
of perceived risk; credit rationing; and credit insurance. It was concluded that the
main gaps of research lie not within these fields but between them. As such, it is
at the interface of these four areas of financial economics that the thesis aims to
contribute. Although it should be emphasised that each of these contributions are
discrete---no attempt is made to develop a unifying theory that plugs all the gaps
in the literature. Instead, the thesis will offer a selection of models which connect
two or more concepts at particular points which have hitherto remained separate in
the literature (such as credit insurance and credit rationing). The next chapter will
develop a theoretical rationale for the time-variance of signal weights in a model
of perceived risk.
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Notes:
i For a flavour of the more general discussion surrounding deposit insurance see Kane (1993);
Barth and Bradley (1989); Barth et al (1991); Brickley and James (1986); Cebula,(1993); Diamond
and Dybvig (1983); Dowd (1993a,b); Flood (1992); Grossman (1992); Q'Driscoll (1988).
ii The disadvantage of the game theoretic approach, of course, is that it is less conducive to
empirical testing, and so many of the results of these papers are inherently unverifiable,
3 Biased and Heteroscedastic
Assessment Errors
And The Time-Variance Of Signal Weights
3.1 Introduction
The bulk of the empirical research into the nature of perceived risk has assumed
models with linear, time-invariant parameters. This approach is supported by the
fact that there are no immediately obvious a priori reasons to support variations in
the relationship between actual risk of default and its determinants/signals-any
changes can be modelled as one-off regime shifts by introducing intercept
dummies. However, there may be reasons to believe that the relationships
between perceived risk and determinants of default are subject to variation that
cannot be represented simply as intercept shifts.
This chapter aims to provide a rationale for the variability of coefficients in a
linear parameterisation of perceived risk. The chapter shows how fluctuations in
market risk (represented by changes in the proportion of bad risks) result in
fluctuations in risk assessment levels, and in the estimated linear parameters, even
though the true values of those parameters may be constant.
The chapter also shows how the optimal level of risk assessment will not
necessarily rise when market risk is rises. This is because the probability of the
bank setting an interest rate less than or equal to the borrower's reservation
(threshold) rate does not necessarily rise as assessment-error variance falls (for
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example, where the bias declines rapidly relative to the decline in the variance
when risk assessment expenditure increases). These results are of interest because
they highlight the possibility that risk premiums faced by debtors may vary even
though their actual risk is unchanged, and may even rise when their actual risk has
fallen.
That such results are important are supported by Brewer and Rivoli (1990, p. 357):
'The determinants of credit worthiness are of central importance because these
perceptions affect both the supply and cost of capital flows to developing
countries', and it is not only the availability of credit that is affected by perceived
risk, all forms of foreign direct investment are in jeopardy since country risk
ratings are widely available to international institutional investors.
Moreover, inconsistencies in perceived credit risk may distort the economic policy
decisions of the countries concerned. Aizenman (1989) has shown that for
countries with high levels of external borrowing, it may be optimal for a country
to restrict the private sector from borrowing abroad directly and for all external
borrowing to be done via the central bank, auctioning the available credit
domestically at a demand-determined price. This result, however, is contingent
upon international lending institutions having predictable, unbiased, and sound
judgements regarding the creditworthiness of the country. This paper shows how
a lenders' perceptions may, in fact, be fluid, driven by a complex relationship with
movements in market-wide risk. As such, borrowers may find it difficult to
identify the cocktail of economic policies that will minimise risk premiums on
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external borrowing because there IS no stable relationship between perceived
credit risk and determinants.
Before moving on to consider the details of the model, it is worth spending some
time outlining the background to the 'real life credit-market' which forms the basis
of the empirical analysis of the next chapter, namely the sovereign debt market of
the late 1970s and 1980s. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows:
following a brief summary of the debt crisis, previous perceived risk studies are
reviewed; then a theoretical model of perceived risk is developed which allows for
variations in risk assessment effort. The chapter concludes with a summary of the
model's findings.
3.2 Background to Sovereign Debt
Before the 1970s, financing to LDCs (Less Developed Countries) was generally
made through bonds or foreign direct investment (FDI). Lending to these countries
underwent a major institutional change in the 1970s as both international bonds and
FDI came to be replaced by bank loans (see Folkerts-Landau, 1985 for more details
of the emergence of the sovereign loans market). Many sovereign states were keen
to borrow in order to expand their capital base, with a view to building up
particular industries and developing new areas of comparative advantage.
Availability of credit allowed nations, particularly LDCs, to take advantage of 'off
the shelf technology' (Charbaji et aI., 1993, p.751). However, as Charabaji et al.
(op cit.) point out, borrowed funds often came to be used to finance current
expenditures or public borrowing requirements.
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Nevertheless, the responsibility for the LDC debt problem cannot be laid only at
the door of the borrowers, Lender behaviour and the credit-rich context of the
early 1970s explain much of the problem that was to follow. Growth of the
Eurodollar market arising from oil surpluses, resulted in a large increase in lending
to developing countries, particularly to Latin American and Caribbean nations, As
a consequence, the early 1970's saw an unprecedented growth in commercial bank
lending to developing countries to the extent that commercial banks became the
principal source of finance for many LDCs (Hefferman 1986). Not only were banks
extremely keen to make large-scale loans on the principle that 'countries never go
bankrupt' (Citicorp Chairman Walter Wriston, quoted in Sachs 1989 p.8), but LDCs
were also eager to take advantage of the negligible, even negative, real interest rates.
Moreover, as Sachs (1989) notes, during the 1973-79 period, the export proceeds of
some developing countries boomed, enabling the borrower to finance its debt out of
export earnings rather than its own resources. Banks had become not so much
concerned with debtors long run ability to repay (which they took for granted), but
with their ability to meet immediate interest repayments which had become such a
lucrative source of bank revenue. Poor screening of bad risks resulted (Charbaji et
aI., op cit., p.751).
By the mid-eighties, the perceived creditworthiness of many LDCs deteriorated
considerably. The total debt of Latin American countries doubled between 1980
and 1987 (from $242.7 billion to $445.4 billion), but the dollar amount of the debt
rescheduled increased over 100 times, from $782 million in 1980 to $123.5 billion
in 1987 (Moghadam et al. 1991, p.Sl0). While slightly more than three-tenths of
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one percent of the Latin American debt was rescheduled in 1980, almost 28 percent
of the debt was rescheduled in 1987.
The main causes of this reversal of fortunes for the sovereign debt market were the
effects of two simultaneous global shocks at the end of the 1970s. First, the rapid
fall in export earnings of LDCs following the inception of a world recession.
Second, there was a rapid rise in interest rates, which came as a result of developed
countries tightening their monetary policy with a view to controlling inflation (see
Sachs, 1989, p.7). The full implications of these shocks were not realised until 1982
when a major debtor, Mexico, announced that it could no longer meet its
international financial obligations (Edwards, 1986). This announcement on Friday
13th August 1982 marked the beginning of the worst international debt crisis since
the Great Depression. What was initially thought to be an isolated case of temporary
illiquidity, soon spread to most of the developing world, destabilising the whole of
the international financial system.
As well as being an event of tremendous social and political significance, the debt
crisis has also proved to be a unique opportunity to observe the factors that
influence default and the changing behaviour of banks with respect to their
assessment of country risk. Hence the emergence of a substantial literature
surrounding the analysis of country risk over the past twenty years. A contributing
factor to the burgeoning of academic interest was the apparent failure of lenders to
anticipate the debt crisis as a whole and their apparent ineptitude at gauging
individual borrower creditworthiness. Many creditors based their loan decisions on
simple financial ratios (such as the debt service ratio) qualified by essentially
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subjective judgements regarding the economy and political risk. Lenders tended to
consider some of the relevant characteristics of countries, but overlooked others
(Edwards 1984).
In the event, few countries actually defaulted outright, which is surprising given
the absence of collateral or legal enforcement of loan repayment. Eaton and
Gersovitz (1980, 1981) suggest that in the market response to the absence of a
legal institutions able to enforce sovereign debt agreements, is to threaten
exclusion from future international capital, and it may be this threat which has
proved to be the major long term deterrent to default.
Although widespread default did not materialise, the debt crisis has continued, in
the sense that, external debts of some of the world's poorest nations continued to
accumulate during the 1980s and 1990s. Many LDCs have taken on further loans
just to keep up with interest payments. The plight of these countries has recently
returned to the public eye following the work of the pressure group' Jubilee 2000'
which has campaigned for widespread debt forgiveness by the end of the
millennium - 'Jubilee' relates to the Theonomic system of the Old Testament in
which all debts were forgiven and all land returned to original owners every fifty
years. i It is unlikely that the year 2000 will incur such extensive forgiveness for it
to be classified as a true 'Year of Jubilee' but, at the time of writing, there has
been initial steps taken towards an agreed strategy of staggered forgiveness
towards the most impoverished borrowers, potentially achieving a significant level
of debt relief for the countries concerned. ii
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3.3 Review of Previous Perceived Risk Studies
Saini and Bates (1984) highlight two main criticisms of statistical analyses of
country risk. First, they tend to, 'exclude all social and political factors which
give rise to debt repayment problems or (refusal), (Saini and Bates, p.353), and
second, they preclude the possibility of 'structural shifts over time in the
parameters of predictive equations.' (Saini and Bates, p.353). With regard to the
effect of political risk, more recent studies (Citron and Nicklesburg, 1987; Oral et
al., 1992; Balkan, 1992) have included political variables, but the assumption of
constant coefficients has remained. It is generally assumed that this can be
justified on the basis that fundamental economic connections between risk and the
determinants/signals of risk remain constant. Saini and Bates (op cit.), however,
question this assumption, particularly where risk analysis is being applied to
debtors undergoing rapid economic and political change:
'Given that the economies of developing countries and the international
environment in which they trade and borrow are undergoing rapid
transformation, the use of equations derived to minimise errors in
explaining past debt service problems may be of limited use in forecasting
such events' (Saini and Bates, 1984, p.353).
However, it is possible that the effect of regime shifts may simply be captured in
intercept shifts, with no fundamental change in slope parameters. Moreover, were
political variables to be included in formal risk analysis, such upheavals could be
controlled for, leaving the underlying economic connections unchanged.
However, even with these caveats in mind, the constant parameters assumption
may have little substance in the context of perceived risk analysis (i.e. the lender's
perception of the debtor's creditworthiness). A possible driver of movements in
Gwilym B. .! Pryce. 1999. Chapter 3: Biased and Heteroscedastic Assessment Errors 72
parameters may be risk assessment effort - fluctuations in the expenditure on risk
assessment may cause shifts in parameter estimates.
Before exploring this avenue more thoroughly it would be helpful to review the
literature on perceived risk. Analyses of perceived risk have tended to fall into
two categories: i) the survey approach and ii) the econometric approach. These
shall now be considered in turn.
3.3.1 Survey Approach
A number of attempts to examine how banks assess risks were published during the
period of interest (late 1970s to 1990). This typically involved the use of survey
analysis: a selection of banks being sent a questionnaire or interviewed regarding the
techniques used for risk assessment. Three well known studies which took place in
the context of sovereign loans during this period include: Goodman (1978; survey of
37 EXIM banks which accounted for half the sovereign loans made by us banks),
Burton and Inoue (1983; survey of 25 banks in 1980 using a combination of
questionnaire and interview, II of which were US banks), and Hefferman et al.
(1985a,b; survey of27 US, European, Middle Eastern, Asian and Australian banks).
Both Hefferman et al. (1985a,b) and Burton and Inoue (1983) found that most banks
employ a flexible approach to the frequency of risk assessment. In particular,
Hefferman et al. found that 26 per cent of banks 'regard their policy as flexible in
that the frequency of reviews rises with perceived risk and/or exposure' (Hefferman
et aI., 1985b, p.37). This confirmed the Burton and Inoue finding that risk
assessment reviews were taken at a fairly regular frequency unless economic or
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political events prompted a more frequent update. Changes in the frequency of
reviews have important implications for the relationship between the cost of risk
assessment and the level of perceived risk. Assuming that risk assessment becomes
more expensive the more frequently reviews are undertaken", and assuming that the
frequency of review is a function of perceived risk, then a general rise in the level of
bank risk assessment, will imply a rise in risk assessment costs, eel. par. The reverse
should also be true, provided the unit cost of each risk assessment does not change
overtime.
Another important finding of the surveys is the change in sophistication of risk
assessment, particularly during the debt crisis. There is a marked difference between
the earlier findings of Goodman op cit. (only 11 per cent of the sample used a fully
quantitative approach, 62 per cent followed a 'structured qualitative approach', and
14 per cent had no systematic system at all), and those of Hefferman et al. op cit. (all
respondents indicated that they used 'one or more of the systematic approaches to
country risk, that is, they use something other than an ad hoc method in assessing the
creditworthiness of a country', Hefferman et al., 1985b, p.38). Moreover, 22% of
the respondents to Hefferman et al.'s survey (carried out in 1984) indicated the use of
statistical models, compared with only 3% in Goodman's study. Although such
comparisons must be interpreted with care, particularly when the samples vary so
much between studies, they do indicate some evidence of a trend towards the
adoption of increasingly sophisticated risk assessment techniques over the late
seventies/early eighties period (Hefferman, 1986, p.68-69).
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3.3.2 Econometric Approach
Most econometric studies of credit risk have been analyses of objective, rather than
perceived risk, usually involving some form of dichotomous dependent variable
technique to predict the likelihood of a country, firm or individual defaulting on a
given loan (examples include, Frank and Cline, 1977; Feder et al., 1981; Kharas,
1984; Citron and Nicklesburg, 1987; Kutty, 1990; Lee, 1991a,b; Moghadam and
Samavati, 1991; Moghadam et al., 1991; Savvides, 1991; Oral et al., 1992; and
Balkan, 1992 - the earlier studies are reviewed in Saini and Bates, 1984). A
number of studies have, however, attempted to model the factors which drive
subjective or perceived risk assessment, which is the concern of the current chapter.
In this case, the dependent variable is a measure of perceived risk, such as the
spread over LIBOR (Edwards, 1984; Feder and Just, 1977; Haegel, 1980; Gottlieb,
1989; Calvo and Kaminsky, 1991; Rockerbie, 1993), or some risk rating composed
from a survey of lender opinions" (Feder and Ross, 1982; Feder and Uy, 1985;
Brewer and Rivoli, 1990; Cosset and Roy, 1991; Seck, 1992; and Lee, 1993).
Explanatory variables include what the author believes to be the key measurable
influences on the lender's perception of borrower risk. However, if creditors do
vary their level of risk assessment according to the level of market risk, as
suggested in this chapter, there may be implications for the validity of conventional
econometric estimation procedures.
Most empirical studies of perceived risk use panel data to estimate an equation of
the form:
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where,
dil perceived risk;
"OJ = vector of perceived weights (the coefficient parameters which the model
would attempt to estimate);
Sit = vector of signals/determinants (i.e. the data matrix).
Examples include Feder and Just (1977~ata on 27 countries for eight quarters
between 1973 and 1974), Haegel (198~20 countries over four years), Edwards
(1984--19 countries over five years), and Rockerbie (1993-27 less developed
countries and 14 developed countries over seven years). In pooling the panel data
these authors implicitly assume that the both the coefficients and intercept term
remain constant over time, which is equivalent to imposing the restriction that
signal weights are time-invariant. The only paper to date that has actually tested
whether coefficients are stable over time is the perceived risk study of Thapa and
Mehta (1991) which tested for structural break between the sample periods 1979-
1981 and 1982-1983. They found that the Chow test statistic was not significant,
and so the null hypothesis that the two regressions were the same could not be
rejected. However, they do not test for structural breaks across other time periods
and only include a limited selection of explanatory variables (with no measure of
political stability - see discussion in Chapter 4). Although variation in risk
assessment does not necessarily imply variation in signal weights, it does suggest
that coefficients have the potential, if not the likelihood, of changing between
periods.
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A similar problem arises with studies which use time series data on a single country
or individual, such as Gottlieb (1989, data on Israel for 1971 to 1983), since they
also assume constant coefficients. Simple fixed effects models of the form,
which allow the intercept to vary across time, may still be inappropriate since
individual slopes, and not just intercepts, may change during times of crisis. I now
go on to present a theoretical rationale for why estimated perceived risk parameters
may change over time.
3.4 Theoretical Model
There are n types of investor i, where i = 1, 2, ... n, each with the opportunity to
invest in a project requiring a fixed amount of capital, K. Lenders in turn specify
a common punishment strategy C, and charge interest rate r, on each loan.
Investor i's project succeeds with probability I-di yielding the positive return RSi;
and fails with probability d, yielding zero return, where higher risk projects
receive a higher return: 0 < d, < d2 < ... d; < 1 and K < RS} < RS2 < ....< RSn.
Lenders know the structure of the borrower's payoff function, and the relationship
between R'f; and d; It is further assumed that the interest charged on deposits is
unrelated to the terms of the loan, and that the lender uses a common systematic
risk assessment procedure for all borrowers in period t.
In general, default risk for borrower i is assumed to be determined as follows:
d, = d;(Sk;, (J)k) where Ski E S;, and S; E S.
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where Ski are signals/determinants of risk and ffik are weights. There is a
potentially large number of commonly observable signals Ski (normalised indices
reflecting economiclbehavioural characteristics of the borrower and/or project),
and weights ffik that should be attached to each signal, although for sake of
exposition, we shall assume only two signals and two weights. Lenders have to
make some estimate of ffik to achieve an estimate of default probability. Their
estimate of default risk is, however, subject to error even though lenders have
perfect knowledge of Ski due to imperfect information regarding the relationship
between d, and Ski.
3.4. 1 Risk Assessment
Indices, S/i and S2i, reflect the economic/behavioural characteristics of the
borrower, and are normalised such that 0 < S tt. S21 < 1. Assume further that there
are unique values of SI and S2 for each i, and that actual default risk is determined
by a single parameter OJ, such that,
d, = cos), +(l-m)s2i, [1]
where O<m < 1. Risk assessment procedures produce a unique estimate of default
risk dj
A for each i. These estimates are subject to two sources of random error: (1)
a general procedural error term arising from the inadequacy of the systematic risk
assessment common to all loan applications and resulting in bias and variance in
the estimated parameters; (2) that arising from borrower heterogeneity represented
by the individual-specific error term 8;, which arises because of the inability of the
assessment procedure to cope with borrower heterogeneity.
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Thus, the lender can observe Sf and S2, but is faced with the problem of estimating
the weights, roA• It undertakes risk assessment for each risk type, and for that risk
type comes up with a unique estimate of d, based on a common set of perceived
weights, ro Ak, from its estimation procedure,
[2]
where,
"ro=ro+y [3]
and r is the general procedural error term which has a cumulative probability
distribution denoted by G(y), with associated probability density function g(y).
This distribution has mean 1', and variance if. If C; is the expenditure on risk
assessment, then it is assumed that,
if to < 0, [3.1]
Lui = l.ul(C;), I J11'(c;) < 0.
Thus both the variance and absolute mean of yare negatively related to risk
assessment, as is the variance of &, where & ~ XeD, ¢J/), and ¢J? = ¢J?( C;, di), ¢J? '(0
< D. Substituting [3] in [2] yields,
[4]
3.4.2 Borrowers
Assume that there is no price searching on the part of borrowers, so that they
accept (or reject) only the first offer (this is equivalent to assuming that lenders
have monopoly positions in their respective markets)." Borrowers' expected
returns are given by,
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where r, is the interest charged to i on the basis of risk assessment. It is assumed
that the entrepreneur of type i only takes out the loan if,
[6]
The corollary of these two expressions is that for each i E1 there exists some
threshold level of risk, di#, below which it will not be worth the investor applying
because the costs of borrowing for a given rt exceed the returns if successful. This
follows on from equations [1] and [2] which imply that the actual threshold
interest rate is given as a function of risk and return,
(Cd) 1'ill = R'; - 1- ~ K - 1
I
[7]
3.4.3 Lenders
Risk neutral lenders are assumed to maximise perceived profits tp with respect to risk
assessment expenditure S,
r = maxr (J;if) If!; - S)
where,
[8]
where !ViD is the bank's estimate of ND; NiO= 0 if r, > rs i ; and B the deposit
rate. If r, 5 r# i then all applicants accept the loan offer and NiD = N, Clearly
the ideal interest rate to charge i would be r, = r# i. Above this level, revenue
from lending to i is zero, and below it, borrowers of type i enjoy a surplus (i.e.
borrowing below their reservation price). It seems reasonable to assume, then, that
banks will set r, equal to their perception of i's reservation price, r"#i; although,
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equivalent results are achieved with the weaker assumption of a positive
relationship between r#i and r/\#i
Similarly, the lender's estimate of r.« is given as a function of perceived risk and
perceived return:
[9]
Given that there is a one to one relationship between RSi and d.; and that the lender
knows the precise nature of this relationship (assumed for simplicity to be R.I·i =
qdi), it follows that the lender can impute i's return if successful, s"; based on its
estimate of default risk, Ii:
[10]
Because the bank bases the interest rate charged to i on its estimation of i's
reservation price, which in tum is driven by its estimation of i's default
probability, it can be seen that NDiis not exogenous but determined as follows:
NDi=PiNi [11]
where Pi = Pr(r#i ~ ri) and it is assumed that the bank knows N, or has some
perception of it based on previous risk assessment. Using equations [9] and [II]
to substitute out r/\#i and N Di in the profit equation [8] gives:
[12]
3.5 Capricious risk assessment and weight variation
A key question we wish to answer is whether the optimal level of risk assessment
(; remains unchanged, rises or falls as market risk increases (an increase in
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market risk is denoted by an increase in N2 relative to N/, where d, < d2). From
the first order conditions, C; is given where a'l1ac, = 0, and so it can be seen that
aQaNi = j[alaNi (ap/ac,), alaNi (ardi - d2 )Iac,)], indicating that the optimal level
or risk assessment is indeed contingent, inter alia, on market risk. It can be seen
that this has an ambiguous sign because 8p;l8C, has an ambiguous sign (see the
example below).
This suggests that the optimal level of risk assessment will vary with market risk,
but not necessarily rise when market risk rises. This is because the probability of
the bank setting an interest rate less than or equal to the borrowers reservation
(threshold) rate does not necessarily increase as assessment error-variance falls
(for example, where the bias declines slowly relative to the variance when risk
assessment expenditure increases).
3.6 The Example of Normally Distributed Procedural Errors
To illustrate the ambiguity of sign of ap/ac" consider the case where G(y) is
normally distributed and where individual specific errors, 5;, are zero. To
reiterate, Pi = Pr(li :2: ri) is the probability that the lender will not overestimate the
borrower's threshold interest rate. Given the above assumptions, it can be written
as,
= Pr((di (q-c-q di)lk(l-di) - d, (q-c-q di))/(k(l-di)):2: 0)
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= pr(d;(-C+q-d;q) _ (d; +ys;)(-c+q-q(d; +ysJ)J.
(1- dJk (1 - d , - ys;)k
If this is solved for y then the probability can be written as,
= G(a).
where a is the value for y implied by the threshold rate of interest (in other words,
if Y:::;a, the loan offer is accepted). Solving yields a = -(c - q + 2 d, q - d/ q)/(q
s, - d, q Si) and,
Pi =G(-(c-q+2diq-d/ q)/(qsi-diqSi)).
Now if Pi = Pr(y:::;a) = G(a) and G(a) ~ Nell, d) where d '(S) < 0, and / Ji/'(S) <
0, then ap/ix, = aG(a)/a~ = j{d '(S),/ Ji /'(S)). The effect of increased risk
assessment on Pi will thus depend upon the combined effects of the concomitant
fall in the error-variance and error-bias, and their impact on effect on G(a). It can
be seen from the equation for aG(a)!8s that the combined effect has ambiguous
SIgn,
Notice that the sign of this expression depends upon the sign of the mam
parenthesised term in the numerator, which (because alpha is small) depends upon
the sign of the first and last terms within the parentheses: -2cr\t' + J.lcr2,. Note
from [3.1] that if the mean is negative then J.l' > 0, and if it is positive, J.l' < 0.
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Thus the sign of aG[ a]l a(, is ambiguous. If Il is large relative to 0'2 and/or Il' is
small relative to 0'2" then aG[ a]l a(, is negative.
This argument is depicted graphically Figures 3-1 and 3-2 which show how the
area under the curve to the left of the vertical line y = a (assuming a normal
distribution of errors) does not necessarily rise as variance and bias fall. In Figure
3-1, the bias declines slowly relative to the decline in variance as risk assessment
rises, and the area under the curve to the left of a decreases monotonically.
However, from Figure 3-2 it can be seen that if the bias declines rapidly relative to
the variance as risk assessment rises, then the area under the curve to the left of a
may actually rise. The corollary is that the probability of setting an acceptable
interest rate (i.e. one no greater than the borrower's reservation rate) is not
necessarily improved by bolstering investment in risk assessment.
Note that if we were to assume a constant zero mean for the error term (i.e. no
bias in risk assessment), and examine the effect of changes in risk assessment on
d.; then the ambiguity in the impact of risk assessment would not arise because the
sign of aX[ a]1 a(, would always be positive: assuming normally distributed
individual specific errors with zero mean we have,
which is small but positive since 4>2,[(,] < O.
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3.6. 1 Likelihood of Risk Assessment Causing a Fall in the Probabilitv of a
Loan Offer Being Accepted
Given the counter-intuitive nature of the result described above, one has to ask
what is the likelihood of it occurring. The answer is bound up with the relative
sensitivities of the variance and bias to changes in risk assessment. If there is bias
in perceptions of borrower risk, to what extent does more risk assessment mitigate
that bias? If the source of the bias is due to prejudice (such as the political or
racial preconceptions of lenders), then the lenders' views may be robust to
increases in risk assessment expenditure and only the variance may decline with
any pace. If, on the other hand, the source of bias is purely statistical/procedural,
and if the risk assessment is sufficiently transparent and objective to allow new
information to influence all previously held beliefs, then there is no reason why
the bias (ifit exists) will not decline at a similar rate to the variance.
Note also that the bias could well be positive rather than negative. In other words,
as risk assessment increases, the distribution in Figure 3-2 could well shift rapidly
to the left as risk assessment rises and the variance declines. This would, of
course, have the effect of causing rapid decline in the probability of a loan offer
being accepted-Prey ~ a). Also, the bias may decline rapidly at first, but
stabilise as it approaches some level, whereas the variance may decline more
steadily and for longer (and vice versa).
So, there are at least 5 possible scenarios: (1) zero bias; (2) non-zero bias that is
unresponsive to risk assessment; (3) positive bias causing rising risk assessment to
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increase the probability of loans being accepted even if variance declines slowly;
(4) the bias declines more rapidly than the variance only for certain ranges of risk
assessment expenditure; (5) bias declines more rapidly for all or most of the range
of values for risk assessment expenditure. So although it is an interesting
theoretical possibility. it is one that may well not dominate real-life decision
making. Given its counter intuitive nature, it is also unlikely that lenders conceive
of the possibility in their risk assessment strategy: that is, they may assume that as
risk assessment expenditure increases, there is always an increase in the
probability that they have charged the appropriate interest rate (i.e. one that is just
low enough to make it profitable for the borrower to accept the loan offer).
Nevertheless, the theoretical feasibility of the reverse being true only highlights
the ambiguous nature of the relationship between perceived risk and risk
assessment.
3.6.2 Effect 00 Weights
I have shown that S* will change as market risk changes, although the relationship
may not be monotonic. Now, given that o/' = to + y, a change in the distribution of
ywill affect the expected value of (j)". Note that this is the case even when the true
value of the parameter co remains constant. So, if changes in N; result in changes
in S*, and changes in S* affect the distribution of r (by reducing both the bias and
the variance), it follows that changes in market risk will cause movements in the
expected value of (j)", despite the relationship between actual risk and the
determinants of risk remaining constant. This result is important because it
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suggests that the risk premiums faced by debtors may vary, even though their
actual risk is unchanged, and may even rise when their actual risk has fallen.
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Figure 3-1: Movements in the Distribution of the Procedural Error Term, r. as
t;;Rises: The Case where the Mean of r Declines Slowly Relative to the Decline
of the Variance ofy.
a y
Figure 3-2: Movements in the Distribution of the Procedural Error Term, r. as
t;;Rises: The Case where the Mean of r Declines Rapidly Relative to the Decline
of the Variance ofy.
a y
Notes for Fi~yres 3-1 and 3-2:
Ify ::;a then the loan offer is accepted. Thus, the probability. Pi, that the loan is accepted is
represented by the area under the curve to the left of the vertical line y = a. The figures show that
whether this area increases or decreases with ~ depends upon whether the mean ofy declines
rapidly or slowly relative to the variance ofy as ~ rises.
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3.7 Summary
This chapter has examined how fluctuations in market risk can result in changes in
risk assessment and shifts in estimated risk parameters. It has examined what
happens when risk assessment errors are not white noise (zero mean and constant
variance), but biased (non-zero mean) and heteroscedastic (variance varies). A
brief literature review demonstrated the prevalence of the assumption of constant
parameters in existing studies. Then a theoretical model was developed which
assumed both the bias and variance to be negatively related to the level of risk
assessment expenditure, and this model was used to demonstrate how the optimal
level of risk assessment will change as market risk changes.
It was shown, however, that the relationship between risk assessment and market
risk is not necessarily monotonic. Risk assessment investment may fall when
market risk rises, and rise when market risk falls. This is because the probability
of the bank setting an interest rate less than or equal to the borrower's reservation
(threshold) interest rate does not necessarily rise as assessment-error variance falls
(for example, where the bias declines rapidly relative to the decline in the variance
as risk assessment expenditure rises).
If these errors relate to the estimates of signal weights themselves (as in the model
described) and not just the final estimate of actual default risk, then the
movements in the error distribution brought about by changes in risk assessment
will result in shifts in the estimated weights, even if the true values of these
weights remain constant. The corollary is that it is possible for a borrower's
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actual determinants/signals of risk to remain constant, and for the true values of
signal-weights to remain constant (and hence for true default risk to have
remained constant), but for the lender's estimates of those weights to have altered,
and hence, for perceived risk to have altered.
In summary, I have shown how movements in market risk over time can feed
through to changes in risk assessment expenditure over time, which in turn result
in shifts in the perceived risk-parameters over time. These results are of interest
because they highlight the possibility that risk premiums faced by debtors may
vary, even though their actual risk is unchanged, and may even rise though their
actual risk may have fallen. The results also challenge the assumption of the
existing literature that parameters of perceived risk remain constant over time so
long as the relationship between actual risk and determinants remain constant.
Changes in risk assessment can cause these parameters to change irrespective of
the actual relationship and so there is no reason to believe that parameters of
perceived risk are time invariant.
It should be noted that a possible adaptation of the theoretical model presented in
this chapter would be to apply it to the setting of interest rates on existing loans,
where if r is set too high, the borrower defaults. The corollary would be that rand
perceived risk become two distinct entities, the former being an important cause
of the latter. Because of the effect of interest rates on the probability of default, it
is possible that in a situation of excess demand for credit, lenders may choose to
ration credit, rather than raise the rate of interest to clear the market. Although
credit rationing was not explicitly explored in the model presented in this chapter
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(our focus has been on perceived and actual risk), credit rationing is considered at
some length in subsequent chapters, although in a slightly different modelling
framework (i.e. one where risk assessment classifies risk into categories rather
than the risk continuum produced by the risk assessment in this chapter). In
chapter 4, for example, I consider the implications of the existence of credit
rationing for the empirical modelling of perceived risk and, in chapter 5, the
possible effect of risk assessment on the existence of credit rationing is also
examined. It should be noted that the credit rationing model developed in chapter
5 is due not to moral hazard, but to ASCRE-Adverse Selection induced Credit
Rationing Equilibria-as expounded in S&W. The implications for measuring
perceived risk are the same, however, as those of a model in which credit
rationing arises because of moral hazards. In chapters 6 and 7, a new form of
credit rationing is introduced-CICRE- 'Contingent Insurance induced Credit
Rationing Equilibria', which does not depend on adverse selection or harrower
moral hazard, but rather on the terms of the loan insurance and the behaviour of
lenders.
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Notes:
i For a Christian commentary on the debt problem, see McKee (1991).
ii see Eichengreen and Lindert, 1989; Sachs, 1989; and Bird, 1989 for more details on the historical
development of the debt problem
iii particularly since both the Hefferman et al. [1985a,b] and Burton and Inoue [1983] studies found
that specialised staff are usually employed for the task.
iv Seck (1992) argues that the latter is preferred because interest rates alone do not take account of
S&W type credit rationing which may be a key response of lenders to risky borrowers.
v this assumption is included in order to simplify the analysis. Although the assumption is not
entirely realistic, there is little to be gained from introducing, for example, an endogenous
probability that a borrower finds a lower priced loan elsewhere, since the results of capricious risk
perception remain intact.
4 Empirical Testing of Fluctuations in
Weights
4.1 Introduction
Having, in the previous chapter, provided a theoretical rationale for volatility in
perceived risk, this chapter goes on to attempt empirical verification. Direct
comparison of perceived and actual risk is not possible (at least within the
confines of the available data) because it would be necessary to have complete
knowledge of the actual risk of borrowers, which indeed (as we outlined in
Chapter Two) has been the holy grail of much empirical work, particularly in
sovereign debt markets. The problem would come when we attempt to compare
our estimate of actual risk with perceived risk. The primary perceivers of risk (i.e.
lenders) will have used the very techniques we would be using in our estimation to
arrive at their perception of risk (see Hefferman, 1986, p.29, and discussion of
determinants below). So in effect, our comparison would highlight differences
arising, not from actual vs. perceived, but from 'Ql!I economic' model vs.
'lenders' economic model'; 'Ql!I perceptions' vs. 'lenders' perceptions' .
Consequently, discrepancies would be driven by disparities in risk assessment
efforts, and not necessarily by differences between actual and perceived.
Therefore verification of the theory would be undermined by the prime mover of
the theory itself, namely risk assessment effort. In short, it is impossible to test
whether differences between actual and perceived risk have any systematic
Gwilym B. J Pryce, 1999, Chapter 4: Empirical Testing of Fluctuations in Weights 93
variation by controlling for movements in actual risk, because actual risk cannot
be measured.
Despite these epistemological problems, it is still possible to test whether there is
evidence, in a real-life credit market, that the perceived weights placed on risk
signals fluctuate significantly over time. If we employ the assumption that actual
weights - reflecting the relationship between actual risk and the determinants of
actual risk - remain stable (an untestable though not unreasonable assumption),
then measured fluctuations in perceived weights would imply that a borrower's
true risk, and his risk as perceived by the lender, do not necessarily move in
perfect tandem over time.
Practicalities of research require further assumptions to be made, including: (i)
that our model of perceived risk is determined by the same factors assumed to
drive lender estimates of risk (i.e. that there are no important omitted variables in
our model of perceived risk); (ii) that the relationship between risk (both
perceived and actual) and determinants, can be approximated using a linear
formulation; (iii) that it is possible to measure perceived risk reliably. The third
of these assumptions is of particular interest and will be discussed in more detail
below with regard to whether interest rates can be used as a measure of perceived
risk, given the theoretical developments in the credit rationing literature that were
noted in chapter 2. (In subsequent chapters, it is demonstrated that credit
rationing is a complex phenomena, arising not only because of motivations
highlighted by S&W but also because of credit insurance, the demand for which is
contingent upon the borrower's perception of his own risk (chapter 8».
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The implications of the research presented in this chapter are important because
the access to credit, and the interest rate available to a borrower, will be driven by
lender estimates of perceived risk, which in turn depend on the perceived weights
placed on determinants of risk. The further perceptions of risk diverge from
actual risk, the further the equilibrium price and quantity of credit diverge from
efficient market allocation. Furthermore, if the relationship between estimated risk
and the determinants of risk is volatile, then attempts by the borrower to
manipulate these determinants to maximize the market's perception of it as a
creditworthy borrower, will be frustrated.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: first the basic econometric
model is outlined, considering in particular the appropriate structure of regressions
and diagnostic test for parameter change over time. I then go on to discuss the
measurement of variables, discussing in some detail the problem of measuring
perceived risk. Regression results are then presented, followed by tests for
parameter stability. The chapter concludes with a brief summary and discussion
of results.
4.2 Econometric Model
The Econometric simulation will attempt to estimate a model similar to equation [2]
in the theoretical model (see chapter 3), but will include a larger number of signals.
No attempt will be made to suggest a priori which signals are bogus and which are
true. The model will also include a constant term and allow the weights to vary
over time. Hence, the model estimated is given by,
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"
I-dit =WI +W2S2it +W3S3it +W 4S4it + Uil o :S d'l :S 1 \j i, t.
" "I-dit =WSit +Uit;
where,
d; perceived probability of default;
S2i( a vector of debt signals;
S3;1 a vector of economic signals;
S4;1 a vector of political signals;
W,. where v = 2, 3, 4 = vectors of perceived weights for debt, economic, and
political signals respectively; and v = 1 is the intercept term. These are the
coefficient parameters which the model aims to estimate;
w = [ WI' W2, W,' w4];
Slil
Sit
S2il=
S'il
S4il
Slit = 1 Vi. t.
Note that there are no restrictions on the values of the variables except that the
dependent variable is between zero and one. Note also that the circumflex accent
over the dependent variable does not represent predicted values from the estimated
econometric model, rather, it represents (as in the theoretical model) a measure of
bank perception of country risk.
This model translates into a simple OLS regression on a pooled sample of 43
countries over 12 years. This regression is also run on a variety of subsamples to
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test for structural shifts in the parameters over time to test for time-variance of
signal weights. The null hypothesis for such tests is:
H A A0: W",= W"/+I v v> 1,1
Provided F,;', has a significance level less than 0.05, then we can be 95%+ confident
that the null is rejected, where.
F' _ (RSSR - RSSI!)/ r
dfu - RSS / dt.
II 'lu
where RSSR = restricted residual sum of squares = RSSnl + RSSn2,
RSSu = unrestricted residual sum of squares = RSSnl+n2
sub-samples, such that nl + nz = full sample.
A second category of regressions include fixed effects models of the form:
o s d, s 1 V i. {
which allow the intercept to vary over time to account for any movement in the
perceived risk relationship. Again, these regressions will be run on a variety of
samples and ANOV A used to identify time-variance of signal weights.
4.3 Dependent variable
Existing studies have employed three main measures of perceived risk: (i) interest
rate spread; (ii) secondary market prices; and (iii) country risk ratings. Not all
measures are equally robust, however, and some of the problems associated with the
choice of dependent variable have been overlooked in the literature. Each of these
Gwilym B. .J. Pryce, 1999, Chapter 4: Empirical Testing of Fluctuations in Weights 97
variables will now be discussed in the form of a critical review of the associated
literature.
4.3.1 Interest Rate Spread
The majority of perceived risk studies have used either spread over LIBOR
(London Inter Bank Offer Rate) or some other measure of interest rate spread as
the dependent variable - i.e. as a measure of perceived risk. This is partly due to
the desire to explain variations in the risk premium component of interest rates.
Feder and Just (1977), for example, construct a theoretical model yielding an
'equilibrium relation between the interest rate and the probability of default such
that higher probability implies higher interest'. This forms the basis for an
econometric model which the authors claim 'generates estimates of the weights
attached to subjective risk indicators'. The model actually estimated, in fact,
reduces to a regression of the spread over LIBOR on a series of variables which
affect/reflect the probability of default (debt-service ratio, debt-GNP ratio,
amortization-debt ratio, GNP per capita, exports fluctuation index, growth rate,
import-GNP ratio, import-reserves ratio, projected GOP growth rate) for 27
countries over eight quarters between 1973 and 1974. Feder and Just (1980) run
similar regressions based on cross-sectional Eurodollar market data for January
1975 on 27 countries, as does Haegel (1980) based again on the Eurodollar market
(20 countries between 1974 and 1978).
Edwards (1984) estimates a comparable relationship but uses a 'random-effect
error components equation' based on the Fuller and Batesse (1974) procedure.
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They use this model to attempt to consider whether banks had the ability to
distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' risks, and in particular whether they had
anticipated the international debt crisis of 1982-83. Edwards again uses the spread
over LIBOR as an approximation for the perceived probability of defaulti and
regresses this on a number of variables, and the estimates achieved used to calculate
the banks' perception of the probability of default of 19 LDCs over the period 1976-
80. Having calculated the perceived probabilities of default, Edwards compared
them with actual default statistics for the years 1980-83. For some countries which
later ran into financial difficulties (Brazil for example) the perceived default
probabilities increased between 1976 and 1980, showing that banks anticipated well
in advance their debt problems. For others, however, this was not so. As Edwards
notes,
'for Argentina, a country which in 1982 encountered serious financial
difficulties, estimates indicate that the perceived probability of default
declined throughout the period' (1984, p.726).
Edwards (1986) uses OLS and instrumental variable methods to estimate an
essentially similar relationship and compares the results with those of regressions
with spreads on bonds issued by LDCs as the dependent variable.
Other relevant studies include Gottlieb (1989), Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992),
Rockerbie (1993), and Calvo and Kaminsky (1991). Gottlieb (1989) is one of the
few time-series studies of perceived risk, and is based on data on Israel from 1971
to 1983. Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) offer another time-series analysis, based
again on Israel (1979-88 quarterly data) and also attempt to estimate the cost of
rescheduling to debtor nations in terms of the GNP foregone (based on 13 nations
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which rescheduled between 1960 and 1982). Rockerbie (1993) computes a
weighted average interest rate spread (using loan quantities and maturities as
weights) and regresses this on the usual explanatory variables using pooled sub-
samples of 41 countries over the period 1978-84. One of the few papers with a
strong theoretical element is Calvo and Kaminsky which explores 'some of the
implications of assuming that bank syndicates and debtor countries entered into
implicit debt contracts during the 1970s' (1991, p.35). From their implicit
contracts model, they derive a system of three equations (one of which explains
the interest rate spread) and these are estimated simultaneously using non-linear
least squares techniques.
There is an important weakness, however, which undermines all these studies, in
that they are based on the crucial assumption that the rate of interest does not affect
the probability of default. A number of the theoretical papers reviewed in chapter 2
(inter alia Jaffee and Russell, 1976; S&W) have provided more than adequate
arguments for rejecting this assumption. In particular, S&W have shown how
raising the rate of interest will screen out good risks where the interest rate is pooled
(it is demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6 how similar adverse selection can occur with
differentiated interest rates provided there is more than one risk type in any interest
rate category), or produce moral hazards for borrowers who have a choice of
projects to invest the loaned funds (assuming the relationship between risk and
'return if successful' is positive). Moreover, since lenders are unlikely to be
ignorant of this effect it is probable that their perceptions of risk will be altered by
movements in interest rates and the inevitable corollary is that this will feed through
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to their decisions on interest rates setting, including the possibility of equilibrium
credit rationing. The studies also overlook the fact that, 'the ranking ignores the
possibility that fees may act as a partial substitute for higher spread' (Hefferman,
1986, p.31).
Feder and Just (1980) justify their use of interest rates as a measure of perceived
risk on the basis that 'lending transactions are assumed to be of sufficiently
negligible size relative to the borrower's scale of operations ... so that the
probability of default is not influenced by the lender's current decision, i.e. the
interest rate on the loan does not affect default probability' (p.125). This
argument is weakened, however, by the fact that on such large loans as those
made in the sovereign debt market, changes in the rate of interest can incur
massive changes in the levels of repayment, and may affect the willingness to
repay, if not the ability. Consequently, lenders may prefer to dampen upward
movements in interest rates and ration further credit to borrowers. Where credit
rationing of this kind exists, interest rate spreads are not a sound measure of
perceived risk.
It should be noted that the debate over the usefulness of interest rates in the
presence of credit rationing has extended well beyond the literature on perceived
risk analysis. A commonly held view amongst economists during the early post
war period in the US, for example, was that 'central bank control over interest
rates was useless as a restraint upon cyclical swings in the American economy'
(Rosa, 1951, p.270, quoted in Hillier and Ibrahimo, 1993, p.273). One motivation
for this view was that, if credit rationing is prevalent, saving and investment
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would be insensitive to the rate of interest, rendering impotent monetary policies
based on interest rate control.
With regard to the implications of credit rationing for the usefulness of interest rates
as a measure of perceived risk, Seck (1992) has argued that the LIBOR spread
variable used by Edwards and others is inadequate because the use of spreads alone
does not take into account restriction of access to credit markets which is in itself an
important reflection of how banks perceive a country's risk. Edwards assumes that
'if the financial community distinguishes between countries with different
probabilities of default, these perceptions will be reflected in spreads over
LIBOR' (1984, p.726). Support for Edwards' approach is provided by Folkerts-
Landau who argues that,
'Even a casual inspection of the difference between the borrowing and
lending rates of banks active in the international market suggests that the
spread between the interest rate charged to borrowers and the banks' own
cost of funds - the London Interbank Offer Rate, or LIBOR - has come to
reflect the market's assessment of expected loss due to debt
rescheduling ... ' (1985, pp.331-332, quoted in Calvo and Kaminsky op cit.
p.9)
Even though Edwards (1984) is aware that there may exist a 'credit ceiling'
beyond which 'that particular country will be completely excluded from the credit
market'(ihid}, he does not suggest proxies to take this into account. It is possible
that lenders perceive borrowers to have different thresholds with respect to the
maximum interest they are willing to pay (analogous to the thresholds for loan
application suggested in chapter 3), and if lenders' estimates of a particular
borrower indicate that the existing interest rate is already near its threshold, then
they may decide to stifle increases in the spread in the event of a rise in perceived
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risk and ration new loans (either quantitatively or qualitatively) to that borrower.
This may be less true of other borrowers, where the spread will be allowed to rise
without fear of it reaching the borrower's reservation rate for countries where
other determinants of default have adversely changed or countries which have less
bargaining power.
Strong evidence for the case against Edwards is given In Lussier and Alford
(1993, p.7l3) where it is noted that 'during the first round of rescheduling
negotiations in 1983, the spread was maintained at two per cent over LlBOR.
However, during the second round, 1984-85, the average spread was reduced to
1.2 per cent and to below one per cent in the third round, 1986-87. The interest
rates were not reduced because the solvency situation of the debtor countries had
improved, rather to ease the debt-service requirements.'
Thus, it can be seen how distortions may arise in the LIBOR spread which cause it
to diverge from perceived risk. Indeed, one of the factors which sparked the flurry
of papers based on interest rate spreads was the desire to explain why the 'lending
spreads in the market [are] currently very low' and because of 'concern that
lenders are not being adequately compensated for the risks they are assuming'
(Haegel, 1980, p.41).
4.3.2 Secondary Market Prices
During the 1980s a secondary market for sovereign debt began to develop which
allowed banks to buy and sell assets comprised of outstanding country debt. The
market began in 1984 and has 'grown from a volume of five billion dollars in
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1986 to more than 100 billion dollars in 1991' (Lussier and Alford, 1993, p.725).
Initially, transactions in the secondary market were 'dominated by banks
attempting to decrease their exposure in one currency while increasing their
exposure in another currency (debt-for-debt swaps)' (ihid). Such transactions
were made with a view to concentrate or to diversify their portfolios of loans to
LDes. More recently, developing countries themselves have traded in the market
in attempts to reduce the face value of outstanding loans through 'debt buy-backs'
(for a discussion of such policies see Bulow and Rogoff, 1988; Snowden, 1989;
Wijnbergen, 1990; Acharaya and Diwan, 1993).
The important aspect of the secondary market for the purposes of this chapter is
that the price of a country's debt on the secondary market (expressed as pence in
the pound) has been viewed as an approximation of the perceived probability of
default of that nation. For example, if the secondary market price (SMP) is 0.8,
then this can be interpreted as indicating that the market, at that point in time.
expects only 80% of the loan will be repaid (or that there is an 80% chance of the
full amount being repaid). It has been argued (by Lussier and Alford, 1993, for
example) that secondary market prices offer a better reflection of perceived risk
than the spread over LIBOR, and this is demonstrated by the fact that, whilst
interest rate spreads were narrowing in order to 'ease the debt service
requirements' (ibid, p.713), the average discount on the secondary market (that is,
one minus the secondary market price) was at times over fifty per cent tihid,
p.714).
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A number of authors have sought to exploit this feature of secondary market
prices and a small literature has emerged which uses SMPs as measures of
perceived risk. Laney (1987), for example, uses a sample of 31 countries to run
cross-section regressions of secondary market prices in 1986 on economic risk
and socio-political risk variables, each derived using principal components from a
range of sub-variables. Both variables had the correct sign, although the latter
was not statistically significant. Sachs and Huizinga (1987) regresses SMP prices
for 28 countries against Debt/GNP, real GNP growth, a dummy variable for
rescheduling, and a dummy variable to indicate whether US bank regulators had
required a loan-loss allocation for each country. Both these studies are cross-
sectional and so do not allow for changes in perceived risk over time. Boehmer
and Megginson (1990) try to rectify this by using SMP data on ten countries over
a 32 month period, but since most of the determinants were not available on a
monthly basis, it was not possible to derive a true panel model. Lussier and Alford
(1993) use a much larger sample, consisting of data on 31 countries over the six
year period 1985-90. The data are pooled, however, and so no time variation of
parameters is tested for, neither are fixed or random effects models used to exploit
the panel properties of SMPs.
Khor and Rojas (1991) differ in their approach from the above papers because
they consider whether the interest rate spread and SMPs are cointegrated. Given
the previously mentioned proposition that secondary market prices are a better
reflection of perceived risk than interest rates, this study is important. For if the
two are essentially equivalent, then it cannot be claimed that SMPs are superior.
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Khor and Rojas argue that, 'it is reasonable to expect divergence in the behaviour
of the variables in the short run; however, we would expect the variables to move
together in the long run.' (ibid, p.865). Their results show that neither the Dickey-
Fuller test, nor the Augmented Dickey Fuller test, support the hypothesis of
cointegration at the five percent level of significance. However, Khor and Rojas
do find that there exists an error-correction mechanism that 'tends to restore the
long-run equilibrium relationship ... Therefore, this test supports the hypothesis
that [the two variables] are cointegrated' (ibid p.867).
However, care should be taken in assuming that the test for cointegration is a test
of 'guilt by association' - that a long run relationship between SMPs and interest
rate spreads necessary implies a fundamental weakness in SMPs as a measure of
perceived risk. The corollary is weak because the existence of a long-run
relationship (and relatively complex one at that) between SMPs and interest rates,
may say more about the long run behaviour of interest rate spreads than about any
distortion in SMPs. It may be, for example, that there is in fact a long run
equilibrium relationship between interest rates and perceived risk, but that the
impact of credit rationing and other distortions cause deviations in the short run
(and consequently render LIBOR spreads impotent as indicators of perceived
risk). The positive test results for a cointegrating relationship between SMPs and
interest rates (where interest rates are known to be an unreliable barometer of
perceived risk) do not necessarily invalidate SMPs as a measure of perceived risk
because, in the context of perceived risk, short run distortions are highly
consequential given the size of the loans involved. The fact that Khor and Rojas
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found substantial short run deviations (to the extent that only Via an error
correction mechanism could a long run relationship be identified), demonstrates
that, in principle, SMPs cannot be excluded as valid measures of perceived risk.
There are, however, problems with acqumng and applying secondary market
pnces as a measure of perceived risk in the kind of panel regression to be
developed here. First, they are not made publicly available: application has to be
made to an international financial institution which trades on the secondary
market, such as Solomon Brothers, and this is difficult for researchers outside of
the USA (and outside of the private financial community) where the appropriate
departments appear to be located. Second, the secondary market is still
considered to be an 'emerging market' and so the volume of trade (and the prices
themselves) are somewhat erratic. SMPs may, therefore, be unreliable because
some of the price movements will reflect insecurity about the secondary market
itself, rather than with regard to the borrower. Third, it is mainly LDC debt that is
traded on the market, and so secondary market prices would not be available for
all countries in the study. Fourth, it is not clear what the effect of country buy-
backs are on the purity of SMPs as a reflection of perceived risk. If lenders view
debt buy-backs as increasing the probability of repayment, they may be willing to
sell debt back to a country intending to redeem its own debt, at a price below that
suggested by the lenders' perception of the country's risk. At the same time, a
country buying back its own debt effectively pushes up the price for its debt
simply because its decision represents an outward shift of demand. Such
intentions may provoke speculative behaviour, which may push up the price of the
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country's debt. However, the country may, of course, never actually buy-back,
and so the price fluctuations which result from lenders cutting prices and
speculative demand pushing up prices, may have no bearing on movements in the
country's actual default risk. Add to this fact that the propensity to buy-back debt
has not been uniform or consistent across countries, and the corollary is that the
ordering of SMPs may not reflect the ordering of perceived risks (an issue that has
not, as yet, been discussed in the perceived risk literature).
4.3.3 Gountry Risk Ratings
To overcome the inadequacies of LIBOR spreads to capture perceived risk, Seck
(1992) employed the country risk rating published annually by the Euromoney
periodical. This rating was first published in 1979 for countries active in the
Eurocurrency markets, and had been used by a number of studies prior to Seck's
analysis (although, without Seck's credit rationing justification), including Brewer
and Rivoli (1990) and Cosset and Roy (1991). However, an examination of the
computation of Euromoney 's rating reveals that, as a measure of perceived risk,
the rating has many of the same weaknesses as interest rate spreads (partly
because spread over LIBOR forms part of the calculation).
Hefferman (1986) reveals that the computation of the rating for a particular nation
is based on the country's average weighted spread:
L (Volume x Spread x Maturity)
Average Weighted Spread = "
L.,,(Vo!umex Maturity)
where volume = all the loans signed for a given country in a given year on the
Eurodollar loan markets; spread = the spread over LIBOR; and maturity = the
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time over which the loan matures. As Hefferman (op cit., p.30) notes, there are a
number of weaknesses to this approach. First, 'the sample is self-selecting in that
it only ranks countries active on the Euromarket in a given year' (ibid). Countries
not participating in the market in a particular year will be omitted from the
listings, even if they are amongst the most risky borrowers. Second, if the average
LIBOR spread alters in a particular year then, 'the ranking will be biased in favour
of countries which borrowed before the increase in the spread, even though this
has nothing to do with the riskiness of the individual borrower' (ibid). Third, the
calculation assumes spread and maturity to be independent, whereas in fact they
are highly interdependent. Fourth, as we have argued earlier regarding the use of
LIBOR spreads, the Euromoney rating may not move in tandem with perceived
credit risk,
'the method suggests that lenders always adjust for higher risk by raising
the spread. However, for the risk-averse lender, who is faced with less
than perfect information with respect to the borrowers, this may not be the
case. If the lender always responded to higher risk by raising the spread,
the deterrent effect would be greater for the low risk than the high risk
borrower. At some point, the increase in spread will raise the average
riskiness of the portfolio and lower expected returns. To prevent this from
happening, the lender sets credit limits to deal with the risk/information
problem rather than raising spreads.' (Hefferman, op cit., p.31)
Moreover, as with LIBOR spread studies, the Euromoney ranking 'ignores the
possibility that fees may act as a partial substitute for higher spread' (ibid).
Since 1979, the calculation of the Euromoney ratings have undergone a number of
changes (for example, see Euromoney, September 1982, p.74). These
modifications have not addressed the weaknesses noted above, however, and have
only served to exacerbate the problems of applying it as a panel measure of
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perceived risk because the changes mean that the measure is no longer consistent
over time.
Institutional Investor Country Risk Rating
The only suitable, publicly available alternative to the measures listed above is the
Institutional Investor annual survey of the major lending institutions to rate the
creditworthiness of over a hundred countries on a scale of 0 to 100 (no bank ranks
the country in which it has its headquarters). These ratings are then combined into
a weighted average for each country, with weights being gauged according to the
banks' sovereign lending as proportion of total sovereign lending. This measure
has a number of advantages. First, it is not an ad hoc survey but a panel data set,
and so can be combined with World Bank economic panel data on borrowing
countries. Second, it is not the reflection of one particular computation of risk (as
in the Euromoney rating) but a true reflection of the perception of lenders
themselves (assuming the weights ascribed are appropriate). Third, the views of
small lenders cannot disproportionately distort the overall rating because of the
weighting procedure employed by Institutional Investor magazine.
Although a number of weaknesses of this rating as an objective measure of risk
have been noted by Hefferman (1986, p.31 ff), his criticisms do not generally
undermine its usefulness as a measure of perceived credit risk because his
comments refer to the inadequacies of 'banker judgement'. Indeed, Hefferman
notes that 'the II rating is best interpreted as a reflection of market opinion rather
than as an indicator of sovereign risk' (p.32). One aspect of Hefferman's critique
that is relevant, is the possibility that 'a banker may be reluctant to reveal his/her
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true judgement on the survey for fear that this information may become public.
This is especially true if a certain bank is known to be highly exposed in sovereign
lending to one or more countries' (p.31). However, the extent to which this effect
distorts the rating as a true measure of lenders' beliefs is likely to be small given
the large number of lenders interviewed and the strict anonymity of those
interviewed.
It is, therefore, this measure which was considered most appropriate for the
econometric model estimated below. The Institutional Investor rating has been
used in a number of previous studies, including Feder and Uy (1985), Brewer and
Rivoli (1990), Cosset and Roy (1991), Thapa and Mehta (1991) and Lee (1993).
Feder and Uy (1985) and Lee (1993) examine data from 1979-1983 and 1979-
1983 respectively to ascertain the determinants of credit risk perceptions. Brewer
and Rivoli (1990) and Cosset and Roy (1991) essentially adopt the same
approach, except that they also run the regressions using the Euromoney ratings
and find that the results are similar between the two sets of regressions. The
Brewer and Rivoli study is distinct from the other studies in that it is the only
paper to examine the impact of political variables on the International Investor
ratings. Thapa and Mehta (1991), as we noted in chapter 3, test for a single
structural break in their sample and find that they cannot reject the null hypothesis
of stable coefficients. Other studies (Feder and Ross, 1982; Burton and Inoue,
1983) have compared the institutional rating to the spread over LIBOR, and have
found a strong empirical relationship.
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To summarise, then, there are a number of possible panel data which could be used
to represent the dependent variable, including the Institutional Investor (II) and
Euromoney country risk ratings, LIBOR spread and secondary market prices. The
advantage of the II rating is that it is not hampered by non-clearing equilibria,
whereas the LIBOR spread and Euromoney may be distorted by credit rationing as
part of the lender's response to risk. Moreover, unlike secondary market prices, II
ratings are published for a wide range of countries over a prolonged period.
Because the II ratings have been around longer, are more consistent than the
Euromoney listings, and have a more sound methodological basis as a measure of
perceived risk, it was decided that these would be the most appropriate for the
model used.
4.4 Determinants
Note that we are interested here in the variables that drive perceived risk and that
these determinants may, of course, differ from those that determine actual risk,
depending on the completeness and accuracy of the lender's risk assessment
procedure. The aim, therefore, is to replicate the list of variables lenders use in
their estimates of borrower risk. This is not as ominous a task as it might appear
since there are a limited number of relevant and measurable variables that are
likely to be used by lenders in their subjective estimates of objective risk. A
reasonable way of arriving at the key set of signals is to examine the existing
literature on actual-risk estimation and from these identify the most significant
variables. This approach is supported by Hefferman's (1986, p29) observation
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that, 'Much of this literature comes from academic publications that do not have a
wide readership among practising international bankers. Nonetheless, the models
developed in the academic literature are used by a wide range of international
banks, either directly or indirectly through economics appraisal services.'
Determinants used in the literature generally fall into three categories: (i) debt
variables - those based on some aspect of the loan agreement; (ii) economic
variables - those based on macro indicators; (iii) political variables - those based
on the political bias, democratic development of a country. Tables 4-1, 4-2, and
4-3 give listings of the core explanatory variables used in the rescheduling-
prediction literature.
Gwilym B. J Pryce, 1999, Chapter 4: Empirical Testing of Fluctuations in Weights 113
Table 4-/ Debt Variables Used in the Okjective Risk Literature
Variable Definition References
AM DB debt
amortization
I total
outstanding
debt
DB GNP Debt
outstanding I
GNP
SA XP ratio of debt
service to
export
eamings(i.e.
the debt
service ratio)
Frank and Cline, 1971 ( discriminant);
Kutty , 1990 (logit);
Balkan, 1992 (probit)
Kutty , 1990 (logit);
Balkan, 1992, (probit)
Moghadam et al., 1991, (probit);
Lee, 1991a (logit);
Lee, 1991b (multinomiallogit)
Similar measures (such as debt/exports) used by:
Savvides, 1991, (simultaneous probit);
Oral et al., 1992 (logit, Cart, G-Iogit)
Frank and Cline, 1971 ( discriminant);
Moghadam et al., 1991, (probit);
Savvides, 1991, (simultaneous probit);
Balkan, 1992 (probit);
Kutty , 1990, (logit)
Feder et al., 1981 (logit)
Similar measures (such as Total debt service I
GNP) used by Moghadam et al., 1991 (probit);
Kharas, 1984 (theory + probit);
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Table 4-2 Economic Variables Used in the Objective Risk Literature
Variable Definition References
IN GNP Gross domestic
investment / GNP
GNPPC GNP / capita
RE MP International
reserves / imorts
(reserves include:
gold, dollar /
sterling holdings,
and net position at
the IMF)
XGNPR Exports / GNP
Moghadam et al., 1991 (probit);
Oral et al., 1992 (logit, Cart, G-Iogit);
Oral et al., 1992 (log it, Cart, G-logit)
Kharas, 1984 (theory + probit);
Similar measures (such as growth of GNPPC or GNP
growth) used by:
Balkan, 1992, (probit);
Savvides, (1991 ) (simultaneous probit);
Lee, 1991a (logit);
Lee, 1991b (multinomiallogit);
Kutty, 1990 (logit)
Citron and Nicklesburg, 1987 (logit)
Frank and Cline, 1977 ( discriminant);
Balkan, 1992, (probit)
Moghadam et al., 1991 (probit);
Savvides, 1991, (simultaneous probit);
Kutty, 1990 (logit)
Oral et al., 1992 (logit, Cart, G-Iogit)
Feder et al., 1981 (logit)
Similar measures (such as international reserves or
growth rate of imports) used by:
Citron and Nicklesburg, 1987 (logit);
Feder et al., 1981 (log it)
Similar measures (such as Growth rate of exports or
imports/GNP) used by:
Frank and Cline, 1977 ( discriminant);
Balkan, 1992 (probit);
Savvides, 1991, (simultaneous probit);
Kutty , 1990, (logit)
Oral et al., 1992 (logit, Cart, G-logit)
Gwilym B. J. Pryce. 1999. Chapter 4: Empirical Testing of Fluctuations in Weights 115
Table 4-3 Political Variables Used in the Objective Risk Literature
Variable ReferencesDefinition
POLINST
POLDEM
GE GDP
Level of political
instability
Level of
Democracy
government
expenditure (or debt
held domestically)
as a proportion of
GNP
Balkan, 1992, (probit)
Other measures of political instability used by:
Citron and Nicklesburg, 1987 (logit);
Oral et al., 1992 (logit, Cart, G-Iogit)
Balkan, 1992 (probit)
Lee, 1991a (logit);
Lee, 1991b (multinomiallogit)
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4.4. 1 Rationale for Including a Variable jn the Regressions
The question to bear in mind when looking down the list of variables listed in the
above tables is why might the lender include this variable in its analysis of
objective risk? In other words, what is the rationale behind the variable? Table
4-4, Table 4-5, and Table 4-6 summarise the expected signs and typical rationale
put forward for these variables. A variety of other variables have been tried in
various papers which are not included in these tables, either because they were not
significant in the regressions or because the data could not be obtained for the full
panel. Also, some variables are not included either because the rationale was
weak (and so unlikely that lenders would include them), or because their effect is
picked up by other variables (as indicated in Tables 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3), or because
the variable proved statistically insignificant in the initial regressions. The first
variable listed is AM_DB, debt amortization over total outstanding debt, which has
been used by Frank and Cline (1977) amongst others to measure the extent to which
long-term debt liabilities dominate the debt portfolio of the country. It is expected
to be positively related to creditworthiness. DB_GNP, outstanding debt over GNP,
measures the proportion of current output that must be diverted to debt service and
has been used by a wide range of studies (see Table 4-1) to measure the level of
'debt burden' a country faces. This is expected to be negatively related to current
creditworthiness. The debt service ratio, SA_XP, has ambiguous expected sign
because, whilst on the one hand, high levels of debt service may be an indicator of
commitment to repayment, on the other, it reflects the dependence on export
earnings. As a measure of prospects for future growth, many authors use IN_GNP,
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the ratio of investment to GNP. This is obviously expected to be positively related
to creditworthiness, as is GNP per capita, used as a measure of current income flows
and the capacity for taxation income to repay debt. RE_MP represents the stock of
a country's reserves relative to imports, and the higher this is, the less likely a
country is to face repayment difficulties. Also positively affecting creditworthiness
is the level of foreign exchange a country has left over after debt service payments
relative to its GNP since this measures another aspect of a country's debt service
capacity. Most authors use XGNPR, exports/GNP, to measure this determinant.
Before I go on to discuss the particular problems associated with measuring political
determinants of creditworthiness, it is worth noting some of the drawbacks of the
above variables. First, it is clear that these are all very crude indicators of the
underlying influences they are trying to measure. This is a legitimate criticism of
objective risk studies, but not necessarily of subjective risk analysis (as defined in
chapters 1 and 2) because there is abundant evidence to show that measures such as
these are actually used by lenders to assess risk (Hefferman, 1986). More
qualitative factors will no doubt often be taken into account (see discussion in the
previous chapter), and no doubt there will be fluctuations in the level of
sophistication of models used to combine these variables, but simple financial ratios
have an increasingly dominant role (Hefferman op cit.). Another cause for concern
is that of measurement. The accuracy of all of these variables is dependent to some
degree on the national accounts and data recording practices of the countries
concerned. International organisations such as the World Bank (from which most
of these variables were collected) make significant attempts to standardise
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measurement, but questions over reliability remain, particularly for many less
developed countries, some of which have reputedly doctored figures to improve the
economic image of their country. However, these variables and the sources I used
are typically the sources that lenders themselves use and so again, although
measurement is a particular concern for objective risk studies, it is not necessarily so
for subjective risk analysis. The most important goal of the data collection aspect of
my empirical model is to reflect with reasonable similarity the determinants used by
lenders, even if this means including the measurement errors that lenders face. As
noted above, the strategy I have adopted is to follow the pattern of determinants
used in academic studies as these have strongly influenced the models used by
lenders (Hefferman op cit.).
Not all variables included in the literature are included in the model below,
however, particularly if only one or two studies include them since this is unlikely
to reflect general lending practice. One example of a variable not included is capital
flows. Most studies which have included the variable (Feder and Just, 1977; Feder,
Just and Ross, 1981; Kharas, 1984) have assumed flows of capital to be an indicator
of a country's creditworthiness and have found it to be an important determinant.
Such authors argue that commercial and non-commercial inflows represent a
significant source of exchange for many LDCs which can be used to meet the
obligations of external debt (Feder et al., 1981). Thus, the greater the capital
inflow, the less chance there is of encountering debt service difficulties.
However, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981, p.289) and Kharas (1984, p.429) consider
capital flows to be endogenous. Kaharas op cit. observes that if at the start of the
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year a nation decides to reschedule, such a decision may affect the volume of capital
inflows in that year, indicating that 'capital inflows cannot be taken as independent
of the error term', In response to these arguments, Savvides (1991) constructed a
simultaneous probit model of creditworthiness and capital inflows and found a
reversal in sign (i.e. positive rather than negative) in its influence on risk. He
suggests that this may be explained in terms of defensive lending where existing
creditors extend new loans to problem debtors in order to defend the value of their
existing claims (see also Krugman, 1988). Thus, an increase in the flow of foreign
capital constitutes 'a signal of reduced creditworthiness' (Savvides, 1991, p.320).
In the absence of a full simultaneous system, however, Cline comments on the
role of capital flows in determining creditworthiness are apt:
'It would not be surprising to find a negative statistical relationship between
them (as Feder and Just do). But high capital inflow should be construed
more as a consequence of creditworthiness than a cause of it, and this
variable therefore would not appear to belong on the right-hand side of the
equation as an explanatory variable' (1983, p.219).
It is this view which is adopted here, hence the exclusion of capital flows as a
determinant of risk.
Another series of variables not included in the regressions are those used in the
literature to reflect the bargaining power of borrowers. In addition to standard
financial ratios and economic variables ii, Lee (1991b) includes variables to capture
the bargaining power of borrowers during negotiations. These are: (i) MB - a
dummy variable for major borrowers'"; and (ii) DHIC - a dummy variable for
highly indebted countriesiv (Lee, argues that, 'Since the commitment of lenders is
already large, it is expected that major borrowers, and to a lesser extent the highly
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indebted countries, are able to obtain better terms on rescheduling their loans',
1996b, p.469); (iii) GNP - included as a measure of the size of borrowers (Lee
hypothesizes that the larger the borrower is, the more bargaining power it will have
during the re-negotiation of its loan.); and (iv) EXP - borrower's exports to
industrialized countries as a share of total exports, included as a measure of the
extent of the borrowers trade links with lenders. It is expected that the greater the
ratio is, the less the borrowers' bargaining power will be",
However, these bargaining variables are likely to be highly correlated with other
debt and econonic variables and so much of their explanatory power is captured
without their inclusion. Not surprisingly, they were not generally statistically
significant when included in preliminary regressions, and so were excluded from
the final model.
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Table 4-4 Debt Variable Definition and EWecfed Signs
Variable Expected Rationale
. tsign
AM DB (+)
DB GNP (-)
SA XP (+ or-)
Low AM_DB (debt amortization over total outstanding debt)
indicates long term debt liabilities dominate the debt portfolio of the
country. This implies little short run flexibility in reducing debt
service commitments by temporary reduction of borrowing.
Therefore, the country is more likely to reschedule. 'The absence of
short term liabilities also indicates that a country does not have
significant access to short-term commercial credit facilities, i.e. the
country is not particularly 'credit-worthy'. A lack of a good credit
reputation makes it difficult for a country to obtain quick access to
additional credits when shortfalls in exchange earnings occur and
rescheduling of debt becomes a more attractive alternative to
alleviate foreign exchange crises' (Frank and Cline, 1977 p.332.)
Debt outstanding over GNP measures the proportion of current
output that must be diverted to debt service.
The ratio of the debt service to export earnings is an indicator of
debt service capacity; increase ofSA_XP implies an increase in the
vulnerability to foreign exchange crises. 'Any shortfall in foreign
exchange earnings or capital imports which is not covered by
exchange reserves must be met by reducing imports: since debt
service is a fixed obligation, the higher the debt service ratio, the
greater is the relative burden on import reduction for a given
shortfall in foreign exchange' (Frank and Cline, 1977). On the
other hand, high levels of debt service may be an indicator of
commitment to repayment and so an indicator of the willingness to
repay which may explain why certain studies have found a negative
relationship with risk (Edwards, 1986, p.579, found it to be
negatively related to bond spreads; see also Burton and Inoue, 1985
and Calvo and Kaminsky, 1991, p.31). Calvo and Kaminsky
explain the ambiguity of sign is due to such variables being
'simultaneously determined with the probability of default' (p.ll).
t Positive if increases creditworthiness.
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Table 4-5 Economic Variables.' Rationale and ExpecledSigns
Variable Expe Rationale
cted
sifn
IN GNP (+) Gross domestic investment over GNP, 'Reflects the country's prospective
for future growth' (Moghadam et al. 1991 p.6)
GNPPC (+) GNP per capita is a measure of current income flows and capacity for
taxation income to repay debt
RE MP (+) International reserves over imports: cet. par., the country with the high
reserves relative to imports is less likely to reschedule (Frank and Cline,
1977)
XGNPR (+) Exports over GNP: 'Of two countries with equally high debt service ratios,
the country having the highest exports-GNP ratio would have the most
foreign exchange left over after debt service payments relative to its GNP,
eet. par. This more stable characteristic of the economy may thus influence
the attitude toward rescheduling. A high export / GNP ratio would tend to
reduce the need for painful domestic adjustments' (Feder et al., 1981, p.658)
Positive if increases creditworthiness.
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Table 4-6 Political Variables Rationale and Expected Signs
Variable Expected Rationale
sign t
FR
GE GNP
(- / +) This is Gastil's (1988) Freedom Rating which attempts to capture
democratic development, both in terms of the extent to which the
political system is democratic, and in terms of whether the
behaviour of the populous suggests that the electoral system is
genuinely working (i.e. absence of revolutions, anti-government
demonstrations, guerilla warfare etc.). This has an ambiguous
sign since there has been considerable debate in the literature as to
whether democracy helps or hinders development.
(- / +) Government expenditure over GNP: according to Alesina and
Tabellini (op cit.), left wing governments are more likely to default
and to the extent that political bias is reflected in government
expenditure/debt, this variable will be negatively related to
perceived creditworthiness. A less political rationale is given by
Lee, 'Inappropriate domestic policies may have compounded debt
problems faced by borrowers. Hence, the ratio of domestically held
government debt to GDP variable is included to serve as a proxy
measure of government fiscal policy' (Lee, 1991b, p.47S).
However, high government levels expenditure may be justified if
targeted at infra-structure, for example, and so lenders may not
always view this variable pejoratively.
t Positive if increases creditworthiness.
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4.5 Political Determinants
Of the three categories of variables listed, economic and debt variables have
generally dominated the regression analysis of sovereign risk. Few studies,
however, offer a rigorous theoretical framework for the influence of economic
variables, and those that do (e.g. Kharas 1984) tend to adopt a highly mechanistic
explanation, violating the guidelines laid down by Eaton et at. op cit.. Ideally,
models should incorporate economic factors in terms of their influence on the
willingness to reschedule, the ultimate decision being contingent upon a wide range
of factors.
In a similar vein, Balkan, notes that,
'A nation's decision to reschedule its external debt reflects not only its
economic circumstances, i.e. its ability to meet its obligations, but also its
willingness to service these obligations. The latter reflects the political
environment of the debtor nation in that the decision to reschedule is a
political decision' (1992, p.999).
One of the major shortcomings of many of the early studies (such as Feder et al.,
1977, for example) was their failure to take into account the affect of political
factors on the decision to reschedule. Reasons for this may include the belief that
such variables were not measurable; that the measures that did exist were either
considered highly subjective or not relevant to risk analysis. Political variables are
partly indicative of a country's 'attitude' to debt repayment and so one might
hypothesise that when risk assessment levels are low, these variables are not
included in lender assessment procedures or not measured with great precision.
Most of the literature that has considered the effects of political elements have
tended to focus on the influence of these factors on development as a whole, not on
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risk assessment per se. For example, Pourgerami and Assane (1992) consider the
relationship between democracy and the pace of development. He concludes that
democracy does not have a negative effect. On a similar note, Healey et al., 1992,
conclude that, 'democratic regimes are no worse at controlling fiscal deficits than
authoritarian regimes' (p.l). Balkan and Green (1990) examine the question of
whether authoritarian regimes will necessarily incur more foreign debt. Testing the
relationship between debt and political liberty, they find 'little empirical support for
the thesis that democracy or autarky influence foreign debt levels'. There is also a
good deal of literature on the effects of democracy on inequality (surveyed by
Sirowy and Inkeles 1990).
The question more pertinent to the issues at hand, however, is whether democracy
has any impact on perceived creditworthiness. It is only in the more recent studies
that the influence of political factors on sovereign risk have been examined (for
example, Abdullah, 1985; Citron and Nichelsburg, 1987; Brewer and Rivoli, 1990).
Abdullah (op cit.) develops an indicator of debt-servicing vulnerability by
compiling a weighted index combining several financial ratios. These ratios are
indicators of: the international liquidity position, internal debt growth, inflation rate,
export position, and the political stability of a country. He labels the index the
'Payments Interruption Likelihood Index'.
Citron and Nicklesburg (1987) incorporate a measure of instability in the political
structure. There rationale is as follows: relieving pressure on government
budgetary obligations using rescheduling or default is costly to the borrower
(presumably in terms of loss of international creditworthiness), but these costs may
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be considered acceptable during times of political instability, particularly if the
pressure to meet repayment obligations may require tax increases which would
ensure political collapse. When governments are changing frequently, the option of
rescheduling becomes all the more attractive. Citron and Nicklesburg thus use a
five year moving aggregate of the number of changes in government as a proxy for
political instability. This variable proved significant, although only three other
variables were included in the regression, and the sample consisted of only five
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Spain, and Sweden) considered over the
1960-1983 period. If instability is as important as the authors claim, then there is
perhaps a case for reconsidering the policy of imposing on LDCs strict requirements
for economic policy reform if such impositions serve only to add to the political
instability. Indeed, 'both Argentina and the Dominican Republic have emphasised
that because such policies increased instability they were unwilling to strictly adhere
to them' (Citron and Nicklesburg, 1987, p.392).
Brewer and Rivoli (1990) examine the effect of political factors specifically on
perceived risk and attempt to answer two central questions: '(1) Do international
bankers and financial markets respond to these political phenomena in their
assessments of countries' creditworthiness? (2) What types of political instability
affect creditworthiness perceptions?' They consider the effects of government
regime change, political legitimacy and armed conflict in addition the current
account balance / GNP and total debt / GNP. 'Political legitimacy' was measured
using Gastil's (various years) annual reports on human rights which rank countries
on the extent to which the political process is democratic versus authoritarian.
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Countries with a high rating allow free and open elections, popular participation in
government, and genuine political opposition (see Bollen, 1986, for further
information on measuring political rights and liberties). Brewer and Rivoli find
that, 'political variables are at least as important as economic variables in explaining
perceived creditworthiness' (op cit. p.357). Interestingly, they found
creditworthiness to be negatively related to the democracy scores, suggesting that
'more authoritarian regimes are more creditworthy in the short run. These regimes
may be better able to extract resources from the economy, and also better able to
institute or maintain austerity programs that lack popular support' (ibid, p.365).
This interpretation, however, is controversial, and has to be measured against the
ongoing debate in the literature as to whether democracy is positively or negatively
related to development (see Pourgerami and Assane, 1992). Indeed, Brewer and
Rivoli acknowledge a second possible interpretation of their results, 'that the
lenders' risk assessments are short sighted in their failure to consider a longer-term
and more comprehensive view of country stability ... ' (Brewer and Rivoli, 1990,
p.365). That human rights violations have a deleterious effect on credit risk is
supported by the fact that,
'Authoritarian regimes increase the chance of violent and revolutionary
change, as many recent examples make clear, and therefore we would
expect that the risks of country lending would be higher under such
regimes .... For example, we know that the illegitimacy of the authoritarian
regime of Ferdinand Marcos, as well as continued armed conflict in the
Philippines, had deleterious effects on the ability to service sovereign debt.'
(Brewer and Rivoli, 1990, p.365)
Although the measures of political risk used inter alia by Abdullah (op cit.) and
Citron and Nicholsberg Cop cit.) are sound, variables suitable for the econometric
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model developed below are restricted by the requirement that they be available as a
panel series over the full 12 year period 1979-1990. This limits considerably the
options available given that many of the variables used to assess political risk are
collected on an ad hoc basis for two to three years at most. Gastil's measures (used,
for example, by Brewer and Rivoli, op cit.), on the other hand, are available on an
annual basis for an extended period and so are more suitable.
The econometric model developed in this paper uses two measures covermg
political bias and political development:
4.5. 1 Political Bias
This is essentially the grading of political regime as in terms of right or left wing
ideological alliance. Alesina and Tabellini (1988) give a theoretical underpinning
for this type of measure by constructing a dynamic model based on a simple class
division between workers and capitalists. That is, 'two social groups behaving non-
co-operatively' (Alesina and Tabellini, 1988, p.216). In this scenario, a right wing
government (one that serves the interests of capital) is less likely to renege on debt
repayment since it is capitalists who suffer most from bank punishment strategies
(for example, credit restrictions and trade sanctions initiated through the influence
of banks on the international community). The corollary is that left wing
governments are less creditworthy than right wing governments and so are more
likely to default.
This is obviously a controversial conclusion, and one that is not easily empirically
verified. Our main concern here, however, is not whether the conjecture is true,
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but whether international banks perceive it to be so, As far as the author is aware,
no studies to date have explored this aspect of political risk using an empirical
analysis, If and only if the coefficient on GE_GNP is positive, will it be possible
to reject the hypothesis that left wing governments (defined as those with high
levels of intervention) have higher perceived credit risk.
4,5.2 Political Development
The second category of political risk is 'political development' which refers to the
extent to which a country can be called democratic. Some measure is needed of the
extent to which there is political freedom or political repression; protection of
human rights or violation of human rights; rule by the masses or rule by an elite.
Governments who disregard the civil and political rights of their civilians are less
likely to have regard for repayment ethics. Moreover, since such countries are likely
to be already out of favour with the international community, bank punishment
strategies will carry less weight.
To support their inclusion of a political development measure, Brewer and Rivoli
(1990) refer to Shapiro's (1985) argument that a government's ability to meet its
debt obligations depends upon the state's ability to extract the necessary resources
from its citizens. Brewer and Rivoli argue that, 'stable regimes are more likely to
have this ability than unstable ones' (1990, p.359). However, as discussed earlier,
whether authoritarian regimes are any less stable cannot be answered without
qualification, neither can the question of whether authoritarian regimes are more
or less conducive to economic development (particularly since many of the
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emerging Asian economies that demonstrated rapid growth in the mid-eighties and
early nineties were less than democratic).
Democracy is assumed to be comprised of two aspects (both of which are captured
in the FR variable): (i) the absence of populous behaviour indicative of a less than
democratic system; and (ii) the fairness and transparency of the electoral system.
The first aspect measures the amount of social unrest that occurred in a given year
(number of: assassinations, anti-government demonstrations, guerilla warfare,
riots, general strikes, revolutions, coups d'etat, government crises and purges).
The higher the political instability, the higher the risk of rescheduling. The
second aspect captures two elements: a) extent that the executive and legislative
branches of government reflect the popular will; and b) the degree of exclusion of
political parties from the system and the ability of the largest party to dominate
national elections.
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4.6 Econometric Results
Having decided upon a suitable measure of perceived risk (the institutional
investor Risk Rating) and an appropriate list of determinants of perceived risk
(drawn largely from existing studies), regressions were run on a variety of
samples to facilitate the search for structural breaks. All variables were derived
from World Bank data except for FR which, as discussed above, was taken from
Gastil's Freedom Rating, and the dependent variable (II) which was collated from
the Institutional investor published ratings. The results of the OLS and Fixed
Effects regressions are listed in Table 4-7 and Table 4-8 respectively. The results
of the one year regressions are not listed but the elasticities based on these
regressions are given in Table 4-9 and graphed in Figure 4-1.
Looking at the 12 year OLS regression it can be seen that the overall explanatory
power is reasonable (adjusted R2 = 0.556), all of the regressors have the expected
signs and only the political variables are statistically insignificant, and then only
in particular years. Diagnostics generally improve the less pooled the sample, and
are generally stronger for the second half of the sample period (the OLS
regressions pooled on twin years from 1985 onwards all have adjusted R2 over
0.7). Both of these symptoms suggest the existence of structural breaks over time.
A similar story is told in the fixed effects twelve year regression panel model
(regression 20) with an adjusted R2 of 0.557, compared with an adjusted R2 of
0.746 for 1987-1990 (regression 27). The Bruesch-Pagan results for the OLS
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models suggest much stronger heteroscedasticity in the latter years of the sample,
and this was dealt with using Whites standard errors. All variables were
significant in at least one regression.
FR was found to be much more significant in the early years (regressions (4), (6),
(9), (10), (11), (23), (25), (28), (29)) and to some extent this is also true for
AM_DB. However, the opposite appears to be the case for GE_GNP which is
most significant (and most negative) towards the latter half of the 1980s
(regressions (5), (8), (18), (19), (22),24), (27)). The variables tending to have the
highest significance levels overall are DB_GNP, IN_GNP and XP_GNP.
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Tallie 4-7 Ordi!1.ar)!, Le.as..t Sg_uare.5..Baasssuuu: Sam/l.la PQole.d.
(a)
Variable Sample
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1979-1990 1979-1986 1983-1990 1979-1984 1985-1990
12 Years 8 Years 8 Years 6 Years 6 Years
Constant 3.099 0.205 -7.1041 1.148 -4.812
(2.713) (0.125) (-3.538) (0.510) (-2.141)
AM DB 0.49171 0.558 0.26765 0.585 0.263
(7.329) (6.702) (3.025) (5.504) (2.593)
DB GNP -9.9163 -11.608 -8.7240 -10.942 -9.700
(-12.377) (-10.364) (-8.710) (-6.503) (-9.035)
SA XP 0.65289 3.6534 0.38810 3.125 0.452
(4.287) (6.856) (2.867) (3.512) (3.599)
IN GNP 0.21984 0.19135 12.181 0.182 9.815
(3.833) (3.881) (6.435) (4.300) (4.560)
GNPPC 1.1860 2.0013 0.82628 1.835 1.009
(3.949) (4.970) (2.279) (3.636) (2.455)
RE MP 2.1154 2.1706 1.6496 2.348 1.337
(6.742) (4.984) (4.413) (4.105) (3.599)
XP GNP 5.9453 6.8294 5.3530 5.832 6.097
(8.054) (7.406) (5.677) (4.850) (6.071 )
FR -0.052 -0.097 -0.021 -0.177 0.030
(-1.244) (-1.674) (-0.394) (-2.538) (0.523)
GE GNP -0.31907 -0.161 -0.708 -0.164 -0.59758
(-1.804) (-0.742) (-3.530) (-0.595) (-2.915)
N 516 344 344 258 258
F-test for 72.590 39.685 81.226 24.170 72.468
Ho: rok = 0 V k [OJE-13] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Breusch-Pagan Chi- 36.5756 19.2697 56.4381 21.6053 46.8074
Squared [0.3E-04] [0.023] [0.5E-08] [0.010] [0.4E-06]
Adjusted R2 0.556 0.504 0.678 0.448 0.715
Figures in rounded brackets are t-values based on White's standard errors.
Figures in square brackets are significance levels
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(b)
Variable Sample
(6) (7) (8)
1979-1982 1983-1986 1987-1990
4 Years 4 Years 4 Years
Constant 0.56201 -12.044 -3.675
(0.196) (-4.681) (-1.218)
AM DB 0.54134 0.324 0.237
(4.023) (2.851) (1.860)
DB GNP -7.8378 -10.207 -10.029
(-3.986) (-7.483) (-8.576)
SA XP 2.4003 3.647 0.435
(2.150) (7.574) (3.596)
IN GNP 0.18636 13.955 8.307
(6.139) (6.709) (2.939)
GNPPC 1.7035 1.377 1.043
(2.924) (3.162) (2.057)
RE MP 2.6447 1.804 1.370
(4.098) (2.900) (3.317)
XP GNP 4.0085 6.3121 6.625
(3.035) (5.507) (5.741)
FR -0.27021 -0.059 0.074
(-3.397) (-0.678) (1.l29)
GE GNP -0.10073 -0.403 -0.64007
(-0.305) (-1.368) (-2.766)
N 172 172 172
F-test for 14.408 41.240 57.287
Ho: Wk = 0 \::j k [0.6E-15] [000] [0.IE-15
Breusch-Pagan 13.5508 19.343 41.2686
Chi-Squared [0.139] [0.022] [0.4E-05]
Adjusted R2 0.414 0.679 0.748
Figures in rounded brackets are t-values based on White's standard errors.
Figures in square brackets are significance levels
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(c)
Variable Sample
(9) (10) (11 ) (12) (13) (14)
1979-1980 1980- 1981- 1982- 1983- 1984-
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
2 Years 2 Years 2 Years 2 Years 2 Years 2 Years
Constant 0.46612 -7.4903 -9.0020 -13.763 -14.126 -10.810
(0.137) (-1.752) (-1.956) (-3.457) (-3.674) ( -2.922)
AM DB 0.55751 0.26672 0.32763 0.34952 0.32433 0.42233
(2.917) (J .578) (1.688) (2.166) ( 1.879) (2.098)
DB GNP -7.0140 -8.6102 -8.5049 -8.4958 -10.178 - 10.053
(-2.985) (-3.862) ( -3.(97) (-3.246) (-3.681) (-5.341)
SA XP 2.0666 3.0599 2.8027 2.5262 3.1699 3.6679
(1.403) (I. 950) (1.617) ( 1.943) (2.500) (5.824)
IN GNP 0.18609 12.663 14.119 18.183 17.279 13.441
(7.557) (3.941) (3.359) (5.492) (5.662) (4.756)
GNPPC 1.7743 0.59262 0.50274 0.61470 0.71974 1.4701
(2.454) (0.985) (0.782) (1.022) (1.031) (2.295)
RE MP 2.0337 1.7594 2.2738 2.7799 2.5317 1.4607
(2.691) (1. 725) ( 1.932) (2.747) (2.404) ( 1.823)
XP GNP 3.8236 3.6679 3.2585 2.9210 6.0252 5.8307
(2.543) (1.774) (1.300) ( 1.584) (2.831 ) (3.411)
FR -0.279 -0.371 -0.289 -0.124 -0.101 -0.059
(-3.004) (-3.722) (-2.512) (-0.983) (-0.755) (-0.490)
GE GNP 0.2317 -0.499 -0.457 0.10694 -0.496 -0.844
(0.510) (-1.640) (- 1.082) (0.207) (-1.142) (-1.861)
N 86 86 86 86 86 86
F-test for 6.462 13.123 12.5709 152759 17.8218 19.730
Ho: Wk = 0 V k [0.9E-06] [0.2E-I I] [0.6E-II] [0.7E-13] [0.2E-14] [0.4E-15]
Breusch-Pagan 6.010 12.602 23.571 31.123 25.953 15.011
Chi-Squared [0.739] [0. I82] [0.(05) [0.2E-03] [0.002) [0.09IJ
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.562 0.551 0.6018 0.6404 0.665
Figures in rounded brackets are t-values based on White's standard errors.
Figures in square brackets are significance levels
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(d)
Variable Sample
(15) (16) (17) (18) ( 19)
1985-1986 1986-1987 1987-1988 1988-1989 1989-1990
2 Years 2 Years 2 Years 2 Years 2 Years
Constant -9.9683 -6.7684 -5.320 -1.8180 -2.2810
(-3.174) (-1.888) (-1.260) (-0.443) (-0.559)
AM DB 0.30117 0.066 0.14017 0.33142 0.30385
(2.0S5) (0.379) (0.833) ( 1.947) ( 1.677)
DB GNP -10.849 -12.128 -10.898 -9.8794 -9.7291
(-6.526) (-S.987) (-5.931) (-5.237) (-6.S72)
SA XP 3.8749 0.63932 0.52984 0.46679 0.38096
(8.057) ( 1.559) (2.890) (2.592) (2.254)
IN GNP 11.061 12.437 10.707 6.3203 6.4755
(4.138) (3.887) (2.644) (1.856) ( 1.788)
GNPPC 1.9141 1.1671 1.5033 1.5758 0.42402
(3.375) ( 1.939) (2.344) (2.015) (0.546)
RE MP 1.2834 1.3167 1.2373 1.6529 1.3572
(1.761) (2.165) (2.372) (2.673) (2.060)
XP GNP 6.8627 7.4118 6.2140 5.5878 7.6981
(4.986) (4.603) (4.112) (3.177) (4.238)
FR 0.009 0.040 0.10511 0.067 0.24786E-OI
(0.080) (0.432) ( 1.272) (0.713) (0.245)
GE GNP -0.178 -0.003 -0.545 -0.98272 -0.67962
(-0.508) (-0.010) (-1.573) (-2.509) (-2.121)
N 86 86 86 86 86
F-test for 25.07144 26.851 28.245 24.490 28.248
Ho: Wk = 0 V k [0.4E-15] [0.000] [0.3E-IS] [0.000] [O.IE-IS]
Breusch-Pagan 8.1707 17.7282 0.7425 16.0748 21.6825
Chi-Squared [0.517] [0.039] [0.999] [0.065] [0.010]
(D.F.= 9)
Adjusted R2 0.7182 0.732 0.743 0.713 0.7426
Figures in rounded brackets are t-values based on White's standard errors.
Figures in square brackets are significance levels
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Tallie 4-8. Fixe.d. E(ft:.c.ts. Reg_re.niQl1.5.
(a)
Variable Sample
(20) (21 ) (22) (23) (24)
1979-1990 1979-1986 1983-1990 1979-1984 1985-1990
12 years 8 years 8 years 6 years 6 years
AM DB 0.50406 0.55603 0.272 0.566 0.258
(5.854) (4.778) (2.888) (3.935) (2.590)
DB GNP -9.4115 -10.331 -9.188 -9.718 -9.870
(-10.713) (-8.742) (-9.799) (-6.414) (-9.496)
SA XP 0.67524 4.1034 0.378 3.727 0.433
(4.146) (6.111 ) (2.614) (3.815) (3.129)
IN GNP 0.24772 0.22726 11.956 0.216 9.704
(3.112) (2.740) (8.854) (2.477) (6.449)
GNPPC 1.1563 2.0181 0.849 1.879 0.990
(3.860) (5.114) (2.608) (3.939) (2.750)
RE MP 2.0602 2.1767 1.626 2.356 1.350
(5.185) (4.138) (3.953 ) (3.578) (3.031 )
XP GNP 5.9778 6.9262 5.484 6.082 6.264
(7.604) (6.599) (6.204) (4.503) (6.620)
FR -0.061 -0.011 -0.013 -0.188 0.029
(-1.298) (-1.772) (-0.259) (-2.561) (0.528)
GE GNP -0.302 -0.092 -0.703 -0.082 -0.594
(-1.618) (-0.380) (-3.542) (-0.275) (-2.762)
N 516 344 344 258 258
F-test for 33.385 23.879 45.874 17.001 46.237
Ho: Wk=O V k [0.1 E-77) [O.IE-44) [O.IE-72] [O.8E-28] [0.2E-59)
Adjusted R2 0.557 0.516 0.677 0.466 0.711
Figures in rounded brackets are t values.
Figures in square brackets are significance levels
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(b)
Variable Sample
(25) (26) (27)
1979-1982 1983-1986 1987- I990
4 Years 4 Years 4 Years
AM DB 0.546 0.3238 0.23326
(3.075) (2.108) (2.141)
DB GNP -7.515 - I0.207 -10.207
(-3.938) (-7.633) (-8.361)
SA XP 2.526 3.6468 0.41720
(2.049) (5.363) (3.027)
IN GNP 0.204 13.955 8.1381
(2.363) (7.533) (4.382)
GNPPC 1.773 1.3766 1.0202
(3. 117) (2.841) (2.415)
RE MP 2.495 1.8037 1.4082
(3.032) (2.993) (2.789)
XP GNP 3.925 6.3121 6.8183
(2.448) (4.885) (6.025)
FR -0.275 -0.0591 0.0736
(-3.135) (-0.812) (1.148)
GE GNP -0.071 -0.40259 -0.032
(-0.198) (-1.385) (-2.498)
N 172 172 172
F-test for 11.086 41.23955 42.874
H;; Wk = 0 V k [0.7E-15] [0. IE- I5] [0. IE-42]
Adjusted R2 0.4 1445 0.679268 0.746
Figures in rounded brackets are t values.
Figures in square brackets are significance levels
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(c)
Variable Sample
1979-1980 1981-1982 1983-1984 1985-1986 1987-1988 1989-1990
2 Years 2 Years 2 Years 2 Years 2 Years 2 Years
AM DB 0.564 0.329 0.329 0.302 0.143 0.305
(2.394) ( 1.250) (1.362) (1.461 ) (0.921 ) ( 1.900)
DB GNP -7.054 -8.438 -10.195 -10.832 -10.944 -9.714
(-2.673) (-3.336) (-4.537) (-5.895) (-5.867) (-5.762)
SA XP 2.022 2.829 3.227 3.887 0.526 0.386
(1.251) (1.615) (2.247) (5.032) (2.143) (2.122)
IN GNP 0.195 14.049 17.173 11.065 10.666 6.477
(2.342) (5.210) (5.768) (4.558) (3.380) (2.653)
GNPPC 1.807 0.512 0.721 1.918 1.503 0.428
(2.455) (0.612) (0.941) (2.927) (2.607) (0.644)
RE MP 1.983 2.286 2.517 1.287 1.227 1.362
( 1.707) (2.027) (2.590) ( 1.602) (1.782) ( 1.676)
XP GNP 3.853 3.245 6.137 6.854 6.210 7.700
(I.707) (1.251 ) (2.646) (4.355) (4.013) (4.367)
FR -0.272 -0.290 -0.101 0.009 0.105 0.025
(-2.231) (-2.508) (-0.889) (0.093) ( 1.245) (0.241)
GE GNP 0.183 -0.447 -0.498 -0.177 -0.540 -0.688
(0.362) (-0.913) (-1.060) (-0.465) (-1.455) (-1.841 )
N 86 86 86 86 86 86
F-test for 5.920 11.177 15.873 22.271 25.166 25.124
Ho: (t)k = 0 V k [0.1 E-05] [0.2E-10] [0.7E-14] [0.1 E-17] [0.4E-19] [0.4E-19]
Adjusted R2 0.367 0.5449 0.636 0.71448 0.73979 0.73945
Figures in rounded brackets are t values.
Figures in square brackets are significance levels
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4.7 Elasticities
The parameter estimates from regressions run on each year were used to calculate
elasticities (see Table 4-9), which were plotted over time (Figure 4-1). The
elasticities were based on the estimated weights and computed as the mean across
i of (o(1-di)/owik)(mik1di). It can be seen from these figures that there is
considerable movement over time in the responsiveness of perceived risk to many
of the determinants. Elasticities also vary in magnitude between determinants,
with the majority of regressors proving fairly inelastic (AMDB, SAXP, GNPPC,
REMP, FR, GEGNP); only DBGNP, INGNP and XPGNP were found to have
elasticities with absolute value greater than one. The most volatile elasticities
appear to be with respect to XPGNP, and INGNP, with AMDB and FR having the
least variation in their elasticities. Interestingly, although the FR elasticities vary
little in magnitude, there is a distinct change in sign over the period from negative
to positive. This would suggest that before 1985, the level of democracy in a
country was seen by lenders to have a negative effect on credit worthiness, but
from the mid-eighties onwards this view changed and democratic development
came to be seen as a favourable influence on risk.
Interestingly, the debt service ratio was not found to be a particularly important
determinant of lender's perceived risk with an average elasticity of around 0.6,
despite the fact that,
'The debt service ratio has achieved the status of a rule of thumb by which
to judge a country's creditworthiness. Most authors (Feder et al. 1977;
Cline, 1983) have expected (and found) a significant, positive correlation
between the debt-service ratio and the likelihood of debt rescheduling'
(Moghadam et al., 1991, p.511).
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In the first half of the 1980s this elasticity was noticeably higher than in the period
from 1987-1990. Thus, it would appear that lender's assessment of risk became
less sensitive to SA XP.
Elasticities for DB_GNP and SA_XP generally rose in absolute terms over the
period 1979-1987, except for a small dip in 1982. Both elasticities fell noticably
in 1987, particularly E_SAXP and remained at a lower level until 1990. E AMD
proved highly inelastic throughout the period, with little fluctuation.
All economic variables had the expected positive elasticities throughout the
sample period. E_INGNP proved to be the largest (and most volatile) of the
elasticities. Apart from 1979, all values were greater than one. XP_GNP was the
only other variable to have an elasticity greater than one and proved to be elastic
in more years than not.
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Table 4-9 Elasticities afPerceived Risk
Year AMDB DBGNP SAXP INGNP GNPPC REMP XPGNP FR GEGNP
1979 0.139 -2.359 0.527 0.056 0.824 0.424 1.335 -0.149 0.249
1980 0.079 -2.747 0.801 4.080 0.209 0.464 1.217 -0.224 -0.082
1981 0.040 -2.881 0.834 3.557 0.309 0.550 1.059 -0.284 -0.167
1982 0.142 -2.495 0.530 5.488 0.291 0.745 0.168 -0.075 0.077
1983 0.030 -2.965 0.694 5.451 0.283 0.940 1.318 -0.090 0.026
1984 0.160 -3.288 0.964 4.981 0.482 0.568 1.897 -0.056 -0.312
1985 0.070 -3.244 1.031 3.228 0.898 0.351 1.780 0.001 -0.168
1986 0.068 -3.581 0.865 3.439 0.798 0.449 2.248 0.009 0.028
1987 -0.015 -4.011 0.117 4.500 0.515 0.380 2.353 0.072 -0.100
1988 0.082 -3.109 0.180 3.114 1.000 0.319 0.965 0.055 -0.364
1989 0.069 -3.103 0.107 1.238 0.472 0.624 2.202 0.034 -0.199
1990 0.043 -3.141 0.123 3.021 -0.045 0.168 2.505 -0.004 -0.176
Mean: 0.076 -3.077 0.564 3.513 0.503 0.499 1.587 -0.059 -0.099
StDev 0.051 0.449 0.353 1.616 0.318 0.206 0.696 0.112 0.172
Source: Based on coefficients from econometric estimates
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Figure 4-1 Elasticities Over Time
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
2
Debt Elasticities Over Time
_ .~ .L __ ,__ • :_:
............ - .
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
-E_AMDB
. E_DBGNP .
· E_SAXP
o
O.OOE+OO
-1.00E+00
6.00E+00
5.00E+OO
4.00E+OO
3.00E+OO
2.00E+00
1.00E+00
Economic Elasticities Over Time
-E_INGNP
·0· E_GNPPC
.~E_REMP
...... E_XPGNP
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Gwilym B. J Pryce, 1999, Chapter 4: Empirical Testing of Fluctuations in Weights 144
Political Elasticities Over Time
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Although Brewer and Rivoli (1990) used Gastil's measures in their study of
perceived creditworthiness, they did so only as part of a cross-sectional analysis and
so the econometric model developed here is the first to exploit the panel properties
of Gastil's measures. The movement of the freedom rating parameter suggests
support for Brewer and Rivoli' s second possible interpretation of their results, 'that
the lenders' risk assessments are short sighted in their failure to consider a longer-
term and more comprehensive view of country stability .... ' (op cit., p.365). The
results presented here show a marginally positive relationship for the year of the
Brewer and Rivoli study (i.e. 1986), whereas Brewer and Rivoli found this to be
negative, though not statistically significant. Looking at the bigger picture of how
this parameter has changed over time, it can be seen that their study was done at a
time when lenders were changing their view as to the role of political democracy on
development, and the consequential uncertainty at that time explains the lull in the
Gwilym B. J Pryce, 1999, Chapter 4: Empirical Testing of Fluctuations in Weights 145
statistical significance of the variable in the mid-eighties. Although the t-values
pick up marginally toward the end of the decade, they never fully recover,
suggesting that banks are not fully convinced of the positive relationship between
democracy and creditworthiness.
It was stated above that if and only if the coefficient on GE_GNP is positive, will it
be possible to reject the hypothesis that lenders perceive left wing governments
(defined as those with high levels of intervention) to have higher credit risk. As the
tables and graph show, the sign on the coefficient proved to be somewhat erratic,
reflecting a degree of uncertainty in the lending community. However, in more
years than not, the consensus was that left wing governments entail a higher risk of
default, and so it would seem that the Alesina and Tabellini conjecture is one that
holds favour with the international lending community. Alternatively, the perceived
positive relationship between risk and GE_GNP may be based on the belief that
high levels of intervention produce inefficiencies in the domestic economy through
crowding out effects and high income taxation.
4.8 Structural Break Results
As a means of gauging the location and magnitude of parameter movement seen
in the graphs of Figure 4-1, F-tests were used to measure the extent of structural
breaks over time. The process involved running OLS regressions pooled across a
number of years (for example, 1979-1982), and then comparing coefficients with
those of regressions run on two subsets of this time period (for example, 1979-
1980 and 1981-1982). The null hypothesis is constant coefficients across time,
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and so the time-variation of signal weights is indicated by a large F-value (i.e. one
with a significance level less than or equal to 0.05).
Because it is possible that these structural breaks over time may be controlled for
by parameter shifts in the explanatory variable, F-tests for coefficient stability
over time were also carried out on fixed effects models of the form:
The results of the pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions are reported in Table
4-10 and Table 4-11 below.
The only previous study to date to have tested whether coefficients are stable over
time is that of Thapa and Mehta (1991) which tested for a structural break between
the sample periods 1979-1981 and 1982-1983. They found that the Chow test
statistic was not significant, and so the null hypothesis that the two regressions were
the same could not be rejected. However, they did not test for structural breaks
across other time periods and only include a limited selection of explanatory
variables (with no measure of political stability. In constrast, it can be that 8 out of
15 of the tests on pooled regressions in Table 4-10 rejected the null hypothesis of
constant coefficients. The two largest structural breaks came in the early eighties
(1980-81 and 1982-83). This is consistent with the theory in that this is when the
market-wide risk levels were changing most rapidly (certainly, perceived average
risk were changing most rapidly around this period, as Figure 4-3 shows).
In
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Table 4-11, of the six ANOV A tests on fixed effects regressions, five rejected the
null hypothesis of constant coefficients. Again, the largest structural breaks
(indicated by the lowest significance levels on the F-test) appear to occur earlier
rather than later in the sample time frame (compare the results of test [2] with test
[3]; compare test result [4] with [5] and [6]).
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Table 4-10 AND VA Tests For Parameter Stability: Pooled OLS Rezressiolls
Restricted Unrestricted F-value Sig. Level
12 year pool: 6 year pool:
1979-1990 1979-1984 5.966* 0.000
1985-1990
8 year pool: 4 year pools:
1979-1986 1979-1982 7.265* 0.000
1983-1986
1983-1990 1983-1986 5.019* 0.9E-06
1987-1990
4 year pools: 2 year pools:
1979-1982 1979-1980 3.104* 0.001
1981-1982
1983-1986 1983-1984 1.231 0.383
1985-1986
1987-1990 1987-1988 1.686 0.182
1989-1990
2 year pools: 1 year
regressions:
1979-1980 1979 1.950 0.054
1980
1980-1981 1980 12.761 * 0.7E-4
1981
1981-1982 1981 2.139 0.0949
1982
1982-1983 1982 7.764* 0.7E-3
1983
1983-1984 1983 3.203* 0.025
1984
1984-1985 1984 1.652 0.1963
1985
1985-1986 1985 4.468* 0.007
1986
1986-1987 1986 1.081 0.390
1987
1987-1988 1987 1.339 0.321
1988
1988-1989 1988 3.617* 0.016
1989
1989-1990 1989 2.663* 0.047
1990
* Null can be rejected at 95% level of confidence.
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Table 4- 11 AND VA Tests For Parameter Stability: Fixed Meets (FE)
Regressions
Test Restricted Unrestricted F-value Significance
No. Level
12 year FE: 6 year FE:
[1] 1979-1990 1979-1984 3.219* 0.4E-5
1985-1990
8 year FE: 4 year FE:
[2] 1979-1986 1979-1982 3.666* 0.4E-4
1983-1986
[3] 1983-1990 1983-1986 2.902* 0.2E-3
1987-1990
4 year FE: 2 year FE:
[4] 1979-1982 1979-1980 2.331* 0.009
1981-1982
[5] 1983-1986 1983-1984 1.911 0.103
1985-1986
[6] 1987-1990 1987-1988 2.920* 0.020
1989-1990
* Null can be rejected at 95% level of confidence.
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Figure 4-2 Perceived Market Risk: Annual Average Institutional Investor
Ratings
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4.9 Summary
We noted in the previous chapter how the fluidity of lenders' perceptions may
result in borrowers finding it difficult to identify the cocktail of economic policies
that will minimise risk premiums on external borrowing because there is no stable
relationship between perceived credit risk and determinants. This chapter has
demonstrated that lender perceptions are indeed unstable, with considerable
movements over time in the weights given to a number of economic variables.
Perhaps the most striking implication, however, of these results, is the mixed
signals given by lenders to debtor nations as to the efficacy of democratic
development. In the early 1980s, authoritarian governments were seen as a
positive advantage, in the mid 1980s the effect of democracy was seen as
ambiguous, and at the end of the period, democracy was seen, once more, as
marginally detrimental to credit risk.
These results also have implications for lenders. It seems highly unlikely that the
relationship between actual risk and economic variables is as unstable as the
relationship between perceived risk and economic variables found in this chapter.
Such variation must mean that low risks have been denied credit or charged
excessive risk premiums, and more importantly for lenders, high risk countries
will have been lent inappropriate amounts of credit at inappropriately low risk
premiums. That the structural breaks continued right up until the most recent
period considered in the analysis, suggests that the inaccuracies and uncertainties
that led to the early 1980s debt crisis had not been fundamentally resolved by the
end of the decade.
Gwilym B. 1. Pryce. 1999. Chapter 4: Empirical Testing of Fluctuations in Weights 152
Thus, the theory and results presented in this chapter are potentially important to
both the academic literature and to those directly involved in the sovereign debt
problem. The implication for borrowers is that risk assessment is not fixed in
stone and this suggests that there should be room for maneuver when bargaining
over loan terms. For lenders, the results highlight the need for them to be aware
of their own capriciousness (particularly with regard to political factors) and to
treat with some skepticism the results of risk assessment. It is also important for
lenders to fully appreciate the complex nature of the relationship between the
probability of charging the optimal rate of interest and the level of risk assessment
expenditure. Greater risk assessment expenditure only alters the shape of the error
distribution--it does not remove it. Moreover, the changed shape may actually
reduce the probability of setting an inappropriate interest rate. The implication for
the academic literature is that coefficients on linear parameterizations of perceived
risk cannot be assumed constant over time and this precludes the hitherto
ubiquitous use of data pooling.
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Notes:
i The precise relationship between default probability and LIBOR spread was assumed to be:
s = fp!(1-p)], where s is spread over LIBOR, p is the (subjective) default probability.
ii Namely: interest rates on international lending, growth of GNPPC, the ratio of total foreign debt to
GNP, the growth rate of industrial countries, variability in changes in per capita GDP, and the ratio of
government debt to GDP.
III I if a major borrower, 0 if not. Based on World Bank classification, Lee's (1991 b) major
borrowers consist of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Turkey, and Venezuela.
iv I if a highly indebted country, 0 if not. According to World Bank classification, Lee (1991 b)
includes the following as HICs: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and
Yugoslavia.
v Presumably this is because the stronger the trade link, the more vulnerable is the borrower. For
example, if the bank promotes a negative publicity campaign against the borrower, the country may
lose export earnings.
5 Classificatory Risk Assessment and
Favourable Selection
5.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters examined the rationale behind, and evidence for,
fluctuations in risk assessment and their impact on default risk as perceived by
borrowers, assuming that risk assessment produced continuous scale of perceived
creditworthiness for each borrower. This chapter will go on to examine the
implications of classificatory risk assessment, where the monitoring procedure
yields bands of risk rather than a continuum.
The chapter will begin by examining ASCRE (Adverse Selection induced Credit
Rationing Equilibria), which is the explanation put forward by S&W. It is based
on the observation that raising the rate of interest may cause adverse selection
when there is no risk assessment, and so there may be occasions when it is optimal
for lenders to ration credit. The chapter then introduces risk assessment and
shows how monitoring, and its corollary, differentiated interest rates, will always
increase the return on loans to a borrower of particular risk type.
I then aim to show that risk-differentiated pricing can produce favourable
selection, producing an overall utility gain for the lender if the number of
borrowers in each risk category is uniformly distributed or monotonically
increasing with risk. The chapter also demonstrates that there is an absolute limit
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for optimal risk expenditure, and that there will be less scope for S&W type credit
rationing as risk assessment approaches this limit.
5.2 Basic Model
Consider a credit market with n types of risk neutral entrepreneur (investor) i,
where i E 1, and 1= {l, 2, ... n}, each with the opportunity to invest in a project
requiring a fixed amount of fixed capital, K. Banks in tum demand fixed collateral
C, and charge interest rate r on each loan. Investor i's project succeeds with
probability Pi yielding the positive return RSi ; and fails with probability (J -Pi)
yielding zero return, where higher risk projects receive a higher return: 1 > P' >
P2> ... r-> 0 and K < RS, < RS2 < .... < R; where the increments of Pi and RSi are
proportionately of similar magnitudes. i It is assumed that lenders are risk averse,
U(.) '>0, U(.) "<0, and know the distribution of RSi and the distribution of N; the
number of loans made to risk type i. It is further assumed that the interest charged
on deposits is unrelated to the terms of the loan.
5.2.1 Borrowers
The elementary objective function of borrowers is given by max [RSdl +r)K, -C]
and expected returns are given by,
Jr~ =Pi[RSi-(1+r)K]-(l-Pi)C. [1]
It is assumed that the entrepreneur of type i only takes out the loan if,
[2]
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Thus, a necessary condition for an offer of a loan to be accepted, the return if
successful has to be greater than the total repayment costs: RSi> (1+r)K. This is
obvious from equations [1] and [2] which imply that, Pi[RSi-(l+r)K]?(l-Pi)C,
yielding the necessary and sufficient condition,
C
p.>-------
I _ R;'-(l+r)K+C' [3]
Since O<Pi<1, it follows that RSi>(l +r)K. The number of loans demanded by risk
type i is thus given by
{
T· h >
/> _ N; If Jr; _ 0,
N; - h°if n, < 0,
where N/ is the total number of firms of type i.
Proposition ].' Raising the rate of interest causes adverse selection when there is
no risk assessment.
ProQ.,t First assume that, for a given interest rate r, there is a threshold success
probability Pi# (i.e. threshold type of investor) such that the entrepreneur borrows
from the bank if and only if Pi5:Pi# (i.e. i?i#) where Pi#'(r)<O (i# is positively
related to r).
The proof can be shown by contradiction. First note that pu is given where the
borrower just breaks even. For Jrbi=O the weak inequality [3] becomes an
equation,
C [3.1]
P;# = R;~ -(l+r)K+C'
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where RSi# is the return if successful associated with Pi#, given the fixed
relationship between RS and p. Given that the loan is only applied for if RSi# ~
(l +r)K. it follows that higher rates of interest will raise RSi#,
because of the negative relationship between RSi and i. In other words, lower risks
will not apply for a loan when r increases because it is not worth their while given
the lower return on lower risk projects, and the greater cost of repayment when r
increases. Now assume that Pi# is nQ1 strictly decreasing in r,
=> i#(r+f.)~iHCr) which contradicts [4].
5.2.2 Lenders
Competitive lenders know the distribution of Pi and R\ and so know the value of
Pi#, but cannot identify the Pi of a particular loan applicant. Lenders are risk
averse and wish to maximise U where
[5]
and Uj is the utility obtained from loans to borrowers of type i. Banks finance
their credit offers by funds from deposits. If B is the interest paid on deposits, the
bank's utility of net profits on a loan to investor i is given by,
ui=Nifpju{(l+r)K -(J +B)K} + (J-Pi)U{C- (l+B)K}]. [6]
Banks will only lend to borrowers where Ui>O.
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Proposition 2: Equilibrium credit rationing is possible if the lenders are
imperfectly informed concerning Pi .
Proof Credit rationing is defined as a situation where N; < NF, where NY; is the
number of loans demanded from risk type i (where NF = N/ or 0). This implies
that :3i such that ,,/(r) ;:::0 and N; < Nr Such rationing can be sustained in
equilibrium provided :3i such that,
U(r + e) < U(r) and N; < NF
where G E 91+.Thus, raising r in certain circumstances will reduce overall lender
utility for the lender, and so allow for the possibility that raising the interest rate
will not be optimal, even when there is excess demand for credit. Proof can be
established by contradiction. Suppose U(r+£»U(r)forsome£,Pi,Ni and r,
then,
"i-II ( ) "i-II ()~ L..,.- u r + e > L..,.- u r
1=1, , 1='* I
which implies that one of two possibilities must always be true when r rises: either
utility per loan type does not diminish when r rises and higher interest rates
always imply a lower threshold risk group i# ; or utility per loan type is strictly
greater when r rises, but the threshold risk group is weakly lower,
both of which contradict [4]. So for credit rationing to be precluded it has to be
shown, not only that n - i«, the number of risk groups which the bank can sum
across, remains the same or increases, but also that the utility to the lender of each
loan to type i always increases. However, because lower risk groups are less
likely to make a profit when interest rates rise, the bank will effectively screen out
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lower risk borrowers (i# always rises when r rises). Also, it should be noted that
the bank gains more utility from lending to good risks eet. par. and so its average
utility per loan type diminishes when good risks are screened out. The preference
for good risks (eet. par.) can be shown by contradiction: if U;>Uk and N;=Nk'
where i>k, then,
p;U{ (1+r)K-(l +8)K} +(l-p;)u{ C-(l +8)K} >
Pku{(l+r)K-(l+ 8)K}+ (l-Pk)U{C- (I+8)K},
~ P;>Pk,
which contradicts the ordering of probabilities. Thus the increased utility from
raising r (due to the greater gross interest) has to be balanced against the lost
utility from screening out good risks and the riskier loan portfolio that it implies.
Notice that the bank will not always ration credit, but the above, first put forward
by S&W in the context of risk neutral banks, shows how credit rationing is not
precluded under asymmetric information.
5.3 Risk Assessment
Investing in risk assessment allows the bank to distinguish between v* risk groups
amongst borrowers where v* takes only positive integer values: V*E [1,00]' The
interval to which the lender can allocate borrower type i following the assessment
of risk is given by, Pv={p;: Pv5.P;<Pv+J} where Pv = v/v* and v E V; V = {a, 1,2,
... , 1:}, 1: = v*-I; and P = {Pv: v E V}. Qualities ofP include (1) V v: P; c P ; (2)
VI*- V2 ~ Pvl fl Pvl = 0; and (3) Uv(V Pv = P. In other words, every point ofP
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belongs to one and only one P; (each subset P; of P is therefore disjoint), and so
the family of sets P is a partition. Risk assessment is 'true' in the sense that
borrowers are always correctly associated with the appropriate partition of P.
Since the bank knows the risk interval to which each potential borrower belongs,
it is not possible for borrowers at the lower end of each interval, who may be
faced with a rate of interest that makes borrowing unattractive (i.e. RSi<(J +rv)K)
to surreptitiously make their way into the lower category. Thus, borrower type i
cannot pretend to be anything other than {i : Pv ::;p;<pv+ I} .
5.3. 1 Cost/ess Risk Assessment
For a given level of risk assessment, the lender aims to max (J, where
(J = L"U", [7]
where U,' is utility gained from a particular risk interval, Pi; which the bank can
identify. This utility will comprise the sum of utilities from loans to all borrowers
relevant to that risk interval, ranging from the highest risks admitted (determined
by risk assessment) to the lowest, defined either by the upper bound of Pc, or by
the risk group that just breaks even given r.; whichever is the greatest. Note that,
for each identified interval, there will be a different interest rate and so there will
be a different associated threshold success probability Pi#V and associated i#v,
_ "i,
U,' = L..Jmax(i i'I')
'v'
N;fp;u{(l+r)K -(1+B)K} + (l-p;)u{C- (l+B)K}],
[8]
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where i.v is defined as {i: Pi = max(pi < Pv+l)}, the lowest i admitted in Py; i; is the
highest i admitted in P; defined as {i: Pi = Pv}; and i#v is the threshold risk group
who will still find it profitable to apply for a loan given r; (all i < i# will not
apply). Note also that for each risk type there is a threshold interest rate ri#
above which investors will not apply for a loan, and this is obtained by solving for
r; in the equation for Pi#V, which is derived in a similar way to Pi#:
c
[9]
P,«; = R" -(I+r,,)K+C;#1'
Borrowers will only apply for a loan if RSi#y>(1 +r v)K . ii
If the bank sets r" such that the threshold success probability is greater than or
equal to the upper bound of F;
then all risk types in the interval P; will apply for a loan because,
The number of loans made to investors in P, will be N; where N; = L;~"N, . In
general N, is given by
"i" NNv = ~ ;'max(i .." i",) [10]
Note that there is no incentive to set r, below that which produces i#y = i·v,
since the bank would lose revenue on each loan without gaining extra (low risk)
loan applicants.
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On the other hand, if the bank sets r" such that the threshold success probability is
less than the lower bound of Pv,
r; = {rv:p#v <Pv}= fry: is«> iv},
then no risk types in P; apply, and Nv=O. Since the lender knows t=; and i.; and
hence the associated probabilities and returns (Pi.v, pi; RSi•v, RSiv), it can compute
the interest rates in each P v required to achieve Pi.v and Piv- Thus, the profit
maximising bank will always set r; such that rvmin ~ r; ~ rvmax,where r"min = {r,
: i#v = i.v}. and rvmax={rv: i#v= iv}. (NB: i.v < iv).
To recap, summation is across all investors at least as risky as the threshold risk,
i#" (determined by r,,), but less risky than the lower success probability bound p.:
If r, is set such that i#v>iv then there will be zero loan applicants from the range
Pv. If r, is set such that i#v ~ i.v then all risks in the range P; will apply.
Proposition 3: Increasing costless risk assessment will always increase the return
on loans to a borrower of particular risk type, and produce favourable selection,
producing an overall utility gain for the lender if Nt is uniformly distributed, or
monotonically increasing across i.
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ProQt
Increasing risk assessment allows the bank to obtain some of the surplus
previously attributed to borrowers because it allows the bank to charge a greater
number of differentiated interest rates. This inevitably means that borrowers (for
whom investment is still profitable in the state of greater risk assessment) that
enjoyed a large difference between their reservation interest rate, ri#, and the
actual interest rate, r.; will, under a regime of greater risk assessment, be faced
with an interest rate that is closer to their reservation rate. Let S be the total
borrower surplus for all Pv E P,
where,
~i"
Sv = L... .. (r#i -r,.)Ni,maX(/" .• I.,.)
Raising v* results in a greater number of subsets of P, resulting in narrower
intervals for each interest rate, rvrnin :::; r; :::;rvrnax, and this will cause the average
consumer surplus sjNv in each identified risk interval to fall. This means that for
every loan made, the bank is receiving a greater return.
However, as the diagram below shows, a greater number of identifiable risk
categories will result in some borrowers being priced out of the market, as well as
others now being priced 'into' the market. It is possible that the former group will
dominate both the latter group and the utility gain from greater revenue per loan.
The horizontal axis depicts the spectrum of threshold interest rates across i, given
that each i has a unique threshold interest rate, above which it is not worthwhile
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investing. Super-imposed onto the axes are the interest rates actually charged,
denoted by r under no risk assessment, and rl and r2 following risk assessment.
All risk types with threshold interest rates less than r., are effectively excluded
(shown by the shaded area in Figure 5-1). Thus, when risk assessment is
increased, as depicted in diagram (b), those investors with interest rates between
r2min and ri will no longer find it profitable to invest. There is no a priori reason
why the number of new borrowers due to risk assessment (i.e. those lying between
rl and r) will be greater than the number of old borrowers that have been lost.
However, those gained will have a lower probability of default than those lost, and
so this displacement produces a less risky loan portfolio for the bank. Note that if
N; is uniformly distributed, or monotonically increasing across i, the
discplacement results 111 an unambiguous utility gain for the lender since the
number of borrowers displaced 111 higher risk subsets of P will outweigh the
number displaced in lower risk subsets.
Figure 5-1 The Favourable Selection of Risk Assessment
(a) v* = 1
rillax
(b) v* = 3
rlmin rlmax
r2min
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5.4 Costly Risk Assessment
Now assume that there is a cost schedule associated with assessing risk, S, where:
v* = v*(s); v*'(s) > 0; and v*( s = 0) = 1.
Banks will invest in risk assessment to the extent that the marginal gain just equals
the marginal loss. Thus, factors which cause the gains to rise relative to costs, will
result in a higher optimum level of risk assessment, and vice versa. The optimum
level of risk assessment is denoted by s*.
Proposition 4: There exists an absolute limit for c;* given by r:;~so that 0 S c;* S
ELQQ.f: This follows from the assumption that there exists some level of risk
assessment that results in P becoming a family of singletons (that is, no more than
one Pi in each Pv), and that the bank knows when it has reached this level of risk
assessment (the bank can deduce this from the fact that it knows the range of RS in
each P v, and so it knows that there is only one Pi in P v when RS vrnax = RS vrnin for all
v). Beyond this level of expenditure, the bank gains nothing from additional
investment in assessment.
Proposition 5: If risk assessment is sufficient to produce 'near perfect'
information then there will be no scope for ASCRE.
Proal 'Near perfect' information is defined as the situation where the partition of
P is fine enough to include only one i in each partition (as is the case when l;* =
l;~)and so the bank does not have to pool different risk types, but can charge
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separate interest rates to each i. In which case, banks can respond to excess
demand for funds in any category Pi E P; by raising the interest rate in that
category, without risk of adverse selection, provided the interest rate is not raised
above ri#v. If r; is raised above ri#V then no investor in P; will apply. Thus, every
risk type is treated as a separate market, each market having homogenous-risk
loan applicants and an interest rate determined through the traditional interaction
of demand and supply.
5.5 Summary
In the previous two chapters we examined the rationale and evidence for
fluctuations in risk assessment and their impact on default risk as perceived by
borrowers, assuming that risk assessment produced a continuous scale of
creditworthiness for each borrower. This chapter has examined the implications
of classificatory risk assessment, where the monitoring procedure yields bands of
risk rather than a continuum.
It began by reproducing the S&W result that raising the rate of interest causes
adverse selection when there is no risk assessment, providing a rationale for
equilibrium credit rationing. The chapter then introduced risk assessment and
showed that risk assessment, and its corollary, differentiated interest rates, will
always increase the return on loans to a borrower of particular risk type. I have
aimed to show that risk-differentiated pricing can produce favourable selection,
producing an overall utility gain for the lender if the number of borrowers in each
risk category is uniformly distributed or monotonically increasing with risk. This
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is an important result since it adds to the rationale for risk pricing. Not only does
the lender gain revenue through extracting more surplus from higher risks, but it
also favourably influences the actual selection of risks. Surprisingly, this is not
something which has been noted in the literature and so this is a significant
contribution. The chapter also demonstrated that there is an absolute limit for
optimal risk assessment expenditure, and that there will be less scope for S&W
type credit rationing as risk assessment approaches this limit.
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Notes:
i This is to preclude the possibility that i+1 has R'i+1 "" R'i, and Pi+1 «Pi which suggests the
possibility that expected profits in equation [I] may actually be less for i+ I than for i. Stated in the
positive, I assume that for a given rate of interest, Pi and R'; are related in such a way that expected
profits are higher for higher risks. This is less restrictive that assuming a mean preserving spread
(as in S&W) and yet is sufficient to reproduce the S&W result.
ii . R'e; >(I+r)K~r< ~-I
6 Credit Insurance, Perverse Incentives
and Credit Rationing
6.1 Introduction
Having developed a model of lending with risk assessment in the previous
chapter, this chapter now introduces credit insurance into the model. Over the last
quarter of a century, there has been considerable growth in the employment of
loan insurance in a variety of credit markets. In return for an annual or front
loaded premium, lenders can claim from the indemnity provider some proportion
of the losses made in the event of default. As financial products and the loan base
have diversified in a large number of credit markets, such coverage has proved to
be an attractive way for lenders to share default risks and has resulted in loan
insurance becoming a significant component of the insurance industry. Various
types of credit insurance have also been suggested for the sovereign debt market:
'Many proposals for solving the foreign debt problem of developing countries
contain some kind of contract in which part of the repayment to creditor banks is
insured by a third party, such as a donor country or a multinational organization'
(Borensztein and Pennacchi, 1990, p.806), although it is really in the personal
sector that the loan insurance has burgeoned.
US private mortgage insurance, for example, grew rapidly during the 1970s from
5.1% of total conventional lending in 1970 to 18.2% in 1980, with 70% of
mortgages with loan to value (LTV) ratios over 80% carrying private insurance by
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the end of the decade (Brueckner, 1985). UK mortgage insurance in the form of
Mortgage Indemnity Guarantee enjoyed a similar expansion period during the
1980s, partly due to the increased availability of credit following financial
deregulation and the consequent rise in the number of mortgages with LTVs over
75%. Loan insurance has also been employed in a range of other credit markets,
often on an ad hoc basis, and sometimes underwritten by not-for-profit or
government organisations, such as the UK Loan Guarantee Scheme, introduced in
1981 to improve access to credit by small firms constrained in their ability to
borrow by lack of collateral. Firms pay an insurance premium - calculated as a
proportion of the loan - to the government, and in the event of default, the state
compensates the bank for the outstanding amount of the proportion guaranteed. i
Credit insurance has also been widely employed by firms to indemnify against
default risk of balance sheet receivables (Jackson 1996).
But such expansion has not been without its problems. Both in the US and the
UK, mortgage insurance players have experienced severe losses during periods of
high default rates. In the 1980s, for example, the collapse of Equity Programs
Investment Corporation left private mortgage insurance firms in the US with
combined exposures of over $400 million - approximately 18 % of the industry's
total capital (Kau et al., 1993). Similarly, following the massive surge in
repossessions in the early 1990s, insurers of UK mortgages found themselves
faced with losses estimated in excess of £3 billion (Douetil, 1994).
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Despite the pervasiveness and size of loan insurance markets (the UK mortgage
market alone is a sizeable entity, with gross mortgage advances of over £64 billion
in 1988, and over £52 billion even in the recession of 1992, [Ford and Kempson
1997]), relatively little work has been done developing appropriate
microeconomic theory to model their behavioural implications. The aim of this
chapter, therefore, is to apply the techniques developed in the asymmetric
information literature to the loan insurance market and to trace the connections
between the three sets of agents involved: lenders, borrowers, and insurers.
Because a brief review of the relevant literature was given in chapter 2, there is no
need to discuss it here. As far as the author is aware, no asymmetric information
study to date has examined the simultaneous interaction of both insurer incentives,
lender incentives and borrower incentives, or considered the implications of loan
insurance for lender decisions to offer credit, set interest rates, and assess risk.
It is the aim of this chapter to show that two types of moral hazard can occur in
the presence of loan insurance; the first arising from lenders having insufficient
incentive to assess borrowers; and the second arising from the incentive for banks
to select deliberately high risks, knowing that such borrowers will pay higher
interest rates, and that any losses will be covered by insurance. The chapter also
examines the possibility of equilibrium credit rationing occurring In a near-
perfectly informed credit market under various insurance regimes. A discrete
model of lending with risk assessment and loan insurance is developed, where the
insurer has to rely on the lender to identify and select low risk borrowers. Risk
averse banks have the option to assess risk and to obtain loan insurance, and
insurance companies, unable to observe borrowers directly, can process signals
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from the terms of the loan contract (such as interest rates), and if necessary make
insurance coverage contingent upon these loan terms.
6.2 Loan Insurance with Flat Rate Premiums
Assume now that the bank is able to take out loan insurance against default losses
which covers the difference between the outstanding capital balance and the value
of collateral. Thus, in the event of default the bank claims back Ji(K-C) where ji is
the level of insurance cover. The cost of insurance is given by If/(e), where If! is
the premium and If/(O)= 0, Ifl(f) > O. It may not, however, be the bank who pays
the premium, but the borrower - as in the case of the Mortgage Indemnity
Guarantee (MIG) system in the UK, even though it is the bank who receives the
insurance cover. We consider both possibilities below and examine the
implications of each scenario.
6.2. 1 Insurance Company
It is assumed that the insurer cannot observe the lender's utility function. It can,
however, observe the terms of the borrowers' payoff functions such as interest
rates, and knows the distribution of Pi and its relationship to RSi, but does not know
the Pi of individual loan applicants. Irrespective of who pays the premium, the
risk neutral insurance company aims to maximise expected profits given by,
I1f'~ = I"n; , [11 ]
where,
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~~ ( )1[,= .. -1-. fiK-C Nv max(I, • .t."j If/ ( P,) '( .') i [11.1]
Flat rate premiums such as these have been used in a number of credit market
situations, most notably in the UK Mortgage Indemnity Guarantee market in the
1980s, and in the UK Loan Guarantee Scheme.
Proposition 6: Insurance reduces the utility gain from lending to lower risks.
ProQt In the uninsured state, more risk assessment increases the number of
identified risk categories allowing a greater number differentiated interest rates,
which in tum reduces the potential for adverse selection. If there exists a k E 1
such that rk# < ry', and Pk# > Py.#, where ry' and Py.# are respectively the interest rate
and threshold success probability associated with the lowest recognised risk
interval Py' E P, then increasing v* to the point where ry' < rk# will increase utility
to the bank (if risk assessment is costless) because the average risk of loan
portfolios will fall with the inclusion of Pk and the displacement effect will bring
an overall utility gain provided the number of investors is uniformly distributed
across risk types.
In contrast, under loan insurance the lender will gain less from having a less risky
portfolio, and under full coverage, will not gain at all. Under no insurance, if i >
k, and N; = Ni, then U; > Uk would imply Qi > Qk , where Qi and Qk are the utilities
from lending to individual investor of type i and k respectively. This is a
contradiction given:
Qi = Piu(l+r)K + (l-Pi)U(C) - u[(l+B)K + s],
and,
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This will still be the case under insurance, but the utility gain from having lower
risks will be less when the bank can make a claim against default losses. Let Q
and Qk be the analogous utilities under insurance,
Q = Piu(l+ri)K + (l-Pi)U(C + I{F-c)) - u[(l+B)K + fll{P) + s],
It can be shown that Qk - Qi > Qk - Qi' that is, the gain in utility from lending to a
lower risk is greater in the uninsured state. Assume the opposite: Qk - Qi ~ Qk-
S (Pi - Pk) u(C + I(K-C)) +Pku(l+rk)K - Piu(1+ri)K
~ (Pk - Pi) u(C) ~ (Pk - Pi) u(C + I(K-C))
which is a contradiction 'I/! > O. More generally, it can be shown that the utility
gain from lending to lower risks is less the higher the insurance coverage. Let tI
A A A A
Qk/I - Q/1 S Qk/2 - Q/2
~ u(C + tiCK-C)) ~ u(C + f'z(K-C))
which is a contradiction.
Gwilym B. J Pryce. 1999. Chapter 6: Credit Insurance 175--~----~----~-------------------------------
Prooosition 7: Type A (Mild) Moral Hazard: Insurance cover makes assessment
of risk less appealing to lenders.
Proot This follows on from Proposition 6 which implies that the optimal level of
risk assessment expenditure, l;*, will be lower under insurance because l;* is
determined where the benefits from extra risk assessment just equal the costs.
This break even point will be lower if the benefits are reduced in some way, as
they are through loan insurance.
Prooosition 8: Ty_veB (Acute) Moral Hazard: Insurance reduces the utility losses
from raising interest rates and so results in a higher optimal interest rate, thus
screening out good risks.
/!rQQj: Let r* v be the optimal interest rate charged to i: Pi E Pi: For the rational
lender r* v will be determined where the utility gain (due to extra revenue per loan)
from raising r., just equals the utility loss (due to adverse selection). We already
know from the bounds on r; that rvmax ~ r*v ~ rvmin.Now it can be shown that the
optimal interest rate will be lower at lower levels of insurance coverage: r*VII ~
r*vd, where 0 ~ II < .~~ 1. This follows from the fact that r* v will be higher if
the utility losses from raising r; are in some way reduced as they are through loan
insurance. To show this, compare the utility to the lender of a loan to the average
risk in Pv, denoted by PI when r; = rlv, and ]52 when r; = ri-, where rt» < r2v·
Average success probability is calculated as j3 = _I_Iiv . . NiPi' where i#v=N maX(IN" ,t.,,)
I'
j{rv) and i#v'(r) > O. The gain in Qi, the utility per loan from raising r., is greater
when insurance is higher:
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where,
A
Qrlfl = P2u(1+r2)K+(l-P2)u(C+ft(K-C»)-u[(1+B)K+ '!J{£)+l;],
- [p, u(l +r I)K + (1- 15,)u( C + fi(K-C») - u[(l +B)K + '!J{£) + l;]]'
- [15, u(1 +r I)K + (1- 15, )u(C + 6_(K-C») - u[(l +B)K + '!J{f.) + l;]]'
Assuming the opposite of the proposition,
..... '" " .....
Qir2fl - Qir1fl> Qir2f2 - Qir1f2
Since 15,> 152,
~ u(C + fi(K-C») > u(C + 6_(K-C»)
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which is a contradiction. Thus r*2 > r*).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 9; Loan insurance weakens the S&W credit rationing result whether
it is lenders or borrowers who pay the premiums.
Another corollary of Proposition 1 is that because flat rate loan insurance reduces
the utility loss of lending to bad risks, it weakens the effects of the adverse
selection associated with raising interest rates to clear the market. Thus, when f!. =
1, there is no utility loss from lending to bad risks, and so no disincentive to
raising interest rates in the event of excess demand, and so equilibrium credit
rationing is not feasible irrespective of the level of information asymmetry
between banks and borrowers.
6.2.2 Borrowers pay the premium
Consider the case where it is investors, not lenders, who bear the cost of insurance
(which is the most common arrangement for credit insurance). This yields an
expected utility of lending to each risk type of :
u;=N;[p;u(l +rv)K +(1 -p;)u( C+ £ (K-C»)-u[(1 +fJ)K+Q].
Borrower expected profits are now,
[15]
It is assumed that the information collected by banks is strictly private-insurers
do not know the extent of risk assessment or the results from it. Consequently, the
moral hazards described in the 'banks pay premiums' scenario still apply, with the
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added problem for insurers that raising premiums to cover losses will exacerbate
the adverse selection effects. The following proposition still holds under risk
assessment and differentiated interest rates provided there is more than one Pi E PI'
(i.e. P, is not a singleton), which implies s* < s -.
Proposition 10: When risks are pooled, and borrowers pay premiums. raising
premiums causes adverse selection, and hence in a pooled risk regime where
borrowers pay the premiums, insurance rationing is a feasible equilihrium
outcome.
Proat
Intuitively, the reason follows from the fact that premiums can be viewed as
adding to the cost of borrowing, and so raising premiums in a pooled risk
environment has the effect of disqualifying good risks from obtaining credit since
their project return if successful is lower than for high risks. Analogous to the
S&W type credit rationing result, the proof follows from showing that the
threshold success probability is positively related to IjI when risks are pooled.
(There will always be some pooling of risks unless SO = S- in which case the
lender has the option of offering differentiated interest rates to each risk type).
Assuming the opposite when the borrower pays gives,
Pi# under indemnity guarantee can be obtained from augmenting [3.1] with the
insurance premium to yield:
P,« = pJRi' -(l+r)K+C]
C+e+1jI
[14]
Gwilym B. 1. Pryce, 1999, Chapter 6: Credit Insurance 179--~----~------~-------------------------------
Thus, C+~+& C+~p;[R;'-(l+r)K+C] <Pi[R;'-(l+r)K+C] which is a contradiction
given that E > O. Although insurers do not know individual pi, they know the
distribution of Pi and its relationship with RSi and as such can compute Pi# for a
given interest rate and the effect on pu of changing '1/.
6.2.3 Lenders Pay Premium
Assume .e is determined exogenously and that the bank pays the premium." This
gives an expected utility to the lender from lending to each risk type of:
ui=Ni[PiU(l +rv)K +(l-Pi)U( C+.e (K-C»)-u[(1 +B)K + '1/ (fJ )+SJ]
Note that if premiums are flat rate, raising premiums will not alter the decision to
raise interest rates even when it is lenders who pay (although the threat of
increased premiums may well be effective - see section 7).
6.2.4 Applicability to the Mortgage Market
We cited the mortgage market in the introduction as an example of a sector where
credit insurance has become prevalent. The applicability of the results of this
chapter (and the next) to the housing market rests on the appropriateness of the
assumptions, particularly the relationship between risk and return, which underlie
the adverse selection/moral hazard processes of the S&W model. Does return
really rise with risk in the housing market, and if so, in what sense?
First, it should be said that if no such relationship existed (i.e. greater returns were
available in certain areas without any additional risks), then some kind of
arbitrage process would come into play ensuring that the anomaly was only
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temporary. For example, if purchasing a house in Edinburgh was certain to result
in substantial capital gains, there would inevitably be an influx of speculative
purchases. This would drive the price of Edinburgh housing up further, fuelling
another round of rising prices and speculation. As this process continues, and
prices escalate, there becomes at some point a very real risk that the bubble will
burst and substantial capital losses made, particularly for those who entered the
market relatively late on. Eventually the bubble does indeed burst and prices
adjust to their long-run equilibrium level.
Although it seems that those who bought early on (when prices were low) would
have borne relatively little risk and made the greatest return, a number of points
should be noted before one jumps to the conclusion that the textbook risk return
relationship has been disproved:
1. risk-return choices cannot be compared at different points in time since each
time period is accompanied by different information sets.
2. those who bought before the price rises were facing the greatest risk (i.e.
greatest variance of possible returns given the contemporaneous information
set) because they would have had the least historical information on rising
house prices. Edinburgh would have been just one of many locations where
prices could potentially rise in future. Those who came in later had more
information on how the market was behaving and had the benefit of observing
an upward price trend relative to other areas. Their lower risk (i.e. lower
variance of possible returns) was accompanied by lower returns (they were
purchasing nearer the peak).
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3. even if a negative risk-return relationship were evident in a particular market
at a particular point in time, one should not confuse temporary deviations from
a general law (i.e. the adjustment process) with a contradiction of that law.
Arbitrage opportunities do not last forever unless there are significant barriers
to entry.
In the mortgage market, such barriers may well of course exist: downpayment
requirements, credit rationing, illiquidity and immobility, may all limit the number
of borrowers who can take advantage of potentially high returns with limited
risks. But the market is sufficiently large to reduce this possibility to a time lag in
adjustment rather than a permanent state of high returns with low risks. It should
also be noted that high interest rates may, at the margin, screen out borrowers with
pure consumption motives and attract only those who are willing to take the risk
that future capital gains may not outstrip the high costs of repayment. Clearly, the
higher the interest rates, the greater the gamble. Interest rate rises may also have a
moral hazard since it may make borrowers more inclined to purchase in areas with
rapidly rising-but more volatile--prices, in the hope of recapturing the costs of
borrowing. Or it may force borrowers to locate in high employment-risk areas, or
purchase a dwelling more likely to have structural faults, or buy in a difficult-to-
sell locale where the escape route of rapid sale in the face of repayment problems
is precluded, or locate further from work and increase the difficulties of holding
down a steady job.
Raising interest rates also directly affects the borrower's ability to repay, and in
the UK where so many mortgages are variable rate, this has proved to be a very
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real problem. Raising interest rates to clear the market Increases the risk of
repayment problems for existing mortgage borrowers.
Therefore, through a variety of processes and channels, it IS likely that the
assumptions underpinning the S&W model--particularly that of rising interest
rates having a deleterious effect on the lenders' portfolio of risks=-do indeed have
some relevance to the UK mortgage market.
6.3 Summary
Although a vast corpus of literature exists on the operation of credit and insurance
markets, apart from the considerable efforts devoted to analyzing deposit
insurance, relatively little has been done to examine interaction of the two
markets, particularly with respect to loan insurance. Nevertheless, loan insurance
is a large and pervasive industry, employed in a range of markets, from mortgage
insurance, to Government initiated small firm loan guarantee schemes, and the
indemnification of balance sheet receivables.
This chapter has attempted to develop a suitable theoretical model to examine the
agency and credit rationing issues associated with loan insurance. Loan insurance
was introduced into the model developed in the previous chapter and shown to
reduce the utility gain from lending to lower risks, with the corollary that
insurance cover makes monitoring less attractive, which is bad news for the
insurer given that risk assessment and differentiated pricing result in favourable
selection. In addition, a further moral hazard was shown to exist, termed 'acute
moral hazard'. This refers to the tendency for insurance to reduce the utility
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losses from raising interest rates and so results in a higher optimal interest rate,
thus screening out good risks.
Loan insurance was also shown to weaken the S&W credit rationing result
(whether it is lenders or borrowers who pay the premiums) because flat rate loan
insurance reduces the utility loss of lending to bad risks, diluting the adverse
selection effects associated with raising interest rates to clear the market. Thus,
when coverage is 100%, there is no utility loss from lending to bad risks, and so
no disincentive to raising interest rates in the event of excess demand. In this
situation, equilibrium credit rationing is not feasible irrespective of the level of
information asymmetry between banks and borrowers. This is a significant result
because is shows that credit insurance could impose an important qualification of
the S&W credit rationing result. I also showed how insurance rationing is a
feasible equilibrium outcome when borrowers pay since raising premiums to clear
the market increases the costs of borrowing, having a similar adverse selection
effect as raising interest rates.
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Notes:
I Cowling (1995) found take up rates to be highly contingent on guarantee and premium
parameters, which have had at least three sets of values since inception. From June 1981 to May
1984, premiums and guarantee rates were 3% and 80% of the loan value respectively. These rates
became 5% and 70% in June 1984; 2.5% and 70% in April 1986; and 1.5% and 85% in 1993
(Cowling op cit.).
ii A recent development of the UK MPPI market is that some lenders have started to offer to pay
Mortgage Indemnity Guarantee premiums, to the extent that now the majority of large lenders are
offering this facility on at least one of their mortgage products. However, MIG is not a
straightforward example of credit insurance since borrowers remain legally liable for losses made
upon default and repossession even though MIG has covered a large proportion of those losses for
the lender.
7 Implications of Alternative Insurance
Regimes
7.1 Introduction
This chapter will examine the implications for moral hazards and equilibrium
credit rationing of different insurance regimes. Such regimes are not only
different between different markets for credit insurance, but also evolve over time,
as in the case of the UK MIG (Mortgage Indemnity Guarantee)' market. Indeed,
for insurance regimes particularly susceptible to moral hazards, it is almost
inevitable that the structure of the insurance contract will change if the industry is
to remain sustainable.
For example, it has been claimed that one of the reasons for the prolonged housing
boom of the 1980s housing market was the significant improvement in access to
credit, particularly to purchasers previously considered too risky to lend to. A
possible contributory factor to the relaxed lending policy was the insurance cover
provided by MIG. Recession in the wider economy in the early 1990s resulted in
large scale repossessions, partly the result of the inadequate risk assessment and
relaxed lending criteria of the previous decade.
That banks had inadequately assessed risk became evident when the UK economy
moved into recession towards the end of 1990, resulting in widespread income
and job losses. As Figure 7-1 illustrates, the subsequent arrears and repossessions
reached unprecedented levels. The ubiquitous use of MIGs with 100% coverage
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and flat rate premiums meant that it was insurers rather than mortgage lenders that
bore the associated losses, estimated at £1.8 billion for 1991 and 1992, plus a
further estimated £1.8 billion between 1993 and 1996 (Boleat, 1994).
Following the massive increase in claims, there followed a process of radical
restructuring of the insurance contract. This began in the latter half of 1991 with a
substantial increase in premiums by as much as 60% (Douetil op cit. p.300; see
also Building Societies Commission, 1994). Rationing has since been introduced
in a variety of dimensions, including a cap on £ of 80% for most loans, and a cap
of £ = 0% for (i) loans on a semi-commercial business (e.g. dentists), (ii) 'loans
called in for reasons other than non-performance' (Douetil op cit., p.303), (iii)
claims after five to eight years since inception, and (iv) claims in the event of
compulsory purchase (see ibid. and Building Societies Commission, 1994).
As Proposition 5 of chapter 6 would predict, simply raising premiums in response
to the crisis was insufficient because of the adverse selection effects when it is
borrowers who pay premiums, and the impotency of such a measure in curbing the
moral hazards for the lender. Consequently, insurance companies introduced co-
insurance clauses, effectively reducing coverage, but also making premiums
contingent on risk using information supplied/revealed by the lender. I now go on
to consider a number of possible insurance regimes which may be adopted to
alleviate moral hazards.
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Figure 7-1
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7.2 Interest Contingent Insurance Terms
In this section we explore the adverse selection, moral hazard and credit rationing
effects of making insurance terms in some way contingent upon the observable
characteristics associated with an insured loan. It is assumed that insurance
companies can observe actions taken by the bank towards the borrower, such as
the setting of interest rates, but cannot observe the characteristics of the borrower,
and so do not know the risk of default or any other details regarding investors. In
an attempt to alleviate the moral hazards described in the previous sections, the
insurance company may make the terms of the contract dependent upon the rate of
interest being charged in an attempt to alleviate the moral hazards. However,
making insurance terms endogenous has different effects, depending on whether it
is the bank or borrower who pays.
7.2.1 Banks Pav Contingent Premiums
Proposition 11: Moral hazards are reduced hut not eliminated when insurance
terms are made endogenous.
fn2o.f: By making the premiums dependent not only on the level of cover, but also
on the interest rate charged such that 'IIv'(rv) > 0, banks are in effect penalised for
lending to high risks (the only group prepared to pay high rates of interest). Thus,
depending on the size of the interest rate multiplier applied by the insurance
company in setting premiums, banks may have an added incentive to assess risk in
order to limit themselves to low interest loans (i.e. only lend to good risks).
However, insurance companies may actually profit from the bank lending to high
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risks if premiums are endogenous, and so the insurance company may not wish to
set multiples so high as to eradicate the moral hazard completely. Thus there will
be some optimal If/v' (rv), determined where the difference between the costs due
to insurance claims from lenders having a risky loan portfolio, and the revenue
from premiums gained from such a portfolio is greatest. The acute moral hazard
effect, however, will still remain within a particular P; provided P; is not a
singleton. Proposition 3 of chapter 6 still holds under contingent premiums
because the interest rate within a particular P; may still be higher under insurance
than it would under no insurance.
Proposition 12: eleRE (Contingent Insurance induced Credit Rationing
EQuilibriq).· Equilibrium credit rationing when S* = (' becomes feasible ((
contingent premiums are introduced. When S* < (' , risk contingent insurance
premiums provide a source of equilibrium credit rationing which is additional and
complementary to the S& W explanation.
f..r..QJ}j: We concluded in Proposition 4 of chapter 6 that adverse selection still
occurs when the bank fully insures itself but it is not necessarily true that this will
cause a reduction in utility. And if there is no utility loss associated with raising
interest rates, then there is no reason why the bank should not raise the rate of
interest when there is excess demand for credit in a particular P v in order to clear
the market. However, if insurance cover or premiums are tied to a risk indicator,
such as the rate of interest, such a response may well be sub-optimal for the bank
and so the possibility arises under endogenous insurance that the lender will prefer
to ration credit, even if it is nearly perfectly informed about Pi (~* =~~). We term
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this CICRE (contingent insurance induced credit rationing equilibrium) as
opposed to ASCRE (Adverse Selection induced Credit Rationing Equilibrium-
the S&W source of credit rationing, summarised in Proposition 2 of chapter 5).
CICRE not only applies when risk assessment expenditure is at its maximum. but
will occur whenever there is risk pricing in the credit market (differential interest
rates), combined with risk contingent insurance premiums (or coverage). Note
that where there is more than one Pi E Pv, and less than 100% default insurance,
CICRE reinforces-rather than supplants-ASCRE. Note also the connection
with the moral hazards of loan insurance. When type B moral hazards bite,
equilibrium credit rationing is less severe since there is an incentive for lenders to
raise r, which in an excess demand situation, will help clear the market. Thus if
insurers can reduce the moral hazards (by making premiums interest contingent
for example) then CICRE will be more evident. The less the contingency policy
is effective, the less scope exists for CICRE. Conversely, the more effective the
contingency policy, the greater the scope for CICRE.
7.2.2 Borrowers Pav Contingent Premiums
Proposition 13: If there is risk assessment and differentiated interest rates,
'favourable selection' may occur when insurers make premiums endogenous and
it is borrowers who pay.
/!J:QQf: If borrowers pay the premiums and insurers tie premiums to interest rates,
and as a result, lower risks experience lower premiums, then the cost of borrowing
to low risks will be reduced and cause P#iv, the threshold probability of success in
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P; to fall. If P#iv falls, then favourable selection occurs because investors with
success probabilities at the upper end of a particular P; will find it profitable to
invest, having previously found it to be unprofitable. In other words, if \I'i#v is the
threshold premium above which Pi E P; will not apply, then provided :3\j1v < \j1
such that \j1v::;; \j1i#V, then there will be some Pi: Pa#iv > Pi> Pb#iv where pa#iv and Pb#iv
are the threshold probabilities of success under flat rate and differential premiums
respectively. Similarly, some high risks previously included are likely to be
screened out if :3\j1v > \j1 such that \j1v ~ \j1i#V ~ :3Pi: Pa#iv < Pi < Ph#iv. Thus if in
each P; the mean risk of loan applicants remains the same or falls due to the
introduction of \j1v, and there is at least one P; E P in which average default risk
falls, then overall riskiness of the insured portfolio will be reduced due to the
introduction of contingent premiums.
Proposition 14: For high levels of coverage, hanks may actually he made
worse-off by charging differential interest rates, if it is the borrowers who pay
insurance premiums, and premiums are risk contingent.
ProQf Where banks pay the premiums, contingency clauses would simply make
it more profitable for banks to lend to lower risks. However, in the case where
borrowers pay the premiums, lenders are not penalised directly for lending to
higher risks, but the risk-contingency of premiums implies that high risks may be
discouraged (if the interest multiple is high enough), resulting in lower interest
returns on average for the bank, and thus lower total revenue if insurance cover is
high. Consequently, banks may have an incentive not to differentiate interest rates,
thus diluting the motive to assess risk, and result in the lender genuinely pooling
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risks. Alternatively, it is feasible that, where insurance cover is high, it may be
optimal for the lender to assess risk, charge one interest rate, and result in the
lender rationing credit to low risks. Screening out good risks will raise the
equilibrium pooled interest rate, and if there are as many high risks as low, raise
the total revenue for the lender.
7.3 Contingent Coverage
Contingent coverage has similar implications to making prerruums dependent
upon interest rates where lenders pay. If fl.v = fl.v(rv) where !v'(rv) < 0, then CICRE
is possible since there is once again a cost to the lender associated with raising r;
to clear the market. Acute moral hazards are again reduced, but may not be
eliminated because within each P; there remains the possibility that interest rate r,
is higher under fl.v than if there were no insurance. (By definition, type A moral
hazard will exist under insurance, but may of course be counter-balanced by the
gains to the lender of assessing risk, which are diluted when insurance terms are
made interest-contingent).
7.3.1 Insurers Assess Risk
In some loan insurance markets insurers carry out their own risk assessment to
differentiate premiums and to screen out high risks (an example of this is the US
private mortgage insurance market), either by insisting that lenders reveal some
information on the borrower (such as credit history details) or by collating its own
information. If the insurer can distinguish between z* risk groups amongst
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borrowers where z* E [1, 00 ] and the identifiable risk interval is P= = {Pi: P= s;; Pi s;;
P=+/}, then the insurer can charge differential cover rates t; and/or charge a
differentiated premium Ifz either to lenders or borrowers for each borrower in P=.
Assessing risk will obviously reduce the moral hazards, but will not eliminate
them unless insurer risk assessment is at least as good as lender risk assessment.
Where insurers rely on lenders for information, ensuring superior information will
be a problem since lenders can always be selective in what they reveal, although
independent monitoring is not without drawbacks since the insurer will still not
know whether it has superior information.
Proposition 15: Acute moral hazards persist unless insurer monitoring is
superior to lender monitoring
Let P = {Pv: VE V} and Q = {Pz: ZEZ}. Insurer monitoring is said to be superior to
lender monitoring if Q >- P, that is, if Q is finer than P in the interior sense. ii Q >-
P if vv 3z: P; c Pz, which occurs when Pi E P; ~ Pi E P= 'l:fv, z, i.
If Q is not finer than P in the interior sense, then there exists some i and j (i < j)
that the lender cannot distinguish between (and so charges the same premium and
offers the same coverage), but that the lender gm distinguish between. This
leaves the possibility that under insurance the lender will gain more from
screening out i by charging a higher pooled interest rate to i and j than it would
under no insurance. If, however, Q is indeed finer than P in the interior sense,
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then the insurer can differentiate premiums and coverage for every risk group
identified by the bank and so eradicate acute moral hazards.
Independent monitoring has a number of interesting implications for the
institutional structure between lenders, insurers and borrowers. First, if lenders
know that insurers are assessing risk and that they will charge differential
premiums and screen out high risks, there is an incentive for banks to cease risk
assessment completely and tie interest rates to premiums, and credit rationing to
insurance rationing (the exact reverse of the above). This is particularly appealing
if risk assessment costs are high. Thus whilst independent monitoring may
remove acute moral hazard, it will not remove type A moral hazard.
Such a move may have important disintermediation implications since if insurers
who carry out their own monitoring have access to international wholesale credit
markets, they will be in a strong position to bypass banks and lend to borrowers
directly. Another possible development in the event of high monitoring costs and
insurance rationing is that lenders set up their own insurance branch or establish
joint ventures with an existing insurer to share the costs of risk assessment, whilst
limiting the impact of large scale losses. There has recently been some evidence
of this in the UK mortgage market where the larger lenders have established their
own insurance companies, or used a variety of specialist insurers to undertake
underwriting for its own insurance products (Stephens, 1997).
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7.4 Observable Actions and Knowledge of Payoffs
7.4.1 Insurance Terms Contingent on Default Rates
Rather than making premiums and coverage interest contingent, Insurers may
simply make them dependent upon default rates of the previous period (a common
practice in US private mortgage insurance). This implies a dynamic model of the
form:
_ (L;(1- pi)f,(K -C)Ni,]
\jJl+! - f " '
£....;N;I
and/or of the form:
This allows the insurance company to penalise the bank for any action it
undertakes that adversely affects the volume of claims, and indeed provides an
incentive for the bank to minimise default risks. As such it may appear to be the
most obvious arrangement to deal with the moral hazards of loan insurance.
However, it can be shown that this arrangement will not necessarily remove the
possibility of moral hazard.
Proposition 16; The possibility of acute moral hazards cannot be eliminated by
threats of higher premiums or insurance rationing in the next period.
Proal:
Where the bank anticipates a large proportion of risky loan applicants in period t
and a much smaller proportion in period t+1, it may be preferable to set a high
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interest rate in period t knowing that the resultant riskier loan portfolio is covered
by insurance, even if this means insurance is not obtainable / made unprofitable in
the second period. To illustrate, consider the following example where there are
two risk types PI and P2 such that PI > P2, with associated equilibrium loan
quantities NIl, N21 in period t, and NIt+I, N21+1 in period t+1. Assume a pooled
interest rate r, and flat rate premium \VI and coverage fl' The lender maximises
expected utility over the two periods:
U = max(UI + UI+/)
= [NI,QI' + N21Q21 + Nll+IQI+1 + N21+IQ21+IJ
where Nil = {Oif r, > ri#, Nil if r, ~ ri#} and Qil is the utility to the lender per loan.
For sake of exposition assume further that the optimal pooled interest rate charged
under no insurance, r~rl' isjust equal to the threshold interest rate for PI, r i«. Thus
if under insurance the lender charges interest rate above r~ft then PI will be
screened out and only P2 will apply. For all type B moral hazards to be removed,
it must always be optimal for the bank to set r, ~ r~/I' Assume that the bank can
choose between two interest rates in period one, either ru or rn« where ru = (0,
rl#], and rift = (rill. r2#1)'
If the bank chooses rift rather than ru. PI will be screened out and the total
insurance claims at the end of period 1 will be L/I-p;)f,(K,-C,)N; = (1-
P2) f,(K, - CI)N2t. If the bank chooses ru. then the total insurance claims will be
(l-PI)fl(K, - CI)NII + (l-P2)£I(KI - CI)N21. Default rates after the two possible
actions of the lender will thus be:
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DLt = {(I-PI)ft(Kt - Ct)N/t + (l-P2)ft(Kt - Ct)N2t} / NI + N2
Dllt = (l-P2)ftCK, - Ct)N2t} / N2
It is clear that Dllt > DLt (assuming the opposite gives I-PI;:: I-p2 which is a
contradiction), and so in the event of Dllt the insurer only offers Jit+1 = JiL,
compared with it+1 = til in the event of DLt, where £L < Jill. For acute moral
hazards to be precluded, there must exist an £1 that makes the insurance offer more
profitable for the bank than no insurance, and there must exist an £1+1 such that:
[N2lr1lJQ2lr1lJ + NI,+IQ,+/(£d + N21+IQ21+/(£t}]
< [NllrLJQIt(rLJ + Nlt+IQt+/(Jir)+ N2t+I(t'Q2t+/]
But this can be shown to be a contradiction for some Nit. For example, if Nit and is
small and N2t is large, and/or if ri« is considerably larger than ru then it is possible
that the inequality sign is reversed, even if the threat is maximised (JiL = 0).
A similar argument can be used to show that making second period premiums
dependent upon first period default rates in a regime where lenders pay the
premiums" does not preclude moral hazards either since \jJt+1 has to be low
enough to make insurance preferable to non-insurance in the second period. With
this constraint on \j!t+l, it is possible that choosing a risky portfolio in period 1 and
no insurance in period 2 is preferable to setting rt = ru and being insured in both
periods.
This result is strengthened by the fact that the threat of prohibitively high
premiums or rationing of coverage in period two may not be credible In a
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competitive Insurance market, where banks can collectively opt for a risky
portfolio in period 1. If insurers make the threat dependent upon each lender's
default rate relative to other default rates (in an attempt to overcome the problem
of penalising all borrowers in periods when all default rates rise due to cyclical
exogenous factors), a 'prisoner's dilemma' scenario will develop. If lenders all
opt for a risky portfolio in period 1, they will all benefit, but if one chooses to
offer ru, then the others will be worse off. Although in single shot games, the
Nash outcome is that all choose ru. Kreps et at. (1982) have shown that in
repeated games co-operation may be optimal where there is incomplete
information.
Proposition 17 The threat of future premium rises or insurance rationing
makes CICRE possible
ProQt Since (credible) threats pose a cost to the bank of raising r to the clear the
market, it is possible that equilibrium credit rationing may arise, induced not by
adverse selection, but by contingent insurance terms (CICRE). The rationale
follows the same logic as the proof to Proposition 12.
7.5 Knowledge of Payoff Functions
So far we have assumed that the insurer cannot observe the lender's payoff
function. However it could be argued that if the game is repeated over a number
of periods, then the insurer will be able to deduce the nature of the lender (his risk
aversion etc.), or lender behaviour is common knowledge derived from a history
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of responses to a variety of situations. Thus, although it may seem unrealistic to
assume that insurers know the lender's utility function exactly, it could equally be
contended that it is unrealistic to assume that insurers have no knowledge of the
lender's utility. If we assume that the insurer does indeed know the payoff
function of the lender, then insurers know that for every t', 'I' combination, there is
an optimum r, Ni; and sfor the lender. The insurer can then use its knowledge of
the lender's reaction function to choose the most appropriate action, balancing the
costs from adverse selection and moral hazard effects of high 'I' and f with the
revenue gains. Such information results in the scenario of lenders paying the
premiums having very similar adverse selection, insurance rationing and credit
rationing results as when borrowers pay.
Proposition 18 Where there is common knowledge of payoff functions,
equilibrium insurance rationing becomes possible even when lenders pay the
premiums.
A similar adverse selection result to that identified in Proposition 5 of chapter 6 is
likely to arise when lenders pay the premiums if insurers and lenders have full
knowledge of each other's payoff functions. Raising premiums implies greater
marginal costs to the lender of extending credit, and so within a given Pv, the
quantity supplied will shift inwards eet. par.. This will result in a higher
equilibrium interest rate through the interaction of demand and supply, unless the
effect of S&W type credit rationing is sufficient to preclude any movement in
price (which is not feasible if f = 1). Whether the adverse selection effect of
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raising premiums is stronger when banks payor when borrowers pay will depend
on the slopes of the demand and supply curves. Thus, transferring the premium
burden from bank to borrower will result in lower interest rates, but this may not
be sufficient to offset the increased costs to borrowers from having to pay the
premium (so it is possible that insurers may be better off asking banks to pay). If
the insurer can anticipate the effect on r.; and hence on i#v, of raising 1jI. it will be
aware that it may be optimal to ration insurance rather than raising IjI to clear the
market.
Proposition 19 Where there is common knowledge of payoff functions,
equilibrium credit rationing will be feasible even when premiums are flat rate
and risks are pooled.
Proof; Because lenders can anticipate the effect of raising interest rates on the
amount of coverage offered by the insurer, lenders perceive a cost associated with
raising interest rates to clear the market and this threat of insurance rationing in
some circumstances will be sufficient to induce equilibrium credit rationing, even
though premiums, coverage and interest rates are all pooled (i.e. the same across
different risk types).
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have considered a number of insurance regimes designed to
alleviate the moral hazards highlighted in the previous two chapters. Moral
hazards were found to be reduced but not eliminated when insurance terms are
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made contingent on interest rates. The chapter also showed how this type of
contingency clause results in equilibrium credit rationing becoming feasible even
if lenders are perfectly informed. This is an important result because it implies that
risk contingent insurance premiums provide a source of equilibrium credit
rationing which is additional and complementary to the S&W explanation, and
operates when the S&W result does not. Contingent premiums have another
interesting result in that if it is borrowers who pay the premiums, and there are
differentiated interest rates, 'favourable selection' may occur when insurers make
premiums endogenous since the insurer will be able to use the lender's risk
categorisation to screen out bad risks. However, such screening may result in
banks being worse off for charging differential interest rates, providing a
disincentive to assess risk and/or to reveal information on borrowers.
Another possibility considered was that insurers themselves assess risk, but it was
shown that acute moral hazards persist unless insurer monitoring is superior to
lender monitoring. Neither can the threats of higher premiums or insurance
rationing in the next period completely eliminate the possibility of acute moral
hazards. Such threats would also have implications for access to credit in that
they would provide a further motivation for rationing to exist in equilibrium even
if premiums are flat rate, and risks are pooled. Similarly, where there is common
knowledge of payoff functions, equilibrium insurance rationing becomes possible
even if it is lenders who pay the premiums. All of these results enrich our
understanding of how credit insurance affects credit markets, particularly given
the scant attention paid to the topic in the existing literature.
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Some credit insurance markets ration cover in an explicit and visible way through
extensive exclusion clauses. This often results in a dichotomous insurance supply
decision where a fairly uniform cover is offered to all borrowers who meet the
specified criteria. This simplifies considerably the modeling of the demand side
of the market since simultaneity problems can easily be overcome by restricting
the sample to those borrowers that meet the supply-side criteria. This the
approach taken in the next chapter which explores the determinants of credit
insurance take-up and the influence of borrower's auto-perceived risk.
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Notes:
i MIG is an insurance policy which covers lenders for any losses made on a reneged mortgage debt
following repossession and resale.
ii See Berge (1963), chapter I.
iii Whether borrowers face the threat of higher premiums is, of course, no disincentive to the
lender, and may actually cause adverse selection.
8 Take-up of Flat Rate Credit Insurance:
Theory and Estimation of the Mortgage
Protection Insurance Decision
8.1 Introduction
So far I have examined the theory of perceived risk, the importance of credit
rationing in deciding on a measure of perceived risk, the effect of credit insurance
on credit rationing, and the implications of different insurance regimes (such as
whether the lender pays and whether or not the premium is flat rate, for example).
However, in modelling perceived risk, I have so far spoken of it only from the
lender's perspective: that is, how the lender perceives the borrower's risk, and
have overlooked the role of 'auto-perception', that is, how the borrower perceives
his/her own risk. In effect, I have assumed that the borrower knows his/her own
creditworthiness. Some consideration has been given to the case where the
borrower pays the insurance premium (as opposed to the lender) but little space
has been given to the demand decision itself (that is, the determinants of the
borrower decision to take out credit insurance). It is to this subject I now turn,
using one of the most important forms of loan insurance in the UK-mortgage
payment protection insurance (MPPI}-as the focus of the analysis. Risk
perception is now considered from the borrowers' perspective, who arrive at an
estimate of their own risk on the basis of their knowledge of their economic
characteristics and an understanding of the general relationship between these
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characteristics and risk. Risk also is considered from a different perspective since
it is not so much risk of default which the borrower attempts to insure against as
the risk of specific events which may conspire to induce default or temporary
repayment difficulties in the absence of insurance.
8.2 Background to MPPI
Over a quarter of the UK creditor insurance market is accounted for by MPPli
products, which are designed to protect mortgage borrowers against the risks of
accident, sickness or unemployment. In the event of any of these zero-
employment-income outcomes, the insurer is committed to cover the borrowers'
monthly mortgage payments for up to twelve months. MPPI policies have moved
up the political agenda in recent years as policy makers have reduced the extent of
state mortgage protection with a view to alleviating the apparent 'crowding-out'.
State help is provided through ISMI (Income Support for Mortgage Interest)
which covers monthly interest payments for owner occupiers eligible for Income
Support (the UK's means tested welfare safety net). Income Support for Mortgage
Interest (ISMI) was considered by the previous government to be fundamentally
flawed because it exacerbated the unemployment trap, bailed out poor lending,
failed to cover everyone in need, and discouraged further growth of private
finance (Secretary of State for Social Security, 1995, quoted in Ford and
Kempson, 1997). Changes introduced in October 1995 were thus intended to
alleviate the apparent malaise. Before October 1995, IS (income support)
claimants could claim 50 per cent of mortgage interest payments for the first two
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months of any claim, and 100 per cent thereafter. After October 1995, existing
mortgagors receive no support for eight weeks, followed by up to 50 per cent of
their eligible interest for the next 18 weeks and full coverage thereafter; and new
mortgagors (including re-mortgagors) receive no support for 39 weeks followed
by full eligible interest thereafter. The government anticipated that these
modifications would induce the insurance market to provide new and innovative
insurance products to meet the needs of mortgagors caught in the 39-week 'ISMI
gap', even having the effect of reducing arrears and repossessions (Oldham and
Kemp, 1996, p.44).
Thus, it was argued by the Secretary of State for Social Security in 1995 that ISMI
discouraged further growth of private finance, and that a less generous state
safety-net would increase the incentive for mortgagors to take out private
insurance cover, and encourage insurance companies to provide a wider range of
products. Thus, the substantial cut-backs in ISMI provision were introduced (inter
alia) on the basis that they would reduce the 'crowding-out' ofMPPI.
Research since then has started to evaluate the effectiveness of the changes by
interviewing borrowers, insurers and lenders (Ford and Kempson 1997) and by
testing whether MPPI clients are paying above the actuarially fair premium
(Burchardt and Hills 1997a,b; 1998). Other research has examined the
characteristics of those with the greatest odds of arrears (Burrows, 1997; Pryce,
2000) and the success of claims on insurance (Kempson et a!., 1999; see Ford and
England, 2000, for a comprehensive survey of the literature). Little work has been
done, however, to specifically test the 'crowding out' conjecture. Apart from
Gwilym B. J. Pryce, 1999, Chapter 8: Take-up of Flat Rate Credit Insurance 207--~----~------~------~~~--------------------~
Pryce and Keoghan (1999, 2001) who have applied the methodology developed
here to Family Resources Survey and Scottish House Condition Survey data
(generally confirming the results presented in this chapter), no published research
exists for the UK.
This chapter, therefore, aims to test the 'crowding-out' hypothesis by developing a
theoretical model of the mortgage protection insurance decision, and to estimate
this model using data on Glasgow and Bristol from the 1995 ESRC Beliefs and
Behaviour project: 'Beliefs, Perceptions and Expectations in the UK Owner
Occupied Market'. The data used here have the advantage over more recent work
published by the author using the Scottish House Conditions Survey in that it
includes a MPPI premium variable. Elasticities are used to measure
responsiveness of the dependent variable (take-up of MPPI) to changes in its
determinants (Income Support, ISMI, MPPI cover, MPPI premiums, mortgage
costs, unemployment/ill health risks etc) and to establish whether the low take-up
rates of MPPI can be addressed by widening the welfare gap, or whether take-up
is driven largely by factors outside state control. Some of the results of the
chapter have been published in Pryce (1998).
The chapter is structured as follows: first I develop a theoretical model of the
MPPI take-up decision; then I outline the empirical estimation of the model and
present the regression and elasticity results; the chapter concludes with a
discussion of the results and a summary.
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8.3 Theoretical Model
Mortgagors are assumed to make their decisions regarding whether or not to take
out MPPI on the basis of perceptions regarding current and future states of world
(employment, sickness, changes in interest rates, etc.) and their associated
perceived probabilities. All variables are thus assumed to be 'as perceived by the
borrower'. Insurance is taken out only if the expected utility under insurance is
greater than that of not insuring. Consider a borrower i with perceived probability
p of maintaining his current employment, perceived probability q of finding
employment with remuneration above i's reservation wage, and perceived
probability n of being sick over the insurance period t. (Unless otherwise stated,
all terms will be variable across borrowers and so the i subscripts will be omitted).
YI is current income, and Y2 is income received from new paid employment in
period I if the mortgagor loses her job and finds another, where q is the probability
of finding a new job. The probability of zero employment income in period t is
given by the probability 9, arising from the probability of being made unemployed
and not able to find suitable new work or experiencing ill health:
B = (l-p)(l-q) + .Q-.Q(l-p)(l-q). [1]
Assume that the borrower is risk averse, u'[W] > 0 , u"[W] < 0, and aims to
max(u[W]) where W is expected wealth at the end of period I before luxury
. iiconsumption . The assumption that the consumer does not make any
consumption expenditure on non-essential items until the end of period t is
equivalent to assuming that luxury consumption decisions during period tare
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made on the basis of calculations of expected final net wealth made at the
beginning of the period.
8.3. 1 No insurance:
Expected wealth at the end of period t is given by,
Wo p(l-Q)Wa + (l-p)(l-Q) qwi + Ow; [2]
where Wa is wealth at the end of period t if the borrower keeps his current job and
remains in good health; Wb is wealth at the end of period t if the borrower loses
his current job but finds a new one and remains in good health; and We is wealth if
the borrower receives zero employment income in period t because he loses his
current job and is not offered v, ~y* or is sick. Wa is defined as:
= YI - m +S - C, [3]
where m, Sand YI represent mortgage repayment costs in period t, savings at the
outset of period t, and current income of the borrower in period t respectively
(includes income from returns on savings and investments). It is assumed that
borrowers have no control over mortgage repayment costs since they are
predetermined at the point of purchase (the house purchase and mortgage
decisions are not considered here, neither are decisions to extend the loan term).
C is subsistence consumption'" and depends on the size of the household, age of
household members, and their relationship to the respondent. (C is calculated
using the standard Income Support definitions of personal allowances PA and
premiums M which are defined below: C = PA +M).
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Wb is wealth at the end of period t if the borrower loses his current job but finds a
new one:
= [4]
We is wealth at the end of period t if the borrower loses his current job and is not
offeredy2 ~y*:
perceived proportion of m covered by ISMI (b = 0 if savings are
more than £8,000),
savings,
benefits received other than help with housing costs,
Personal Allowances (subsistence income levels guaranteed by the
state. Payments vary according to age, number of children and
marital status),
Premiums (additional payments for families with children, lone
parents, pensioners and long term disabled),
tariff income (based on assumed income from savings and
investments ).
Thus total expected wealth in the uninsured state is given by,
where,
b
s
B
PA
M
B+ bm -m +S- C [5]
B PA +M-Y3 [6]=
=
=
=
Wo = p(l-il)(y, - m + S - C) + (1-p)(I-il)q(y2 - m + S - C)
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+ O(B + bm - m + S - C)
P(l-Q)YI + (l-p)(l-Q)qY2 + O(B + bm) - m + S - CWo [7]
u(.) under the uninsured state is given by,
u(Wo) = p(I-Q)u[y)] + (l-p)(I-Q )QU[Y2] + Bu[B + bm] - u[m] + u[S] - lI[e]
8.3.2 Insurance:
Now consider the case where the borrower takes out MPPI cover. Expected
wealth is given by,
[8]
where Wd is wealth if the borrower keeps his current job and remains healthy, We is
wealth if he loses his current job but obtains another and remains healthy, and W(
is wealth if the borrower receives zero employment income in period t because he
loses his current job and is not offered Y2 ~ y* or is sick.
Yt - uan - m + S - C [9]
= Y2 -1f/ln-m+S-C [10]
= B + lm (1+ If!) - If/ln - m + S - C [11 ]
where I is perceived insurance cover, 0::::;I ::::;1; and If! is the insurance premium
per £ of cover.
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W, p(1-n)y, + (i-p) (l-n)QY2 + e(B + Im(i+If/}) - 1fI111- m + S- C
[12]
u(W,) = p(l-Q)u[y,] + (J-p)(I-Q)qu[y2] + Bu[B + lm(1 +IJI)] - u[lfI111]- u[m]
+ u[S] - u[q
[13]
8.4 The Insurance Decision
It is assumed that the borrower maximises utility,
u*[W] =max (u[Wd, u[Wo])
Thus, the mortgagor takes out insurance if:
u[WtJ ~ u[Wo], [14]
However, if there are factors other than u[W1] and u[Wo] which influence the take
up decision (see below), it follows that this analysis of the take up decision should
be generalised into a continuous variable. Let ~ be the probability of take up and
p the utility gain from taking out insurance (i.e. the financial incentive to insure),
~ = ~[P]; a~/ap > 0 [15]
where,
p u[Wd - u[WoJ = utility gain from insurance [16]
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Equation [16] states that the greater the surplus of utility from expected wealth in
the insured state compared to expected wealth in the uninsured state, the greater
the probability of take up of MPPI. Because the greater is p, the greater the
incentive to take out mortgage insurance, we would expect a positive coefficient
in the logistic regression. Substituting [8] and [13] into [16] yields:
p= O(u[B + lm(l+If/)] - u[B + bm]) - u[ljI11l] [17]
8.5 Additional Factors
The model developed so far focuses on the financial rationale aspect of the
decision whether or not to insure assuming constant risk aversion across
consumers. However, there are a number of additional factors which affect the
take-up:
8.5. 1 Marketing Differentials
Lenders may affect the demand side factors by the extent to which they
differentiate the marketing of the product across borrower types. For example, in
recent years lenders have targeted first time buyers in the selling of MPPI since
this species of borrower is most vulnerable under the new rules for ISMI (along
with mortgage switchers)," although this is likely to be more prominent in years
since the changes, and so the data used here may not detect this trend. This
chapter thus aims to test whether targeted marketing strategies were in place
before the October 1995 changes.
_G_w_il..:..._y_m_B_o _J_o P_ry~ce_, _19_9_9_, _C_h--,QP:..._t_er_B_:_T,_Q_ke_-__:up___:.of_F_IQ_t_R_Q_te_C_r_e_d/_"I _In_s_ur_Q_nc_e __:214
Also, the October 1995 changes raised the profile of MPPI, and so the purchase
date may have an effect on the decision other than simply the rational financial
implications of ISM!. We wish to test whether the purchase date has a significant
effect on take up, particularly if the purchase date is after the announcement
(March 1995) or after the implementation of the change. Note that the financial
effects are included in the p variable through the definition of b and so a
coefficient significantly different from zero would confirm the existence of a non-
financial component in the announcement / implementation of the change. For
example, the publicity surrounding the change and its announcement may have
plugged some of the information gap regarding the ISMI system and MPPI
policies. If no information gap exists, then a dummy variable for mortgages taken
out after the change would be statistically insignificant.
8.5.2 Mvopia
Consumers may be more influenced by existing wealth (wa) than expected wealth
(W). This could be interpreted as cognitive dissonance (denial of any prospect of
change in employment circumstances) or heavy weighting of current over future
consumption if the model were two-stage (with the possibility of zero-
employment income not occurring until the second stage) ", Thus the equation for
~ becomes:
~ = ~[p,wa]
In this formulation of the decision process, choices are driven by the level of
subsistence consumption as well as the expected utility gain from insurance.
Subsistence consumption will vary according to the size of household, age of
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household members, and their relationship to the respondent. Dependants, for
example, imply an additional expenditure for the household and greater
subsistence consumption, and so may lower the reservation demand price for
insurance relative to a household with no dependants but the same income. Net
wealth in the event of no claim may thus be lower than if no insurance is taken
out, and so respondents with 'tighter budgets' will feel they 'cannot afford'
insurance. Thus if Wa is found to be statistically significant, this will provide
evidence that consumers do in fact place a disproportionate emphasis on current
non-zero income situation and do not simply base their decision on the net
expected utility gain from taking out insurance which we assume in the main
model. We test which of the two influences dominate in consumer's minds and
whether both p and Wa are significant when included in the same regression.
8,5.3 Past Experience of MPPI
Another possible influence is the borrower's experience of claiming MPPI. The
sign and significance of the coefficient on this variable is important since it will
show whether claiming MPPI has had a positive effect on their perspective of
whether mortgage protection insurance is worthwhile (particularly important
given the number of clauses included in insurance contracts and the concerns of
Kempson et aI., 1999, regarding the claims procedure).
8,5.4 Regional Differences
In addition to the bare financial differences (e.g. differences in premiums,
unemployment probabilities etc) which are already accounted for in p, there may
exist idiosyncrasies between the two cities which geographically differentiate the
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take-up decision. Such differences may arise due to different levels of risk
aversion between the two regions, or due to marketing differentials in Scotland
and England. This will be tested for using a location dummy.
8.6 Knowledge and Ignorance
In constructing b (the perceived proportion of mortgage costs covered by ISMI),
assumptions have to be made regarding the household's knowledge of the ISMI
changes. If, for example, consumers were unaware of the ISMI changes at the
time the data were collected, then it is assumed they would base their MPPI
decision on pre-1995 ISMI rules. If they were aware of the (forthcoming) October
1995 changes, then it is assumed that mortgagors would base their insurance
decision on the new ISMI provisions. We run regressions both under the
assumption of knowledge and of ignorance to test which implied better
specification for the model.
8.7 Insurer and Supply
Insurance is offered by insurance companies provided the default risk of the
borrower as perceived by the insurance company is no greater than the threshold
risk the insurer is willing to insure. This suggests that supply can be assumed to
be dichotomous: mortgagors meeting a list of criteria will be offered full insurance
at a fixed rate (i.e. standardised insurance packages with flat rate premiums).
Since the modelling of 'take-up' is effectively the modelling of realised demand,
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supply can be modelled by restricting the sample to those borrowers who meet
the eligibility criteria. The discrete supply behaviour of insurers revealed in the
Ford and Kempson (1997) survey suggests that simultaneity problems" can be
overcome by truncating the sample to include only those customers who fit the
criteria outlined by lenders as in Ford and Kempson op cit..
B.B Estimation
8.8.1 Data
The data were chosen because most of the respondents were questioned before the
October 1995 changes (allowing us to examine what could have been anticipated
by policy makers at the time) and because of its rich detail, particularly with
regard to questions on expected changes in economic variables (e.g. questions
were asked regarding expected changes in mortgage interest, expected ease of
finding new jobs etc.). Data was collated from the results of a questionnaire of
822 respondents from Glasgow and Bristol, commissioned under the ESRC
Beliefs and Behaviours project: 'Beliefs, Perceptions and Expectations in the UK
Owner Occupied Market'. It should be noted that the sample is not truly random -
it is a stratified sample of first time buyers, recent movers and stayers. However,
there is no intuitive reason why this should result in bias per se in the estimation
of relationship between take-up and determinants. The only possible reservation
is that estimates of elasticities, for example, that are based on calculations for the
whole sample, where the parameters used to calculate those estimates arise from
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regressions run on a sub-sample (due to missing values, screening out of certain
groups etc.), may be biased if the regression sub-sample does not exactly reflect
the stratification structure. As a result, we report elasticity results based on both
the full number of observations available and the limited regression sub-sample.
Sample sizes varied between 240 and 290 for most regressions depending on
which variables were included in the model.
8.8.2 Formulation of p: Multiplicative vs Additive Construction
It is often a matter of subjective methodological preference whether one first
constructs a specific theoretical economic model and then embarks on estimation;
or begins with an empirical investigation of the underlying data generating
process, and then from the results infer theoretical implications. It is contended,
however, that for the purposes of this chapter - namely estimation of the
elasticities of take-up with respect to a range of arguments - a theoretical
modelling approach (resulting in a multiplicative functional form) is preferable
because an additive econometric model will result in estimates which have no
. .economic meanmg.
To illustrate, consider the following simple example. First, let p = u[wd - u[wo]
be the basis of the theoretical (multiplicative) model, where p is the utility gain
from taking out insurance, WI is wealth with insurance, and Wo is wealth without.
Assume that WI and wo will vary across individuals, and assume the expected
utilities are determined as follows. Expected utility in the uninsured state is given
by:
[i]
Gwilym B. J. Pryce, 1999, Chapter 8: Take-up of Flat Rate Credit Insurance 219------------------------~----------------------~
where p, and Wx are the probability of the 'good' state of the world and the wealth
in that state respectively, and Wz is wealth in the event of the 'bad' state occurring.
Expected utility in the insured state is given by:
U[WI] =Pxu[wx] + (l-px)u[wz + K] - u[y] [ii]
where y is the premium, and K is the payout if event z occurs. Subtracting [i]
from [ii] gives:
p = (l-px)(u[wx + K] - u[wz]) - u[y] [iii]
Now assume that the probability of take-up, P, is positively related to p:
P = P[P], dP/dp >0.
The estimated logit model would thus be of the form:
P = ao + al «(1-px)(u[wx + K] - u[wzD - u[y]) + e [v]
[iv]
where ao and al are the parameters to be estimated. The elasticities with respect to
the various arguments would be calculated using the first derivative. For example,
the elasticity of take-up with respect to Px would be calculated as ha =
(dP/dpx)(PiP):
h,= ( al(u[wz] - u[wx + K]) ) (PxIP) [vi]
Applying the additive approach, on the other hand, without recourse to expected
utility theory, yields an estimated equation of the form:
P = bo + b, P» + b-w; + b3K + bsw, + bsy + e,
giving an elasticity with respect to Px of:
hb = b, (PxIP)
For sake of argument, assume that ha = hi;
=> (al(u[wz] - u[wx + K]) ) (PiP) = bl (PiP)
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=> b, / al = u[wz] - u[wx + K]
which states that the right hand side is constant across all observations since both
b, and al are constants. This is clearly a contradiction because Wz and Wx vary
across individuals. Thus using the additive model to estimate elasticities is
inappropriate when the theoretical structure is highly non-linear, as it is in this
case. Additive regressions were run, but the coefficients had no clear economic
interpretation and so the remainder of the chapter proceeds with the estimation of
the multiplicative formulation of utility gain from insurance implied by equation
[17].
8.8.3 Joint Ownership/Decision Making and Time Horizons
So far, we have referred to the decision-maker as an individual. However, even if
not joint homeowners in a legal sense, partners may have been involved in the
decision making process of whether or not to insure. And even if the partner was
not explicitly involved in the decision, the partner's economic circumstances will
no doubt have influenced the respondent's decision. Thus, it is assumed in the
empirical analysis that the 'borrower' as referred to above, is in effect the
'household'. For respondents with partners, we thus take into account the
employment and earnings characteristics of the combined decision making unit.
The time horizon t is the period over which the respondent is assumed to
maximise expected utility. On the whole we assume this period is one year,
although we also present results for t = 2 years.
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8.8.4 Construction of Variables
Construction of p, the perceived probability of retaining existing job.
Unfortunately, no question was included in the questionnaire asking the
respondent about the expected probability of losing their job, and so a proxy had
to be constructed. Also, houses are purchased and mortgages obtained, on the
basis of household income, not just that of the respondent. Thus the probability of
the household being without employment income in period t includes partner
probabilities of retaining his/her existing job and acquiring a new one:
[18]
where Jr, is the probability that respondent keeps existing job and Jr2 is the
probability that partner keeps existing job. To derive proxies for Jr, and Jr2 it is
assumed that borrower's beliefs about remaining in employment will be
determined by the same factors which determine the chances of being employed at
the time of interview. For the purposes of this study, we are only interested in full
time or near full-time employment - i.e. we would wish to discount employment
below a certain number of hours because we are really only interested in the
probability of the borrower having a job that will enable him/her to maintain
hislher mortgage payments or at least contribute towards them in a substantial
way. As a result, an arbitrary threshold of sixteen hours per week was assumed in
the computation of the logit modelling. This also allowed us to include the effect
of contract type on determining hours worked, which would not have been
possible if the categorisation of work was limited to unemployment (i.e. zero
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hours) or employment (i.e. anything greater than zero hours) because no
unemployed worker would have a contract. Using the threshold number of hours
described above, we found that 53% of respondents working for less than 16 hours
per week had a permanent contract, compared with 66% for those who worked
longer hours. Of those with a permanent contract, 63% were working more than
16 hours per week.
The log it models were constructed to estimate the determinants of being currently
full-time employed (as defined above). A number of regression structures and
explanatory variables were experimented with, but the optimal model appeared to
be determined by three key explanatory variables: whether or not the borrower
had a permanent employment contract (PERM), level of educational achievement
(EDUC), and age (AGE). Regression results are reported in the first two columns
of figures in Table 8-1. Estimates of the probabilities were then obtained from the
predicted values from these regressions following the linear structure of the
regressions: ,,( = 2.03 + 0.75 PERM + 0.20 EDUC - 0.07 AGE; and "2 =
0.62 + 1.99 PERM + 0.37 EDUC - 0.05 AGE; and combined to produce an
estimate of p,
# # # # #)P = "} + "] - (,,} "] , [191
where l ,"(# , and "l are the estimates of p , ,,( , and "2, respectively.
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Table 8-1 Prefgrred Regression Equations (pr Predicting "IL...!!;.J.I! and rh.
"I "2 ,pI rh
DEPENDENT VARIABLE Prob(respon Prob(partner Prob(respon Prob(partner
dent keeps keeps job) dent finds a finds a new
current job) new job) job)
Constant 2.026 .617 1.368 2.079
(.000) (.038) (.014) (.000)
PERM = Dummy for permanent .747 1.985
contract (.001) (.000)
EDUC = Educational achievement .201 .369 .481
(.000) (.000) (.065)
2 -.093EDUC = EDUC squared
(.048)
AGE = age ofrespondentlpartner -.066 -.049 -.064 -.050
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
ETYPE = {I if employer/manager .548 .261
in large/small establishment or (.033) (.265)
professional employee}
AREA = {I if live in Glasgow, 2 if .379
live in Bristol} (.051)
N 811 646 492 436
-2 Log Likel 880.689 608.484 622.905 567.685
Goodness of Fit 796.913 626.246 489.778 436.622
Model X2[k] 222.343 177.678 57.322 26.091
(Significance) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
In sample prediction accuracy 73.00% 75.23% 64.63% 63.30%
Figures in brackets represent the significance level (for Wald statistics unless otherwise stated); the
lower the significance level, the greater the confidence that the estimate is significantly different from
zero.
Construction of q, the perceived probability of finding a new job.
Again the probability of the household not being able to find another job will be
dependent upon the perceptions of both respondent and partner,
[20]
where ,pI = probability that respondent finds a job.
th = probability that partner finds ajob.
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Logit estimates for r/JI and rh were calculated, this time based on the following
question in the survey: 'If you lost your job, how easy do you think it would be to
find a similar one?' with the set of options: {I) Very easy, 2) Relatively Easy, 3)
Relatively Difficult, 4) Very Difficult}. A dichotomous dependent variable was
constructed on the basis of: {I if very or relatively easy, 0 otherwise} and
regressed using logit procedures to obtain predicted values and an estimate of q,
# A-, # A-, # ,1..# #q = Of'1 + r2 - ('I'I r/J2 ), [21]
where l ,r/JI# , and rh# are the empirical estimates of q , r/JI , and rh respectively
based on the regression results reported in Table 8-1 (i.e. r/JI = 1.368 +
0.48 lEDUC - 0.093 EDUc2 -0.0639AGE + 0.548ETYPE + 0.379AREA; and rh =
2.080 - 0.050AGE + 0.261 ETYPE) where AREA and ETYPE are area of
residence (either Glasgow or Bristol) and employment type, as defined in the
table. As one would expect, being an employer/manager/professional, level of
education and living in Bristol all have a positive influence on the perceived
chances of finding another job, whereas age has a negative effect (interestingly,
education has a non-linear effect for respondents, but not for partners, for whom
education was not a significant determinant).
Construction of n, the perceived probability of ill health.
The perceived probability of ill health was defined as the probability that both the
respondent and partner are unable to work due to ill health caused by accident or
sickness. This was calculated as n = COl CO2 , where COl is the probability that the
respondent is sick, and CO2 is the probability that the partner is sick. Estimates COl #
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and aJ]_ # were obtained from the predicted values of logit regressions run on
whether or not an individual was sick at the time of being interviewed.vii
Construction of b: the level of ISMI Cover
Since ISMI is linked to the Income Support benefit provision, the proxy for b
(level of ISMI cover in time period t) has to include some modelling of income
support payments. One complication is that the mortgage payment figure in the
questionnaire does not separate out interest and capital payments, precluding
precise calculation of mortgage interest relief.
The mam determinants of b are whether the person is eligible for ISMI (in
particular, whether they have over £8,000 savings and B > 0), whether the
initiation date of the mortgage lies before or after the October 1995 changes, and
the maturity of the loan if it is a repayment mortgage. This latter component
arises because ISMI only covers interest payments, and lenders tend to front-load
the interest component of repayment mortgages, leaving the bulk of amortisation
until the latter half of the repayment period.
Let 1" be the maturity of the mortgage = {I, 2, ..., T}, and P = the principal. The
total amount to repay is denoted by J:. Assume now that there is a fixed annual
amount to pay to the lender: m = IIT. The amount of interest paid each year on a
repayment mortgage r T can be simulated by the following algorithm: r T = m -
't*(m/T). This assumes that the interest component of mortgage payments
increase by a regular discrete amount each year. This is used to compute the front
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loading ratio, r" such that? = r- 1m. For fixed interest mortgages (endowments,
PEP, pension mortgages etc.), this is assumed to remain constant at two thirds of
mortgage payments (i.e. r .lm z 2/3). Since most people in the sample are early on
in their mortgage, those with repayment mortgages do better cet. par. under ISMI.
The fraction of mortgage payments covered over the time horizon t by ISMI is
thus given by: b =
cover during I.viii
rx; where x is the number of full day equivalents of ISMI
Since the changes to ISMI were announced in the spring of 1995, it could be
argued that it is the new ISMI regulations that should be used in modelling their
insurance decision. We also present results assuming ignorance of the changes
and a longer time horizon based on: b I
where x I is calculated assuming a one year time horizon and ignorance of the
ISMI changes; X2 is calculated assuming a two year time horizon and ignorance of
the ISMI changes; and X3 is calculated assuming a two year time horizon and
complete knowledge of the changes. bi, b2, and b3 were used to construct
corresponding expected utility gain variables PI, P2, PJ using equation [17].
Private Insurance Cover I and Expected Mortgage Costs m
Although the level of insurance cover does vary between policies, most of the
variation has arisen since the survey was completed and so we shall assume that
borrowers anticipate a delay of thirty days before payments are made and when
they are made, full cover of mortgage costs is received which seems to be the
typical MPPI arrangement (Ford and Kempson op cit.). m is assumed to comprise
three components: the existing mortgage payments, the expected change in
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mortgage interest tax relief, and the expected change in the rate of interest. The
survey contains questions on all three components, although the latter two
components are coded discretely as either rise, jail, stay the same or don't know.
To make quantitative use of this information a value had to be assumed for each
discrete choice as follows: if respondents indicated tax relief or interest rates
increased (decreased) it was assumed that this implied an anticipated 10 per cent
impact on mortgage costs, otherwise zero change.
Insurance Premiums per £ of cover, IJf
Since the majority of borrowers did not take out mortgage protection insurance,
observations on 'I'were limited to a small proportion of the sample. However, in
the theoretical model constructed above, all borrowers (assumed to be price
takers) base their insurance decision on the perceived premium offer. The average
premium reported in the sample could be assumed to apply to all borrowers, but
this would overlook any variation between the two regions and over time.
Consequently, averages were computed for a total of twelve categories", and
assigned to borrowers falling within each category.
Utility Function Assumptions
The assumption that borrowers are risk averse implies particular restrictions on
the shape for the expected utility function, namely it has to be concave to the
origin. Consequently, u[w] was assumed to take the form In [1 + w). (This
captures the concavity of utility functions belonging to risk averse borrowers since
u'[w] = 1/(1+w) ).
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8.9 Specified Model
The model estimated comprised the financial factor plus additional factors as
follows:
+ P6 DISMI_ANN
Definitions of variables are given in Table 8-2.
8.10 Results
Intercept terms were introduced in each of the specifications but were found to be
statistically insignificant. As the results tables show, for each of the specifications
of p and combinations of dependent variables, regression elimination procedures
always returned P as the only significant explanatory variable. This suggests that
P is capturing the bulk of variation in the take-up probability. Of the four
specifications of p (Po, Pl.P2andpJ), regressions run under the assumption of no
knowledge of the ISMI changes-i.e. with PI or P2 as the explanatory variable
(regressions [16] and [l7])-had the better diagnostic results in terms of the log
likelihood and SPSS goodness of fit results. But regressions run under the
assumption of complete knowledge of the ISMI changes-i.e. with po and PJ as
the explanatory variable (regressions [6] and [18]Hid better in terms of the Chi-
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square and in-sample prediction accuracy results. All were highly significant in
terms of the Wald statistic result. Consequently, there is no conclusive evidence
that the model is better specified assuming ignorance of the changes. This is not
entirely surprising given the very small elasticity calculated with respect to ISMI
(see below). Because ISMI appears to have very little effect on take-up of MPPI,
changing the knowledge of ISMI generosity also has little effect: consumers in
similar circumstances who over-estimate the generosity of ISMI are likely to
come to the same decision regarding MPPI as those who under-estimate the
generosity of ISMI. Similarly, comparisons of regression [6] results with
regression [18], and [16] with [17] indicate that extension of the time horizon
from 1 to 2 years made no conclusive improvement to the results.
Supply was modelled by restricting the sample to those not rationed by standard
insurance criteria. Comparison of regressions run on the full and restricted
samples revealed that the sample restriction in fact had little effect on the results.
Inclusion ofwa (wealth at the end of period t if the borrower keeps his current job
and remains in good health) was not found to be significant and the P effect
clearly dominated (regressions [1] to [6]).
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Table 8-2
Regression Results
Definitions and Descriptives Q,/ Variables Aopearing in
Variable
.20
Definition Mean
~#
p
DGlasgow
probability of take up _ this is the dependent variable in all of logistic
regressions and is proxied by a dummy variable based on whether or not
respondents in the sample have taken out MPPI.
predicted values of ~ under the assumption of complete knowledge of ISMI
changes and 1 year time horizon.
predicted values of ~ under the assumption of no knowledge of ISMI changes
and I year time horizon.
predicted values of ~ under the assumption of no knowledge of ISM I changes
and 2 year time horizon.
predicted values of ~ under the assumption of complete knowledge of ISMI
changes and 2 year time horizon.
expected utility gain from taking out private mortgage insurance.
Dummy variable = (I if the respondent purchased house after October 1995;
o otherwise).
Dummy variable = (I if the respondent has ever made claim on his policy; 0
ifnot).
Dummy variable = (I if the respondent purchased house after the
announcement of the ISMI changes in spring 1995; 0 otherwise).
Dummy variable = (1 if the respondent is first time buyer; 0 ifnot).
Dummy variable = (I if the respondent lives in Glasgow; 0 if the respondent
lives in Bristol).
Wa is wealth at the end of period t if the borrower keeps his current job and
remains in good health.
.30
.30
.30
.30
-5.48
.01
.02
.15
.38
.50
20365.52
Number of valid observations (Iistwise not including supply side screening) _ 311.00
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Table. 8-J. Reg_res5.iQl1 B.e.5.ll.lts.tiu: Wg Reg_re.uiQl15.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)*
p 0.3482 0.3368 0.3525 0.3768 0.3681 0.1543
(0.1201) (0.1278) (0.1049) (0.0763) (0.0829) (0.0000)
Wa 0.1136 0.1113 0.1220 0.1370 0.1239
(0.3792) (0.3877) (0.3346) (0.2662) (0.3077)
DGlasgow -0.2675 -0.2748 -0.1687 -0.1706
(0.3481 ) (0.3335) (0.5411) (0.5362)
rJMIJMP 0.6632 0.6581 0.5705
ISMI IMP (0.5274) (0.5307) (0.5863)
~_11iID 8.1142 8.1404
(0.6187) (0.6175)
rr 0.0957(0.
7367)
N=N.uhrofam;ilid.rli1dl:~ 262 262 262 262 262 286
-2 LogLikelihooi 303.308 303.421 315.662 315.954 316.338 347.808
Cioo:tles;ofFit 256.637 256.414 261.008 261.086 260.'Xl2 286.033
M<rl!lx2[k) 58.515 58.402 46.160 45.869 45.485 48.672
(sigpificarx:e) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
In-Sample 72.41% 72.41% 70.11% 70.50010 70.11% 70.28%
Prediction
ACCURACY
Figures in brackets represent the significance level: the lower the significance level, the greater the
confidence that the estimate is significantly different from zero.
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[ab.le. 8.-4 Reg.ras.iQlJ. Re.s.u.lts. -- Wa na: Im:.lu.de.d
Variable (7) (8) (9) (10) (11 )
P 0.1685 0.1704 0.1793 0.1768 0.1662
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
OGlasgow -0.2008 -0.1022
(0.4539) (0.6956)
rjSMIJMP 0.8820 0.8280 0.8195
(0.3836) (0.4133) (0.4183)
~_l1ID 8.0935
(0.6205)
Ifill 0.2512 0.3056 0.3129 0.3065
(0.3526) (0.2463) (0.2339) (0.2426)
if"1'_Ai'N 0.3528
(0.2715)
N 286 286 286 286 286
-2Log Ukelihoo:! 333.712 345.656 345.809 346.448 346.625
~ofFit 282.033 286.544 286.210 286.323 286216
M<XIeIX2[k) 62.768 50.824 50.671 50.032 49.856
(signifiane) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
In-Sample 72.03% 70,280/0 70,280/0 70.28% 7028%
Prediction
Accuracy
Figures in brackets represent the significance level: the lower the significance level, the greater the
confidence that the estimate is significantly different from zero.
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Lallie. 8.-$.. Beuassien Bssults
Variable (12) (13) (14) (15) ( 16) ( 17) (18)*
PI PI PI PI PI P2 P3
PK 0.1593 0.1614 0.1728 0.1703 0.1516 0.1516 0.1543
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
DGlasgow -0.2320 -0.1320
(0.3839) (0.6110)
r:jM_1M' 0.8660 0.8119 0.8004
(0.3922) (0.4221 ) (0.4289)
rtrn-l1ID 8.1017
(0.6203)
rfID 0.1983 0.2547 0.2641 0.2581
(0.4600) (0.3306) (0.3117) (0.3219)
N 289 289 289 289 289 289 286
-2Log Likelih<xxf 339.203 351.204 351.463 352.074 353.052 353.052 347.809
~ofFit 284.871 289.442 289.066 289.166 288.963 288.964 286.034
Mcx:kIX2[k] 61.436 49.435 49.176 48.565 47.587 47.587 48.671
(sigpificaJ:e) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
In-Sample 71.<)7010 69.CXfIo 69.CXfIo 69.CXfIo 69.CXf/o 69.CXfIo 7028%
Prediction
Accuracy
Figures in brackets represent the significance level: the lower the significance level, the greater the
confidence that the estimate is significantly different from zero.
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8.11 Elasticities
8. 11. 1 Construction of Elasticities
There are five elasticities that we are primarily interested in: the elasticity of take-
up with respect to insurance premiums (E~[\"l); with respect to the level of ISMI
cover (E~[b}); with respect to Income Support entitlements (E~[B}); with respect to
MPPI coverage (E~[I}); and with respect to the perceived probability of zero
employment income (E~[8}). These were calculated using the variable elasticity
approach: elasticities were calculated for each observation using predicted values
of ~, and then averaged across the sample. For example, E~[b} =
E[(8~/8 b)(b/~)], where, 8~/8 b = -aBm / (J + B + bm).
8. 11. 2 Elasticitv Results
Using regression results from the preferred regressions (i.e. on the restricted
sample with only p as the independent variable) elasticities were calculated for
each available observation using the above method. Elasticities were calculated
using both the maximum number of observations possible and also the most
restricted regression sample (regressions I to 5, n = 262). As the results in Table 5
show, there was very little variation between the various alternative definitions of
p. The probability of take-up is shown to be inelastic with respect to all
determinants, and all five elasticities were found to have the correct expected
signs on average. By far the largest elasticity is E~[\"l with a value of around -0.5,
which implies that a ten per cent reduction in premiums would produce a five per
cent rise in the take-up of private mortgage protection insurance.
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Most importantly, the probability of take-up is found to be highly unresponsive to
changes in ISMI and the benefits system. A ten per cent cut in either b or B would
produce an increase in take-up of less than 0.1 per cent. Take-up is more
responsive to changes in private cover and in the probabilities of zero employment
income, although these elasticities are also surprisingly small: the probability of
take-up would only increase by I per cent and 5 per cent respectively if there were
a ten per cent increase in I or B. Interestingly, however, the standard deviation is
much larger for the f.E,[BJ elasticity, with the response to a 10 per cent rise in
Bbeing as high as 9.8 per cent for some individuals (.43 in the restricted sample).
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T (lb.l e. 8.-6. E lfl£tic.ifJ!. Re.5.ll.lts.
Variable Mean Std Mi Ma N
De n x
v
E~[\l/l- elasticity of take-up with respect to insurance -5120 m -.60 -37 347
premiums (based on p) -5192 .03 -58 -.41 262
E~[\l/ll - elasticity of take-up with respect to insurance -.4900 .03 -58 -37 353
premiums (based on PI) -.5048 .03 -.56 -.40 262
E~[\l/l2= elasticity of take-up with respect to insurance -.4900 .03 -58 -37 353
premiums (based on P2) -.5048 .03 -.56 -.40 262
E~[\1/13- elasticity of take-up with respect to insurance -5120 m -.60 -37 347
premiums (based on P3) -5192 .03 -58 -.40 262
E~[Bj - elasticity of take-up with respect to IS entitlements -.0014 .00 -.02 .00 592
(based on p) -JX)26 .00 -.02 .00 262
E~[Bj 1- elasticity of take-up w.r.t. IS entitlements (based on -JXm .00 -.oJ .00 598
PI) -.0012 .00 -.01 .00 262
E~[B12- elasticity of take-up w.r.t. IS entitlements (based on -.(XX)) .00 -.oJ .00 598
P2) -.0010 .00 -.01 .00 262
E~[B;3- elasticity of take-up w.r.t. IS entitlements (based on -.(W) .00 -.01 .00 592
p,) -.0016 .00 -.01 .00 262
E~[bl- elasticity of take-up w.r.t. level of ISMI cover (based -.(W) .00 -.G1 .00 592
on p) -.0014 .00 -.G1 .00 262
E~[bll - elasticity of take-up w.r.t. level of ISM I cover (based -.0007 .00 -.01 .00 592
on PI) -.0011 .00 -.01 .00 262
E~[b12- elasticity of take-up w.r.t. level of ISMI cover (based -.0007 .00 -.01 .00 592
on P2) -.0011 .00 -.01 .00 262
E~[bJ3 elasticity of take-up W.r.t. level of ISMI cover (based -.0008 .00 -.G1 .00 592
on p,) -.0012 .00 -.G1 .00 262
E~[ll- elasticity of take-up w.r.t. MPPI cover (based on p) .0110 .02 .00 .13 347
.0074 .01 .00 .05 262
E~[l]I- elasticity of take-up w.r.t. MPPI cover (based on PI) .0100 .02 .00 .12 353
.0072 m .00 .05 262
E~[112- elasticity of take-up w.r.t. MPPI cover (based on P2) .0100 .02 .00 .12 353
.0072 .01 .00 .05 262
E~[113- elasticity of take-up w.r.t. MPPI cover (based on P3) .0110 .02 .00 .13 347
.0074 .01 .00 .05 262
E~[OJ- elasticity of take-up w.r.t. percieved probability of zero .0600 .13 .00 .98 347
employment income (based on p) .0321 .08 .00 .43 262
EE,[Ojl - elasticity of take-up w.r.t. percieved probability of .0500 .12 .00 .96 353
zero employment income (based on PI) .0295 .07 .00 .42 262
E~[oJ2 - elasticity of take-up w.r.t. percieved probability of .0500 .12 .00 .96 353
zero employment income (based on P2) .0293 .07 .00 .42 262
E~[()j3- elasticity of take-up w.r.t. percieved probability of .0500 .13 .00 .98 347
zero employment income (based on P3) .0300 .08 .00 .43 262
NB: First row of figures in each cell relate to results from the full sample, whereas the second
row relate to the restricted sample.
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8.12 Discussion
8.12.1 MPPI Premium Elasticities
Of the five elasticities, the elasticity of ~ with respect to private Insurance
premiums was consistently more than ten times larger in absolute terms than any
of the other elasticities. Even so, all the estimates would be classified as inelastic,
a ten per cent fall in premiums producing an approximately five per cent increase
in take-up. This suggests that take-up, although being relatively unresponsive to
changes in any of the variables considered here, is driven largely by insurance
prenuums,
Indeed, if the Burchardt and Hills (1997a,b; 1998) results are accurate, then
insurers could cut premiums by 49 per cent and still break even with expected
payouts (the actuarial premium for their hypothetical unemployment-only MPPI
policy was found to be £2.42 per month per £100 of cover; compared with an
average of £4.02 for actual premiums surveyed in January 1996). Even a 20 per
cent fall in premiums would result in a 10 per cent rise in take up. However,
although this would be beneficial in social policy terms, it is obviously not
beneficial in revenue terms, since the inelasticity is still less than one and so any
fall in premiums would, at least on the average, result in a fall in revenue.
8.12.2 Theta Basticities - the Role ofAuto-PerceptioQ
Sensitivity of take of MPPI to borrower auto-perception was measured by the
elasticity with respect to theta, the perceived probability of zero employment
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mcome. The estimate was unexpectedly low (for every ten per cent rise in the
perceived probability of zero household employment income, MPPI take up only
rises by around 0.5 per cent). This may be due to the underestimation of theta in
the model, arising largely out of the limitations of the data set and from the
simplicity of the model.
However, it should be noted that although the elasticity is small, there still could
be large fluctuations in e in response to changes in the economic cycle. e
represents perceived risk of unemployment, not actual risk, and it is likely that
cycles in perceived risk will have substantially greater amplitude than actual.
Whether or not this is the case will only be verifiable following the onset of the
next recession, although it should be noted that even if perceived unemployment
risk is five times greater than actual, the elasticity with respect to the shift in
actual risk will only be unitary, and this will be insufficient to stem the tide of
people caught in the ISMI gap.
If 0.05 is in fact a reliable estimate of the elasticity with respect to theta, then it
would go some way to explaining the absence of moral hazard and adverse
selection in the Burchardt and Hills study (l997a) which 'found no evidence ...
that the difference between the actuarial premium and the commercial premium
was due to the insured population having higher unemployment than the
uninsured population' (p.30). The financial benefits of MPPI are, for most
people, simply not responsive enough to changes in unemployment probabilities
to attract a significantly higher proportion of mortgagors.
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8.13 Summary
The model developed in this chapter uses data relating largely to homeowners
who took out mortgages before the October 1995 changes. In addition to
constructing demand elasticities, the model aimed to identify the extent to which
rational economic incentives drive the decision to take out insurance, and the role
of other factors (such as the timing of the purchase decision in relation to ISMI
changes; marketing differences between regions and borrower types; and
ignorance of the ISMI changes). Supply was modelled by assuming all
mortgagors which meet the usual criteria stipulated in MPPI policies (see Ford
and Kempson op cit.) will be entitled to full protection for one year.
It was found that the expected utility gain variable, p, as constructed from the
theoretical model, is the only statistically significant explanatory variable in the
regressions. Given the reasonable explanatory power of this variable, it would
appear that, despite the considerable uncertainty and ignorance surrounding ISMI
and MPPI, borrowers are generally making economically rational choices.
The chapter also aimed to estimate the responsiveness of the take-up decision to a
number of the key variables which make-up p, including auto-perception (the
expected probability of zero employment income), insurance premiums, ISMI
cover, MPPI cover and IS entitlement. It is found that probability of take-up will
rise by less than 0.01 per cent following a 10 per cent fall in ISMI cover -
suggesting that the sluggish response to the ISMI cuts could have been
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anticipated. This undermines one of the key motivations for the 1995 changes,
namely the alleviation of the claimed crowding out of private mortgage protection
insurance. Conversely the inelasticity of MPPI take-up to ISMI cover also implies
that significant reinstatement of the safety net for mortgage borrowers could be
achieved without any deleterious effect on MPPI take-up.
Comparison of regressions run under various assumptions about mortgagor
knowledge of ISMI changes, revealed that there was no conclusive evidence that
the model is better specified assuming ignorance of the changes. This is not
entirely surprising given the very small elasticity calculated with respect to ISM!.
Because ISMI appears to have very little effect on take-up of MPPI, changing the
knowledge of ISMI generosity also has little effect: consumers in similar
circumstances who over-estimate the generosity of ISMI are likely to come to the
same decision regarding MPPI as those who under-estimate the generosity of
ISM!.
In summary, this chapter has contributed to the existing literature in the following
ways. First, it has developed the first theoretical model of the MPPI purchase
decision, providing a sound analytical basis for subsequent empirical work.
Second, the work presented in this chapter is the first to consider in a systematic
way the crowding-out of MPPI by ISMI and has presented a methodology for
doing this. Third, the chapter has presented the first estimates of elasticities of
take-up of MPPI to price, ISMI and a range of other variables. The results will be
of interest to policy makers and also to lenders and insurers given that the chapter
presents the first robust estimates of the price elasticity of demand for MPPI.
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Notes:
ii the remainder ofthe market is comprised as follows: 12% Credit/Store card insurance, 52%
Personal Loan insurance, 7% Motor Finance insurance, 2% other (Ford and Kempson 1997, p.26.
based on net written premiums as calculated by Consolidated Financial Services).
ii to avoid confusion, square brackets are used to indicate the arguments of a variable.
iii It is assumed that Wo can be negative as well as positive since the consumer can disave.
iv High-risk groups may also be specifically targetted. Since many lenders appear to make the bulk
of their mortgage lending decisions on the basis of loan and income to value ratios it seems
plausible that these variables may have an additional influence on the take up decision. However,
they were not found to be statistically significant when included in addition to p.
v i.e. there would be some initial time period where the consumer perceives the risk of zero
employment income to be zero (e.g. immediately following the take-up of MPPI). The borrower
may discount future periods sufficiently to make current wealth the overiding factor in deciding
whether insurance is 'affordable'.
vi In a traditional demand and supply economic model, quantity and price are both determined
simultaneously through the intersection of the demand and supply curves. This means that both
the effect of demand and the effect of supply have to be included in any model which attempts to
explain quantity or price, and so special simultaneous equation estimation techniques usually have
to be used. However, if supply is dichotomous, this 'simultaneity problem' can be overcome
simply by appropriately restricting the sample.
vii liJI = 1.3668 - 0.4005 EDUC - 1.5066 AREA -1.4483 FEMALE; O>]_ = -5.5887 + 0.0349 AGE
where FEMALE = {I iffemale; 0 if male}
viii 1ft = I year and the new rules are used, then: x = (0 if S > 8,000 or B < 0; 100/365 if S < 8,000
and date of mortgage after October 1995; 126/365 if S < 8,000 and date of mortgage before
October 1995; 365/365 if S < 8,000 and date of mortgage before October 1995 and either
respondent or partner over 60) where the 100/365 and 126/365 figures are calculated from the
number of full day equivalents of cover as a proportion of the one year horizon, starting from the
point of completing the questionnaire.
IX six time periods of when the mortgage was taken out (before 1986, between 1986 and 1990,
1991 and 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 ) across two areas (Bristol, Glasgow).
9 Conclusion
Assessing, Perceiving and Insuring Credit Risk
9.1 Introduction
It was noted in Chapter 2 that the major omissions in the literature lie not within
the selected strands of financial economics but between them. The aim of this
thesis, then, has been to make some advancement at a number of points of
interface of these disciplines (particularly the risk assessment, credit insurance and
credit rationing literatures) as well as making a number of contributions within
existing literatures (notably the perceived risk sovereign debt literature, and the
MPPI literature). Core themes of the thesis, as indicated by the title, have
included the assessment, perception and insurance of credit risk, concepts which
straddle at least four substantial literatures (objective risk analysis, perceived risk
analysis, credit rationing, credit insurance). From the outset, it was considered
unfeasible (if not undesirable) to attempt a single unifying thesis that synthesised
all these elements. Instead, a series of partial models (both theoretical and
empirical) have been developed to analyse particular points of connection. The
aims of this final chapter are: (1) to summarise the results of these models and
their contribution to the literature(s); (2) to highlight any obvious connections that
exist between the different models and concepts so-far explored; and (3) to point
to possible areas of further research.
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9.2 Results and Contributions of the Thesis
I summarise below the main themes and findings of the thesis and attempt to
highlight the most significant contributions to the literature(s).
9.2. 1 Risk Assessment and Perceived Risk
The first research question explored was how movements in credit market risk
feed through to changes in risk assessment efforts and risk premia. This was
investigated theoretically in chapter 3 on the basis that lenders use risk assessment
in an attempt to set interest rates at a level that will maximise revenue, but also
one that will not exceed the maximum rate the borrower is willing to pay. This
'maximum rate' (referred to as the 'threshold' interest rate in Chapter 3) is
indirectly affected by the riskiness of the borrower's intended project because a
known positive relationship between risk and return is assumed. Thus, in setting
interest rates, lenders attempt to estimate the borrower's threshold interest rate by
using risk assessment to estimate the borrower's risk. The borrower is then
offered a rate less than or equal to the bank's estimate of this threshold.
Assuming that the lender knows the risk distribution of loan applicants, or at least
has some perception of it (based, for example, on previous risk assessments), the
lender's maximum profits will be driven inter alia by the expected number of loan
applicants, itself the product of the probability, Pi, of charging risk type i an
acceptable interest rate (i.e. one that is less than or equal to i's threshold rate), and
N;, the number of applicants in risk category i. Risk assessment is crucial in the
calculation because it determines the probability of charging an appropriate
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interest rate (assuming that the greater the risk assessment, the smaller the
variance and bias associated with the lender's risk assessment errors). The
optimal level of risk assessment is also affected by the numbers of borrowers in
each risk category since it is these numbers which determine how much of an
effect reduced risk assessment errors have on bank revenue. Surprisingly, rises in
the level of risk assessment do not necessarily feed through to rises in Pi. This is
because, if the error-bias in risk assessment falls rapidly relative to the fall in
error-variance as risk assessment increases, then it is possible (for normally
distributed errors, for example) that Pi actually falls. This leads to the conclusion
that optimal risk assessment may actually fall as market risk rises (i.e. as number
of borrowers in high risk categories increase relative to numbers in low risk
categories, it may be optimal for lenders to actually reduce risk assessment).
It should be noted that an implicit assumption of the model, that borrowers do not
go elsewhere for a loan, can be interpreted as assuming that the lender is a
monopoly. However, this assumption is not as restrictive as it might first appear,
since the model could be extended to represent a competitive market by
introducing a probability that for a given r <= r"#, borrowers find an offer from
elsewhere and reject the loan offer. The relationship between rand r"# would
nevertheless be positive, and the implication would remain that risk assessment
may either rise or fall as market risk deteriorates. The model could also be
modified to represent existing long-term loans with fluctuating r, where the lender
is estimating the r to charge without exceeding the threshold at which the
borrower defaults, again producing the same result of fluctuating risk assessment.
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Interestingly, it was found that if risk assessment changes over time, then it is
possible that the lender's perception of the creditworthiness of a particular
borrower may fluctuate, even if the actual default risk of that borrower remains
constant. Because it is not possible to observe actual risk directly, the hypothesis
that the relationship between perceived and actual fluctuates over time, could not
be tested directly. However, the hypothesis could be tested indirectly by assuming
that the relationship between actual risk and its determinants remained constant.
The corollary of this assumption is that any movements in the relationship
between perceived risk and the estimated weights would suggest that the
connection between perceived and actual risk may be fluid. The results of chapter
4 confirm that this is indeed the case for the sovereign debt market, with
substantial and multiple structural breaks over time in the coefficients of
perceived risk regressions. This is a significant contribution to the existing
literature which has almost unanimously assumed constant parameters in
perceived risk models. The results therefore strongly suggest that Thapa and
Mehta's (1991) finding that there was no structural breaks between two time
periods was nothing more than an anomaly and that the usual practice of pooling
data across years is not appropriate when analysing the sovereign debt market.
The results also have important implications for debtor nations trying to optimise
their creditworthiness and minimise risk premiums since it is clear that the goal
posts are not fixed when it comes to setting risk premia in sovereign debt markets.
The results also have implications for lenders in that it highlights their own
capriciousness in assessing risk and the likelihood that good risks have been
inappropriately rationed/charged high interest rates and vice versa for bad risks.
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Perceived risk is also important because it affects foreign direct investment
decisions, since published ratings reflecting lender perceptions are used to gauge
the background risk of investment in projects located in a country. That such
ratings may have a fluid and even tenuous relationship to actual risk has
implications, therefore, not only for sovereign debt markets, but for a country's
ability to attract institutional investment generally.
9.2.2 Credit Rationing
Endogenising the rate of interest, in the theoretical model developed in chapter 3,
would have allowed for the possibility of credit rationing. The impact of r on
default riski was, in the event, excluded from the model for the sake of simplicity.
However, there is no reason to expect the endogenisation of r to alter the result
that risk assessment (and hence perceived risk) changes over time. Although the
inclusion of credit rationing would not have affected the perceived risk results, its
existence does have profound implications for empirical estimation because it
affects the choice of dependent variable. For if interest rates do not simply reflect
perceived risk, but actually determine it, then LIBOR spreads cannot be used as
measures of risk perception, as has become common practice in the literature. It
was noted in chapter 4 that high-risk borrowers may, in principle, be offered a
similar rate of interest to lower risks, but in practice, be credit-rationed. This led
to the conclusion that, only by directly soliciting from lenders the credit ratings
they ascribe to particular borrowers, can a reliable measure of perceived risk be
compiled. And this was the very approach used to compute the Institutional
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Investor country risk ratings, the measure chosen III chapter 4 to represent
perceived risk.
Although the model in chapter 3 was not extended to include credit rationing, the
phenomenon was studied in detail in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In the model developed
in chapter 5, it was shown that credit rationing can arise because of its adverse
selection effects of raising interest rates in a market for new loans (rather than the
moral hazard effects - i.e. raising the rate of interest increases the probability of
default of existing borrowers). ii The use of adverse selection to explain credit
rationing was first put forward by S&W, and it is their model which forms the
basis of the first proposition of chapter 5.
In essence, the ASCRE (Adverse Selection induced Credit Rationing Equilibrium)
result put forward by S&W arises from the assumption that there exists a positive
relationship between risk and return (the riskier the project, the higher the return if
successful) and the assumption that lenders cannot distinguish between the risks
of new loan applicants. Thus, if interest rates are raised, good risks are screened
out of the market. Even if their intended project is successful, the return will not
be sufficient to repay the loan capital plus the rate of interest. The screening out
of good risks may make lenders think twice about raising the rate of interest when
there is excess demand for credit, and hence the possibility of ASCRE.
9.2.3 Worst of the Good and the Best of the Bad
In S&W's model, however, there is no possibility for lenders to assess risk, and
so, one of the aims of chapters 5 and 6, was to bridge the gap between the credit
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rationing literature and the risk assessment literature by exploring the possible
implications of introducing risk assessment into a credit rationing model. It was
assumed that by assessing risk, lenders can distinguish between a discrete number
of risk groups amongst borrowers. The greater the risk assessment effort, the
greater the number of identifiable groups. It was shown (eet. par.) that
classificatory risk assessment of this type can produce favourable selection where
there is still more than one risk type in each identifiable category. The existence
of multiple interest rates, rather than a single pooled rate, will result in some
borrowers being priced out the market who were previously willing to borrow (on
the basis that the return on investment for good risks would not be sufficient to
cover the loan capital plus interest), and others being priced 'into' the market, who
previously considered borrowing to be too expensive. However, the displacement
would not be 'like for like', for the borrowers gained would have a lower
probability of default than the borrowers lost. This is because each category of
risk identifiable by the lender will still contain more than one risk type (unless the
lender is perfectly informed), and so the differentiated interest rates would
continue to be 'pooled' prices, but pooled across a less diverse set of risks.
Assume, for example, that risk assessment allows the lender to classify borrowers
into two groups: a high risk band and a low risk band, with two corresponding
interest rates. Assuming there are still many risk types within each of the two
identifiable bands, some of the borrowers whose threshold interest rate was below
the single pooled interest rate will now be at the upper end of the low risk band,
and find that the rate of interest they are offered is below their threshold rate. In
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contrast, some of those borrowers whose threshold interest rate was previously
above the single pooled rate (and so willing to accept the loan offer) will now fall
into the lower end of the high risk band and so be screened out by the new interest
rate. However, the borrowers falling into the lower end of the high risk band (and
now priced out of the market) are more risky than those falling into the upper end
of the low risk band (priced into the market by differentiated interest rates).
Favourable selection occurs because the worst of the good are better than the best
of the bad. This is an important result in that it adds to the known advantages of
risk pricing in that it suggests that lenders will only gain revenue from extracting
more surplus from higher risks, but risk pricing favourably influences the actual
selection of risks. This is something which has been overlooked in the existing
literature, which is perhaps surprising given the equity implications of risk
pricing: those who are able to afford the most pay the least for a given level of
credit.
The remainder of chapter 5 demonstrated that there will be a limit to the level of
risk assessment, simply because, once risk assessment has categorised each
borrower to the extent that each identifiable risk band contains only one risk type,
then lenders will gain nothing from additional investment in risk assessment. One
property of operating at the maximum worthwhile level of risk assessment
(termed 'near perfect' information in chapter 5) is that there will be no scope for
ASCRE because every risk type would effectively be treated as a separate market,
each market having homogenous-risk applicants, and an interest rate determined
through the traditional demand and supply. Although a fairly intuitive result, it is
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an important one because it initiates an exploration of the implications of risk
assessment for credit rationing, which again has been overlooked in the literature.
9.2.4 Credit Insurance
Although the moral hazards of deposit insurance have been discussed at length in
the literature, the perverse incentive implications of credit insurance have been all
but overlooked. Certainly, no previous study to the author's knowledge has
considered the implications of insurance for credit rationing, or for risk
assessment. It is these three elements (credit insurance, credit rationing and risk
assessment) which chapters 6 and 7 attempted to connect. A number of possible
links were made, including the impact of insurance on the lender's motivation to
assess risk. If the lender is fully insured against default on all its loans, and
insurance premiums are flat rate, then there is less incentive to lend to low risks.
Hence, monitoring becomes less worthwhile (this was termed the 'mild' moral
hazards of credit insurance). Rather more insidious is the possibility that
insurance reduces the utility losses to the lender from lending at higher interest
rates, and so results in a higher interest rate and the screening out of good risks
(referred to as the 'acute' moral hazards of credit insurance).
Interestingly, if it is borrowers who pay the insurance premium (as in Mortgage
Payment Protection Insurance) and the insurance is compulsory for all borrowers
(as has been recommended by a number of commentators for the mortgage
market) then raising premiums to clear the market effectively results in a rise in
the cost of borrowing, and the screening out of good risks from the mortgage
market (in the same way as raising the rate of interest screens out good risks). If
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insurance is voluntary, and it is again borrowers who pay, then adverse selection
amongst the pool of insurees (but not borrowers) may result, with only the riskiest
borrowers finding it worthwhile to take out Insurance. This results in the
possibility of equilibrium insurance rationing in a form that is analogous to
ASCRE.
These are significant results in that they indicate the implications of credit
insurance for risk assessment and credit rationing decisions and so qualify many
of the existing theoretical results in the literature which have tended to overlook
the existence and influence of credit insurance even though it is prevalent in many
credit markets.
9.2.5 CICRE: Insurance Causes Credit Rationing
Suppose lenders pay the premiums on the loan insurance, and the terms of the
loan insurance are in some way contingent upon the terms of the loan contract.
Thus, credit rationing (termed CICRE - Contingent Insurance induced Credit
Rationing Equilbria) can result, even iflenders are 'near perfectly informed' about
borrowers (i.e. can charge a different interest rate to each risk type). This is
because the threat of future increases in the premium, or the tying of premiums
based to interest rates, may discourage lenders from raising or pooling interest
rates in a way that results in higher premiums.
A particularly significant result was that loan insurance was found to weaken the
S&W credit rationing result (whether it is lenders or borrowers who pay the
premiums) because flat rate loan insurance reduces the utility loss of lending to
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bad risks, diluting the adverse selection effects associated with raising interest
rates to clear the market. Thus, when coverage is 100%, there is no utility loss
from lending to bad risks, and so no disincentive to raising interest rates in the
event of excess demand. In this situation, ASCRE is not feasible irrespective of
the level of information asymmetry between banks and borrowers. It was also
shown how insurance rationing could be a feasible equilibrium outcome when it is
borrowers who pay, since raising premiums to clear the market increases the costs
of borrowing, having a similar adverse selection effect as raising interest rates.
9.2.6 Take-up of Flat Rate Credit Insurance: Borrower Perceptions
Chapter 8 considered how perceptions of risk are not only important In
determining the behaviour of lenders and insurers, but also in determining the
behaviour of borrowers since they too face uncertainty. A theoretical model of the
take-up of credit insurance was developed where the borrower pays the premium.
For the purposes of empirical investigation, the chapter focussed on a particular
market for loan insurance, namely Mortgage Payment Protection Insurance
(MPPI) market in the UK. The model was estimated using cross-sectional data on
mortgagors in Glasgow and Bristol relating largely to homeowners who took out
mortgages before the October 1995 reforms of ISMI, the state safety net for
mortgage borrowers. One of the aims of the analysis was to examine the role of
auto-perception and identify the extent to which rational economic incentives
drove the decision to take out insurance, compared with the impact of other
factors (such as the timing of the purchase decision in relation to ISMI changes;
marketing differences between regions and borrower types; and ignorance of the
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ISMI changes). Supply was modeled by assuming all mortgagors which meet the
usual criteria stipulated in MPPI policies (see Ford and Kempson op cit.) will be
entitled to full protection for one year. Underlying assumptions included: the
independence of access to credit markets and interest rates from MPPI; the
assumption that insurers do not assess risk themselves. Both of these assumptions
reflect the state of the mortgage insurance market over the designated period, and
were confirmed in conversations with senior representatives of Consolidated
Financial Insurers (the largest supplier of MPPI in the UK) and of the Council of
Mortgage Lenders.
It was found that the expected utility gain variable, p, as constructed from the
theoretical model, was the only statistically significant explanatory variable in the
regressions. Given the reasonable explanatory power of this variable, it would
appear that, despite the considerable uncertainty and ignorance surrounding ISMI
and MPPI, borrowers were generally making economically rational choices.
The chapter also aimed to estimate the responsiveness of the take-up decision to a
number of the key variables which make up p, including the expected probability
of zero employment income, insurance premiums, ISMI cover, MPPI cover and IS
entitlement. It was found that probability of take-up rises by less than 0.0 1 per
cent following a 10 per cent fall in ISMI cover - suggesting that the sluggish
response to the ISMI cuts could have been anticipated. This is an important result
because it undermines one of the key motivations for the 1995 government
reforms, namely the alleviation of the claimed crowding out of private mortgage
protection insurance. Conversely, the inelasticity of MPPI take-up to ISMI cover
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implies that significant reinstatement of the safety net for mortgage borrowers
could be achieved without any deleterious effect on MPPI take-up. Comparison
of regressions run under various assumptions about mortgagor knowledge of ISMI
changes, revealed that there was no conclusive evidence that the model would
have been better specified assuming ignorance of the changes. Interestingly, it
was found that the take-up of MPPI was not particularly sensitive to the borrower
perception of hislher own risk, which suggests that fluctuations in market risk do
not have much impact on the take-up of credit insurance.
These results were particularly significant given that they constitute the output of
the first systematic investigation into these issues in the UK MPPI market. The
theory and methodology developed here has already pathed the way for more
empirical work to be done in this field (Pryce and Keoghan, 1999,2001).
9.3 Connections between the Models
Each of the models summarised above were developed as fairly distinct entities,
each developed to investigate particular connections between aspects of the
perception, insurance and assessment of credit risk, which either were within
existing literatures, or were straddled between them. This seemed to be the most
appropriate way of tackling the issues of interest since a general equilibrium
theory, if at all achievable, would become so cumbersome as to defy the raison
d 'eire of modeling-i.e. to simplify reality with a view to enhancing our
understanding of particular processes and relations. However, it is possible that a
general model, if desirable, could be developed, perhaps at the expense of some of
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the detailed insights of the more disaggregated approach presented here. As such,
the diagram depicted in Figure 9-1 may constitute the first step in developing a
more general model of these related topics. However, the main function of the
diagram for the purposes of this chapter, is as a means of summarising the content
of the thesis, presenting an at-a-glance overview of the conceptual connections
examined.
The various text boxes represent particular concepts that have been pursued to
varying degrees in the existing literature. The arrows between them denote the
connections studied in the thesis. Their location in the text, and rationale, are
summarized in the accompanying notes, indexed by the numerical references
attached to the connecting arrows. Where chapter references are not listed, the
arrows refer to connections that are either implicitly assumed, or not studied in
depth by the thesis. It should be noted that this is not intended to be a causal or
general equilibrium diagram but simply an inventory of what has been examined
although, as suggested in the previous paragraph, it may provide useful pointers
for future development of such a model. As a guide to which connections are
most important/explored in most depth in the thesis, it may be of help to know that
it is my view that the most significant contributions of the thesis have been to
explore the connections between changes in market risk, risk assessment and
perceived risk (arrows 1 and 2); between risk assessment, credit insurance and
credit rationing and (arrows 4, 5, 7, 10 and 6); and between perceived risk and
insurance take-up (arrow 12).
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It will be noted that there are a number of important omissions from the diagram,
and hence from the models developed in the thesis, such as the endogeneity of
collateral, which Bester (1987) has shown to be significant in affecting credit
rationing. It seems appropriate, therefore, to now consider some pointers for
future research.
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Notes on Conceptual Connections Dia~ram;
4
Changes in market risk levels affect the optimal level of risk assessment (chapters 3 and
4).
Movements in the optimal level of risk assessment effort cause movements in perceived
risk, even if actual risk is constant (chapters 3 and 4).
The measurement of perceived risk is profoundly affected by the existence of ASCRE
(Adverse Selection induced Credit Rationing Equilibrium) since interest rates may not
fully respond to changes in perceived creditworthiness (chapters 4 and 5).
If the model in chapter 3 were to be modified to represent existing loans with variable
interest rates, credit rationing could still result due to the moral hazard implications of
raising the rate of interest.
Classificatory risk assessment can produce favourable selection (chapter 5).
Where risk assessment effort is sufficient to classify each risk type into an identifiable
risk category, the adverse selection effects of raising the rate of interest are eliminated
because every risk type is effectively treated as a separate market, each market having
borrowers with homogenous risk and an interest rate determined through the traditional
interaction of demand and supply. Thus, ASCRE is precluded (chapter 5).
Loan insurance can produce two types of moral hazard for lenders: (i) insurance makes
monitoring less attractive (= 'mild moral hazard'); (ii) insurance reduces the utility loss
from lending to high risks (= 'acute moral hazard'). (Chapters 6 and 7).
The acute moral hazards arising from credit insurance can result in adverse selection of
borrowers.
Loan insurance has a number of implications for credit rationing, depending on the nature
of the insurance regime: (i) flat rate 100% cover precludes ASCRE; but (ii) contingent
insurance terms, where the lender pays the premium, introduces a new source of credit
rationing - CICRE (Contingent Insurance induced Credit Rationing Equilibrium) where
lenders may be reluctant to raise the rate of interest when there is excess demand, not
because of adverse selection, but because of the implications for insurance premiums
(chapters 6 and 7).
Insurance rationing may result if it is borrowers who pay the premiums. Raising the
premium to clear the market may cause adverse selection in the insurance market
(chapters 6 and 7) and hence equilibrium insurance rationing.
In most credit insurance markets, insurance is not a requirement for access to credit, and
so is in not usually compulsory, This means that the demand for loan insurance is itself
endogenous, and so the impact of the results listed above (most notably the impact of
credit insurance on credit rationing and on the risk assessment effort of lenders) will be
contingent upon the extent of~ (chapter 8).
Take-up will be driven, inter alia, by the borrower's perception of his own risks.
Insurance will be taken out if the perceived probability of adverse events and costs
incurred in occurrence of such events are sufficiently large, and if the premium is
sufficiently low. The borrower is assumed to base his estimation of risk on the incidence
of adverse events amongst other borrowers with similar characteristics (chapter 8).
A priori, one would expect changes in labour market risk to affect the take-up of MPPI so
that, cet. par., take-up rises during recessions and falls during booms. However,
empirical estimation showed that take-up was relatively insensitive to changes in risk of
unemployment/ill health (chapter 8).
6
10
II
12
13
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9.4 Possibilities For Further Research
In the introductory chapter, I attempted to highlight the areas of neglect in
interdisciplinary credit market research. It was noted, however, that to point out
the unresearched links between the different fields presupposes knowledge of
what these connections might be. Hence, an epistemological problem emerges:
delineation of our ignorance of an area is constrained by our ignorance of where
the boundary between potential knowledge and the unknowable actually lies.
Ignorance about the boundaries of knowledge curtails the knowledge of ignorance
and precludes an exhaustive list of under-researched connections between our four
fields of interest. So the attempt that follows to highlight areas for future research
suffers the same limitation as the attempts in chapters 1 and 2 to highlight the
main gaps in the various disciplines. It is inevitably an incomplete list, arising out
of questions and ideas that occurred to the author whilst investigating each subject
field.
The first suggestion for future research is the development of duration models for
rescheduling of sovereign loans. Most of the literature attempting to estimate
actual risk employs logit or probit techniques, and little work has been done to
develop survival models in this field. Such models would allow the researcher to
calculate hazard rates for the various loan maturities on country debt. Second, it
may be possible to apply time-varying, fixed-effects, panel-estimation techniques
to perceived risk analysis, with a view to capturing the dynamic behaviour of
signal weights over time. This could perhaps include the development of a
simultaneous equation model which explores, for example, the endogeneity of
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democracy and growth as determinants of perceived risk. A similar application
could be made to the analysis of actual risk, although, to the author's knowledge,
a time-varying coefficient panel model has yet to be developed for dichotomous
dependent variable analysis.
On the theoretical front, much is still to be done in integrating credit insurance and
risk assessment into models of credit rationing. For example, the models
presented in this thesis assume exogenous collateral, but it has been shown by
Bester (op cit.) that endogenous collateral has profound implications for the credit
rationing results. There is also considerable scope within these fields to apply
existing results to previously separate areas of research. One possibility, for
example, would be to explore the credit rationing implications of the recent
proposals put forward by the UK government to introduce tax
concessions/subsidies to brownfield development (i.e. former industrial sites) to
boost housing supply and discourage building on greenfield. If there are greater
risks of contamination on the brownfield sites, then the introduction of the
government subsidy would induce a positive relationship between risk and return,
and so ASCRE could become a possibility. The impact of contamination
insurance could then be explored in this context applying the results developed in
chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.
Fourth, as already hinted at earlier, the heteroscedastic risk assessment model
could be extended to include credit rationing by encompassing the effect of a
change in interest on the probability of default of existing loans. Lenders would
then assess the threshold interest at which the borrower defaults. The model
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would show explicitly that LIBOR spread is stifled for those countries thought to
be approaching their threshold.
Fifth, the heteroscedastic assessment errors model could have both housing
market and labour market applications. House buyers, for example, spend time
and energy building up knowledge of the market in order to offer a price for a
dwelling that minimizes the seller's surplus, but which does not fall below the
seller's threshold price or the expected value of competing offers. Greater search
effort reduces the variance of assessment errors and also the bias. However, if
both the bias and variance fall, with increased search effort the probability of the
offer being accepted does not necessarily fall.
Employers deciding on the level of wage offers may face similar dilemmas, as
might job applicants in deciding on wage requests. In fact, the theory is generally
applicable to any sealed bid auction where bidders expend effort gathering market
information in order to decide on the price that will minimize seller surplus, but
also want to take into account the chances of being out-bid by other bidders (i.e.
they gather information on the likely prices other bidders will offer). It could also
be applied to any situation where sellers set a minimum price and buyers either
accept or reject that price; in this case, sellers may search for information about
the likely reservation prices of buyers. In all these cases, the common result
would be that greater information search effort, if it reduces both the variance and
bias of assessment errors, will not necessarily increase the probability of offering
the optimum price.
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Seventh, it would be interesting to examine the effects of credit insurance on work
incentives, particularly in the context of MPPI. In the UK, for example, the
borrower receives no state help with interest payments for the first nine months
following a zero income event. Consequently, any job offer than pays more than
Unemployment Benefit plus travel costs will be accepted by the borrower since
(unless he/she has savings), refusal to accept the job leaves his house at risk of
repossession (a large negative utility for most individuals). If the borrower has
MPPI, however, then hislher house is not at risk for twelve months at least (even
after the twelve months of MPPI cover he/she will be eligible for ISMI). He/she
thus has the option to turn down job offers below hislher expected wage. The
longer he/she waits, the more chance that a higher paid job will be offered
(incurring an upward effect on the cumulative probability of being offered a
higher wage). This may be offset by the depreciation of human capital whilst
unemployed (incurring a downward effect on the cumulative probability). The
combination of the two effects would result in a shallow upward cumulative
probability function of being offered a job with higher wage.
Option pricing techniques could be used to place a value on the 'option' that
MPPI policy have to reject initial job offers and it would be interesting to see how
the 'option price' varies for different employment categories. It may be further
possible to examine whether this explains the high premiums associated with
MPPI and why relatively low risks are applying (if the wage offers have a far
greater variance for the well-educated, for example, the option will be of greater
value to them). The hypothesis could also be tested by examining wage rates of
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first jobs following insurance (controlling for educational/previous employment
characteristics) and by considering whether the higher wage rates of MPPI
claimants remain greater, or whether wage rates converge over time as the
uninsured take first job, then find a new job after six months or so. It would also
be interesting to test whether uninsured mortgagors change jobs more frequently
following such an event.
9.5 Summary
This chapter has summarised the main findings of the thesis which has attempted
to examine three financial concepts----the assessment, perception and insurance of
credit risk--making contributions both within these areas, and at specific points of
interface between them. No attempt has been made to develop a single unifying
thesis. Rather, a series of partial models are developed, both theoretical and
empirical, that develop and connect particular facets of financial economics.
The main contributions of the thesis are as follows: the development of a rationale
for the fluctuation of perceived risk over time; a new explanation for equilibrium
credit rationing; and the first analytical model of MPPI (mortgage payment
protection insurance). Empirical investigations yielded: the first systematic test
results for structural breaks in perceived risk coefficients in the sovereign debt
market; and the first price, risk, and welfare elasticities of the take-up of MPPI.
Suggestions for further research included: applying the heteroscedastic risk
assessment errors model to other fields; the employment of time-varying
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parameter and survival estimation techniques to the analysis of perceived and
actual default risk, respectively; an analysis of mortgage insurance for work
incentives. If nothing else, the thesis has shown that there is no shortage of
interesting work to be done both within and at the interface of the respective
subject fields and that developments that arise from such research have a good
chance of finding application in other economic disciplines.
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Notes:
i the interest rate then becomes endogenous because it becomes influenced by the lender's desire to
avoid raising the risks of default.
ii although S&W show how their model can be interpreted in terms of moral hazard.
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